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Abstract 
A countercyclical fiscal policy combined with sustainable fiscal finances is 
considered to be one of the most important objectives in modern economic policy.  
However, procyclical fiscal policy is widely observed in practice, especially in 
emerging market countries.  The main purposes of this thesis are to examine the 
determinants of fiscal procyclicality and sustainability with special reference to the 
role of fiscal rules, and to assess the impact of both fiscal procyclicality and 
sustainability on economic growth.  This thesis deals with several new issues on 
fiscal procyclicality and sustainability which have been ignored in the existing 
literature.  We explore the role of the time coverage of fiscal rules in determining 
fiscal procyclicality and assess the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth 
across spending categories and country groups.  We also attempt to answer the 
determinants of fiscal sustainability and the effect of fiscal sustainability on 
economic growth for the first time.    
Our empirical analyses yield a number of novel and interesting findings.  First, 
we find that government consumption and investment appear to be procyclical while 
current transfers appear to be countercyclical in a large number of OECD countries.  
Second, we find that most OECD countries seem to maintain sustainable fiscal 
finances and several factors such as the growth rate, the level of development, and 
aging populations could play a role in determining fiscal sustainability.  Third, we 
find that procyclical current expenditure, especially government consumption and 
current transfers, could have a negative effect on economic growth, and this negative 
effect is prominent in emerging market countries.  We also find that fiscal 
sustainability does not seem to play any role in economic growth in tranquil times.  
Finally, we find that the introduction of fiscal rules not only help achieve both 
countercyclical and sustainable fiscal policy, but also boost economic growth 
indirectly by stimulating countercyclical fiscal policy.  Multi-year fiscal rules 
contribute more toward mitigating the level of fiscal procyclicality than annual fiscal 
rules, and fiscal rules with enforceability, such as the Stability and Growth Pact 
rules, appear to help maintain sustainable fiscal finances.   
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The current economic crisis has been the most severe and widespread since the 
Great Depression in the 1930s (Fernández-Arias and Montiel, 2011).  The world 
economy has been suffering from financial difficulties and a series of economic 
downturn since the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 (Fincke and Greiner, 2012).  
Most countries conducted substantial fiscal stimulus packages from 2008 to 20101 in 
response to the global financial crisis, but they were accompanied by the expense of 
the deterioration of fiscal sustainability (Escario, Gadea, and Sabaté, 2012; Misra 
and Khundrakpam, 2010; Padoan, 2009).  In turn, the concern over default of Greece 
has spread widely and has contributed to a further global economic downturn since 
autumn 2011.   
As a consequence, there has been revived interest in fiscal policy issues.  A 
countercyclical fiscal policy has been highlighted again as an effective economic 
policy tool to overcome economic crisis in recent literature (Wren-Lewis, 2011; 
Feldstein, 2009; Auerbach, 2009).  However, the risk of deteriorating fiscal 
sustainability arising from countercyclical fiscal policy has also been recognized by 
policymakers and economists (Freedman, Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, and Mursula, 
2009).  Furthermore, it is not easy to recover sustainable fiscal finances once the 
budget deficit and government debt start to increase due to the inertial properties of 
fiscal policy.  This is why the international credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor's, consider fiscal situation to be one of the crucial factors for 
the credit rating of each country in practice. 
The objective of economic policy tends to vary at different needs over time 
(Atkinson, Baker, and Milward, 1996) 2.  It has been argued that there are three main 
functions of fiscal policy in modern economies: first, efficient resource allocation 
through the provision of public goods, second, the redistribution of income and 
wealth for fair state of distribution, and finally, a macroeconomic stabilization 
function for high employment, price stability, and sustained economic growth 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989).  To achieve these goals of fiscal policy, fiscal 
authorities should maintain sustainable fiscal finances because they could enable 
                                                 
1. The size of effect of fiscal stimulus packages on budget balance for the period 2008-2010 in OECD 
countries is -3.3% on average (Padoan, 2009). 
2. It has been agreed that the ultimate objective of economic policy is the promotion of social welfare 
(Grant and Nath, 1984), but the specific shape of social welfare can take a variety of different forms. 
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governments to undertake the main functions by providing sufficient resources 
(Berenguer-Rico and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2011; McLaren, Armstrong, and Harris, 
2010).  Therefore, both to conduct a cyclical stabilization over a business cycle in the 
short term and to maintain fiscal sustainability in the long term could be considered 
to be the most important objectives for fiscal policymakers to aim towards (Wyplosz, 
2005)3.  However, it is not easy to obtain macroeconomic stability and sustainable 
fiscal finances respectively, as well as both macroeconomic stability and sustainable 
fiscal finances simultaneously (Huart, 2011; Coeure and Pisani-Ferry. 2005).   
As a result, the issues of fiscal cyclicality and sustainability have been widely 
explored.  However, the existing literature has mainly dealt with the determinant of 
fiscal procyclicality and the measurement of fiscal sustainability.  The issues on the 
determinant of fiscal sustainability and the effect of both fiscal procyclicality and 
sustainability on economic growth have generally been ignored.    
This thesis attempts to fill this gap by dealing with several new issues on both 
the procyclicality and sustainability of fiscal policy which the existing literature has 
omitted.  The main contributions of this thesis are that our analyses not only comfirm 
the results of recent literature on fiscal cyclicality that the fiscal policy of advanced 
countries have also been procyclical at times and procyclical fiscal policy could 
hinder economic growth, but also provide several novel and interesting implications.  
First, this thesis explores the role of fiscal rules in determining fiscal procyclicality, 
and assesses the effect of fiscal procyclicalty on economic growth across spending 
categories and country groups.  Fiscal rules have been considered to be efficient 
policy tools to improve fiscal sustainability, but they could also have an effect on the 
cyclical properties of fiscal policy by exerting various restrictions to budget 
operation.  The main contribution of these analyses is that we find a new important 
determinant of fiscal procyclicality by showing that fiscal rules could play a different 
role in determining fiscal procyclicality depending on their time coverage.  We show 
that multi-year fiscal rules could contribute more towards mitigating the level of 
fiscal procyclicality than annual fiscal rules.  This finding could provide implications 
                                                 
3. For example, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules target macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
sustainability as the main objectives (Buiter, 2004; Buiter and Grafe, 2004).   
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on the recent debate about the effect of Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules4, 
which is the form of annual fiscal rules, on fiscal procyclicality.  These new trials 
could also provide the rationale that governments should operate their fiscal policy in 
a countercyclical way for sustained economic growth, and some policy implications 
as to how each country should operate fiscal policy across spending categories and 
its level of development by showing that the effect of procyclical fiscal policy on 
economic growth is different depending on spending categories and country groups.  
Second, this thesis attempts to explore the determinants of fiscal sustainability and 
the effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth.  These issues have been 
ignored in the existing literature, but they are clearly of increasing concern following 
from the fiscal aspects of current economic crisis.  The main contribution of these 
analyses is that they could provide policy implications for governments in their effort 
to maintain sustainable fiscal finances by revealing the determinants of fiscal 
sustainability.  This analysis could also suggest implications on the structure of fiscal 
rules to improve fiscal sustainability that fiscal rules should be designed in a way 
that has enforceability.  Also, they provide the empirical evidence that unsustainable 
fiscal finances do not hinder economic growth in tranquil times even though it could 
lead to sudden economic crisis by endangering default of government debt. 
The main purposes of this thesis are to examine the determinants of fiscal 
procyclicality and sustainability with special reference to the role of fiscal rules, and 
to assess the effect of both fiscal procyclicality and sustainability on economic 
growth empirically.  This thesis deals with the issue of the macroeconomic 
stabilization function of fiscal policy, namely the cyclical properties of fiscal policy 
in chapter 2, the issue of the fiscal sustainability in chapter 3, and the effect of both 
fiscal procyclicality and sustainability on economic growth in chapter 4.  This thesis 
employs the same methods as the existing literature when we explore the 
determinants of fiscal procyclicality and the effect of fiscal procyclicality on 
economic growth.  This thesis borrows these approaches to explore the determinants 
of fiscal sustainability and the effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth. 
                                                 
4 . EU member countries must avoid excessive deficits (three percent of GDP for the general 
government deficit) and reduce their debt to GDP ratio to below 60 percent.  This rule was introduced 
by the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1992. 
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The thesis is organised as follows.  The second chapter considers the 
determinants of fiscal procyclicality.  We focus on the role of fiscal rules in 
determining the cyclical properties of fiscal policy.  Most of the existing literature 
shows that the fiscal policies of developed countries are countercyclical while those 
of developing countries are procyclical, and it mainly suggests weak political 
institutions or credit constraints as the reason for procyclical fiscal policy.  This 
chapter focuses on analysing the cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD 
countries by decomposing government spending into several categories (government 
consumption, interest payments, current transfers, and government investment), and 
examining the role of the time coverage of fiscal rules in determining fiscal 
procyclicality through both correlation and regression approaches.  We find that a 
large number of OECD countries seem to operate their fiscal policy in a procyclical 
way.  More specifically, government consumption and government investment of a 
large number of OECD countries appear to be procyclical in line with some recent 
literature5.  We also find that multi-year fiscal rules are more effective than annual 
fiscal rules to achieve a countercyclical fiscal policy.  This finding implies that the 
exisiting studies about the effect of the SGP rules on fiscal cyclicality could be 
misleading because they do not consider the fact that the effect of the SGP rules, 
which are annual rules, will be lessened if one excludes the effect of multi-year fiscal 
rules which each country adopted on their own initiative. 
The third chapter attempts to explore the determinants of fiscal sustainability.  
This chapter analyses the fiscal sustainability of OECD countries, identifies the main 
determinants of fiscal sustainability by conducting comprehensive survey on the 
existng theoretical and empirical literature, and examines the role of each factor in 
determining fiscal sustainability with special reference to fiscal rules.  We find that 
most OECD countries seem to maintain sustainable fiscal finances and that several 
factors such as the growth rate, the level of development, and aging populations 
could play a role in determining fiscal sustainability.  The growth rate has a positive 
effect on fiscal sustainability while aging populations have a negative effect.  The 
advanced countries are more likely to maintain sustainable fiscal finances.  We also 
find that the SGP rules appear to have helped policymakers maintain sustainable 
                                                 
 
5. The recent literature starts to suggest the possibility of procyclical fiscal policy in developed 
countries (Lane, 2003; Manasse, 2006; Mackiewicz, 2008; Ilzetzki, 2009; Huart, 2011).    
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fiscal finances in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries, although 
other fiscal rules do not seem to any role in maintaing fiscal sustainability in OECD 
countries due to lack of enforceability when they are violated.   
The fourth chapter explores the effect of both fiscal procyclicality and 
sustainability on economic growth.  The existing literature is starting to deal with the 
former but has ignored the latter.  This chapter focuses on analysing the effect of the 
cyclical properties of fiscal policy and fiscal sustainability on economic growth 
across spending categories and country groups.  We find that procyclical fiscal 
policy could have negative effect on economic growth, and this effect is prominent 
in emerging market countries than in advanced countries.  We also find that the 
composition of government spending plays a key role in its effects on economic 
growth.  More specifically, procyclical government consumption and current 
transfers, which are assumed to be unproductive, could have a negative effect on 
economic growth while procyclical government investment, which is considered to 
be productive, does not hinder economic growth.  On the other hand, we find that the 
sustainability of fiscal finances do not seem to play any role in economic growth in 
tranquil times even though it could lead to sudden economic crisis. 
Finally, this thesis presents a set of general conclusions, policy implications, 
and future research issues. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The role of fiscal rules in 
determining fiscal procyclicality 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is revival of interest on the use of countercyclical fiscal policy as a 
macroeconomic policy instrument following the economic recession which started in 
2007 (Wren-Lewis, 2011; Feldstein, 2009; Auerbach, 2009)6.  However, the same 
policy approach may not be applied to countries with different economic and social 
backgrounds and different budget systems.  It is seen to be difficult to operate 
countercyclical fiscal policy in practice for most countries: fiscal policymakers in 
developing countries especially seem to have more difficulties than those in 
developed countries.  The existing literature shows that the fiscal policies of 
developing countries appear to be more procyclical than those of advanced countries, 
and it mainly suggests the theoretical features, such as weak political institutions and 
the constraints to access international capital markets, as the main reason for this 
phenomenon.  In practice, however, there could be several other factors which cause 
this phenomenon such as weak fiscal institutions.   
This chapter focuses on the role of the time horizon of fiscal policy which 
comprises an important part of fiscal institutions.  We utilize the time coverage of 
fiscal rules as a proxy for the time horizon of fiscal policy.  Fiscal rules can be 
defined as a permanent restriction on fiscal policy and are given by the numerical 
targets on budget and debt over certain periods.  They have been introduced since the 
1970s as a guideline of fiscal policy and have become more common in recent years 
as budget deficits have increased and public debt has accumulated (IMF, 2009).  A 
large number of countries have adopted their own fiscal rules, and some countries 
have adopted supranational fiscal rules such as Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
Fiscal rules have originally been considered to be an efficient policy tool to 
strengthen fiscal sustainability.  However, fiscal rules could also play an important 
role in deciding fiscal stance because they give various restrictions to the budget 
operation.  The debate about alleviating the SGP rules which occurred in the mid-
                                                 
6. Feldstein (2009) argues that governments and economists start to consider fiscal policy to be useful 
countercyclical instrument.  Auerbach (2009) also argues that there has been a policy shift moving 
toward adopting countercyclical fiscal policy such as fiscal stimulus package.  On the other hand, 
Taylor (2009) argues that there is still no empirical evidence for efficiency of a countercyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy.   
9 
 
2000s is a good example that shows the importance of fiscal rules in determining the 
cyclical properties of fiscal policy.  
This chapter focuses on analysing the cyclical properties of fiscal policies in the 
OECD countries by decomposing government spending into several categories, such 
as consumption, interest payments, current transfers, and investment, and it shows 
that a large number of OECD countries appear to implement procyclical fiscal policy.  
More specifically, government consumption and government investment appear to 
be procyclical while current transfers appear to be countercyclical in a large number 
of OECD countries.  Also, this chapter combines the existing explanation, political 
constraints or credit constraints, with fiscal rules to explain the reason for fiscal 
procyclicality.  This chapter, especially, deals with the effect of introducing fiscal 
rules explicitly by analysing the effect of the time coverage of these rules for the first 
time, and it shows that multi-year fiscal rules contribute more towards mitigating the 
level of fiscal procyclicality than annual fiscal rules.  These findings provide some 
implications for governments to operate fiscal policy in a more countercyclical way 
by revealing the determinants of fiscal procyclicality more practically.  These 
findings also provide implications on the recent debate about the effect of the SGP 
rules on fiscal cyclicality by showing that the effect of the SGP rules will be lessened 
if one excludes the effect of national fiscal rules. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains 
theoretical issues on fiscal procyclicality and fiscal rules.  Section 3 provides 
empirical evidence about the cyclical properties of fiscal policies in OECD countries 
and the effect of the time coverage of fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality.  Finally, 
this chapter ends with some concluding remarks and policy implications to mitigate 
fiscal procyclicality. 
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2. The theoretical Issues on fiscal procyclicality and fiscal rules 
 
2.1.  The concept of fiscal procyclicality  
Following the pioneering work of Gavin and Perotti (1997) which shows that 
the fiscal policy of Latin American countries is procyclical7, a series of studies have 
analysed whether this phenomenon is applied to all developing countries.  There is a 
general consensus on the definition of fiscal procyclicality: fiscal policy is defined as 
procyclical if fiscal policy is expansionary in booms and contractionary in recessions 
(Manasse, 2006; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004).  This chapter follows the 
general notion of fiscal procyclicality in the existing literature.  Procyclical fiscal 
policy is assumed to be accompanied by an increase in government spending, the 
drop in tax rates, and the decrease in budget balance when the economy is in good 
times.   
At first, one should decide which fiscal variable, such as government spending, 
tax revenue8, and budget balance, can be utilized as a proxy for fiscal policy in the 
analysis of fiscal cyclicality.  There are some differences in the list of fiscal variables 
employed in the existing literature to estimate fiscal cyclicality.  Most studies utilize 
the government spending or government consumption as a proxy for fiscal policy 
(see, for example, Talvi and Végh, 2005; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; 
Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008; Woo, 2009; Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009; Ilzetzki, 
2011; Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin, 2011; Badinger, 2012), whereas some studies 
utilize the budget balance (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Manasse, 2006; Aghion and 
Marinescu, 2007; Mackiewicz, 2008; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; Çiçek 
                                                 
7. The authors analyse the covariation of fiscal outcomes with macroeconomic fluctuation using the 
data of 13 Latin American countries for the period 1968-1995, and they show that the fiscal policy of 
these countries is procyclical in bad times.   
8. We review tax revenue instead of tax rates even though tax rates are theoretically more suitable 
index to estimate fiscal cyclicality rather than tax revenue.  This is because every country has a large 
number of tax rates responding to the different tax base, so it is difficult to find out representative tax 
rates of each country.  Recently, Végh, and  Vuletin (2012) show that tax policy of emerging market 
countries tends to be procyclical by constructing dataset on tax rates for 62 countries, but it has 
several drawbacks on collecting data as they stated in their article. 
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and Elgin, 2011) or cyclically adjusted budget balance9  (Galí and Perotti, 2003; 
Marinheiro, 2007; Plessis and Boshoff, 2007; Alberola and Montero, 2007; Forni 
and Momigliano, 2007; Huart, 2011).  
It seems reasonable to utilize government spending as the basis of analysis, as is 
done in the most existing literature.  Tax revenue, which depends on both tax rates 
and the tax base, cannot be considered as an appropriate proxy for fiscal cyclicality 
because the tax base is positively associated with business cycle (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and Végh, 2004).  The budget balance can fully reflect the effect of fiscal 
policy on savings and demand, but it cannot reflect appropriately policymaker’s 
discretionary action (Mackiewicz, 2008).  In other words, tax revenue and the budget 
balance cannot be controlled by the government since they are endogenous to the 
business cycle due to the function of automatic stabilizers in budget systems (Ilzetzki 
and Végh, 2008; Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin, 2011; Badinger, 2012).  A cyclically 
adjusted budget balance could be a possible alternative of the proxy for fiscal policy 
in the sense that it excludes the cyclical component of the budget balance, but it 
could be different depending on the measurement methods about potential GDP 
(Mackiewicz, 2008) and could be systematically overestimated or underestimated 
(Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003).  Therefore, this 
chapter utilizes government spending as a proxy for fiscal policy considering the fact 
that it can be considered to be actual discretionary response of fiscal policy to 
business cycle in practice 10.   
 
2.2.  The main determinants of fiscal procyclicality  
One should also consider the main factors which could cause fiscal 
procyclicality.  Two main sets of factors have been proposed as determinants of 
fiscal procyclicality in the existing literature.  One is related to the borrowing 
constraints which arise from imperfection of capital markets (Gavin and Perotti, 
                                                 
9. The cyclically adjusted budget balance could show the current fiscal stance when the effects of the 
business cycle on government spending and tax revenues are removed (CBO, 2008).     
10. Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) argue that actual response of spending to business cycle is important to 
assess fiscal stance in practice regardless of whether it is the cyclical component or the discretionary 
component because the cyclical component is implicit.   
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1997; Riascoc and Végh, 2003; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004; Cuadra, 
Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010).  They argue that the lack of the ability to access to 
international capital market could make fiscal policy procyclical when the economy 
is in bad times, which is a common feature of emerging market countries.  This 
approach could explain the situation of developing countries persuasively, but it has 
been criticized in the sense that it cannot explain the reason why these countries do 
not prepare by accumulating reserves in booms (Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 
2008; Ilzetzki, 2011) and that it is not based on econometric evidence (Woo, 2009).   
Recent studies focus on the political economy constraints.  These are related to 
the political distortions such as political power dispersion, corruption, rent seeking 
behaviour, and social inequality.  Tornell and Lane (1999, pp.85-86) and Lane (2003, 
p.2665) suggest “the voracity effect” as the main reason for fiscal procyclicality.  
They argue that spending could grow more than the proportional increase in income 
if multiple power groups compete for fiscal revenues since the intensity of fiscal 
competition increases during booms.  Talvi and Végh (2005) argue that a budget 
surplus arouses pressure to increase expenditure in good times, and they show that 
procyclical fiscal policy could be optimal if the government has a huge fluctuation in 
the tax base, which is common in the developing countries since tax systems in these 
countries tend to be consumption rather than income based.  Alesina, Campante, and 
Tabellini (2008) show that corrupt governments could appropriate some part of tax 
revenue for political rents.  They assume that voters face corrupt governments, and 
therefore voters require more benefit from tax cuts or increases in spending when the 
economy is in good times, fearing that otherwise the government would appropriate 
more rents.  Ilzetzki (2011) suggests a political friction between incumbent and 
successive governments as the main reason for fiscal procyclicality.  The author 
argues that the incumbent government want to allocate more benefit its own 
constituency when available.  Woo (2009) shows that the social polarization of 
preferences over fiscal spending could make fiscal policy procyclical. 
To empirically examine the effect of these two main sets of factors, the existing 
studies include a variety of variables.  Several of these are introduced to assess the 
positive effect of borrowing constraints on fiscal procyclicality.  Trade openness, 
which is measured by the sum of exports and imports over GDP, is prevalently 
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utilized (Lane, 2003; Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Mackiewicz, 2008; Woo, 
2009)11.  Aghion and Marinescu (2007) also introduce financial development, and 
show a positive effect of the ratio of private credit to GDP.  Woo (2009) employs the 
volatility of capital flows, measured by the standard deviation of annual percentage 
change in capital flow.  The use of emergency credit from IMF (Gavin and Perotti, 
1997), credit ratings and the spread of sovereign debt over the US debt (Alesina, 
Campante, and Tabellini, 2008), the current account balance (Woo, 2009), and aid 
flow (Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009) are also introduced to assess the effect 
of credit constraints. 
The second set of factor is political constraints.  It has been extensively 
introduced to assess the positive effect of political distortions on fiscal procyclicality. 
Several studies (Lane, 2003; Mackiewicz, 2008; Woo, 2009) utilize a political power 
dispersion index12.  Corruption is an important variable which has been introduced in 
recent studies (Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; Mackiewicz, 2008; Çiçek 
and Elgin, 2011).  Polarization of preferences has been also introduced in recent 
studies.  The gini coefficient (Woo, 2009; Mackiewicz, 2008) and educational 
inequality (Woo, 2009), measured as standard deviation of schooling, have been 
utilized as proxies of polarization of preference. 
Other control variables are also introduced to find out the determinants of fiscal 
procyclicality.  The level of development 13  has been widely introduced in the 
existing literature.  GDP per capita (Lane, 2003; Mackiewicz, 2008; Çiçek and Elgin, 
2011), initial GDP per capita (Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; Woo, 2009), 
the age of democracy (Mackiewicz, 2008) are utilized as appropriate proxies.  
Output volatility has also been frequently introduced (Lane, 2003; Aghion and 
Marinescu, 2007; Woo, 2009; Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin, 2011), which is 
associated with tax base volatility in the model introduced in Talvi and Végh (2005).  
                                                 
11. Some studies argue that high trade openness makes fiscal policy less procyclical since it indicates 
high access to international capital (Woo, 2009), but others argue that high openness could make 
fiscal policy more procyclical since it leads to an increase in the cost of financing from international 
market, especially during recessions (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007).   
 
12. Lane (2003) shows a positive effect of the political power dispersion index on fiscal procyclicality, 
while Woo (2009) shows negative effect.   
 
13. Developed countries tend to have good institutions which can be seen from much literature 
concerned with economic growth theory.  Therefore, this variable can be associated with the quality 
of institutions.   
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The size of public sector is also included; Lane (2003) utilizes the ratio of public 
sector employment relative to total employment to capture the potential power of 
public sector workers in influencing fiscal policy, while Woo (2009) employs the 
ratio of government expenditure relative to GDP, and Aghion and Marinescu (2007) 
employ government share of GDP.  Fiscal space14 has also been introduced recently, 
where it is argued that high debt could affect government’s ability to respond to the 
business cycle.  Mackiewicz (2008) employs the stock of public debt and Lledó, 
Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009) employ the external debt to GDP ratio.  
Membership in the OECD (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004), EMU 
membership (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007), the adoption of an inflation targeting 
regime (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007), and terms of trade (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; 
Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009) are 
also introduced. 
 More recent studies focus on the role of the quality of institutions which comes 
from studies on the determinants of economic growth. They show that better 
institutions enable fiscal policy to be more countercyclical.  Manasse (2006) employs 
several institutional indices including government stability, bureaucracy quality, law 
and order, and democratic accountability.  Mackiewicz (2008) employs economic 
freedom, and Diallo (2009) employs the political rights and civil liberty indices to 
capture the degree of democratization.  Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin (2011) construct 
an institutional quality index including law and order, bureaucracy quality, 
corruption, and non-political, non-economic, and non-financial factors affecting 
investment risk.  Çiçek and Elgin (2011) show that the size of shadow economy, 
which is affected by institutional quality, such as the degree of tax enforcement, the 
level of law and order, and bureaucratic quality, is positively related to procyclical 
fiscal policy.  However, institutions are considered to be a difficult concept to 
define15 and there is no consensus on how to measure.  One could consider fiscal 
                                                 
14. Fiscal space is related to international credit constraints, and a greater fiscal space can help reduce 
fiscal procyclicality (Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009). 
 
15. North (1999, p.3) defines institutions as “the rules of game in society”.  The existing literature on 
growth theory generally considers institutions to be the level of property rights and the rules of law.   
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institutions16, such as budget system and fiscal transparency, instead of implicit 
concept of institutions when one explores fiscal procyclicality because fiscal 
performances appear to be affected by fiscal institutions which have not been dealt 
with the existing literature.   
There are several practical issues about fiscal institutions which might affect 
fiscal procyclicality.  First, fiscal transparency could reduce corruption and rent 
seeking behavior, and it in turn may help mitigate fiscal procyclicality.   
Second, one can think of the implementation time lags caused by the political 
procedure and institutional reason.  Spending adjustments to the business cycle takes 
considerable time since they need formal procedure, such as the approval of the 
assembly17.  Also, it might take time or cost to adjust spending items because a large 
number of spending items are non-flexible.  These characteristics make it more 
difficult for governments to operate countercyclical fiscal stimulus in both developed 
and developing countries.   
Third, the lack of forecasting ability could be one of the reasons behind fiscal 
procyclicality.  It is difficult for policymakers to predict the exact timing of the 
business cycle.  Policymakers determine fiscal policy under a veil of ignorance about 
the state of the economy in practice (Manasse, 2005), so they often decide 
expansionary fiscal policy after the economy starts to recover (Burger and Jimmy, 
2006).  This phenomenon is more common in developing countries because they 
have poor forecasting ability on economic situation.  Furthermore, the difference 
between ex-ante budget plan and ex-post outcomes could also lead to fiscal 
procyclicality.  Talvi and Végh (2005) argue that finance ministers of all countries 
tend to underestimate fiscal revenues to avoid political spending pressures.  A 
decrease in expenditure and an increase in revenues could make fiscal policy 
procyclical, especially in recessions (He, 2003).  On the other hand, Frankel (2011, 
                                                 
16. Fatás (2010) identifies transparency, the role of legislature, and the degree of centralization of the 
budget processes as an example of the budget processes and institutions.  The author suggests fiscal 
rules as a narrower set of institutions.   
17. Some studies differentiate legislative lag and implementation lag.  The former indicates the time 
lag between when it is proposed and when it is signed into law, and the latter indicates the time lag 
between when a new fiscal law is enacted and when it takes effect.  Mankiw (1997) calls these inside 
lag and outside lag, and the author explains that fiscal policy has long inside lag while monetary 
policy has long outside lag.    
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2011c) argues that official forecast of the budget balance and GDP growth tends to 
be optimistic by showing empirical evidence of 33 advanced and emerging market 
countries.  Therefore, fiscal stance could be changed from the initial budget plan, and 
it in turn can lead to procyclical fiscal policy.  Forni and Momigliano (2007) show 
that the fiscal policies of EU and OECD countries are more countercyclical when 
using budget plan data than when using real outcomes data.      
Fourth, the characteristics of government spending could affect the stance of 
fiscal policy.  The level of fiscal procyclicality could vary depending on spending 
categories (Ilzetzki, 2011; Lane, 2003).  Therefore, the composition of spending of 
each country could lead to a different level of fiscal procyclicality. Developed 
countries tend to have larger current transfers than developing countries, so they can 
mitigate the level of fiscal procyclicality through automatic stabilizers. 
Finally and more importantly, the time horizon of fiscal policy could be one of 
crucial determinants of fiscal procyclicality.  Most developing countries tend to 
operate fiscal policy from a short-term perspective.  The most common rule is the 
principle of expenditure in revenue, so fiscal policy cannot be utilized as a tool for 
macroeconomic management.  On the other hand, developed countries tend to target 
longer time horizons, for example, the medium-term goal of balanced budgets.  Most 
countries that operate fiscal policy from a long-term perspective have multi-year 
fiscal rules, so they can reduce the level of fiscal procyclicality.  The time horizon of 
fiscal policy can be specified by the time coverage of fiscal rules in a large number 
of countries18, and therefore this chapter utilizes the latter as a proxy for the former. 
 
2.3.  Theoretical issues on the role of fiscal rules  
The practical issues discussed in subsection 2.2 can be one of the factors which 
consist of fiscal institutions.  These factors cannot be a necessary condition for 
countercyclical fiscal policy.  Schick (2003) argues that a sound budget process 
cannot confirm sound fiscal performance, but an unsound budget process could be 
                                                 
18. Of the 185 IMF full fund membership countries in 2009, 80 of these are adopting fiscal rules, 
according to the IMF fiscal rules database. 
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one of the reasons for poor fiscal outcomes.  This is why international organisations, 
such as the IMF and the OECD, have made an effort of promoting a sound budget 
system to developing countries.   
This chapter focuses on the role of the time horizon of fiscal policy by assuming 
the behaviour of policymakers employing the political economics model.  We 
assume that policymakers will operate fiscal policy in a way that maximizes their 
utility arises from it.  They might attempt to maximize electoral support (Manasse, 
2005), weighted average of consumer’s welfare and political contributions 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994), or the size of the public sector and budget (Brennan 
and Buchanan, 1981; Niskanen, 1971; Brandt and Svendsen, 2006).   
In this chapter, we employ a framework where policymakers attempt to 
maximize the size of budget because allocating this budget provides them with 
power to affect the people and groups which obtain spending from the government, 
which is consistent with a bureaucratic model of the modern political economy.   
Brennan and Buchanan (1981, p.350) argue that bureaucrats are “the leviathan” 
which intends to maximize the size of public sector using the ignorance of voters, 
and Niskanen (1971) assumes bureaucrats as budget maximizers because they intend 
to maximize their personal utility such as salary and power.  Brandt and Svendsen 
(2006) extend Niskanen’s model by introducing lobbying cost, and they show that 
bureaucrats will expend budgets more than the optimal level, just like fishermen who 
can access sea without control. 
Bureaucrats maximize budget size since they can obtain additional benefit from 
it, and therefore public service tends to be supplied excessively.  In this context, the 
government’s utility function (U) is defined as equation (2.1) where Gt is 
government spending, and δ is discount factor.  
         = ∑ (  )
                                                                                    (2.1)   
Assume that the government implements fiscal policy from the short-term 
perspective.  The budget constraint is defined as equation (2.2) since the government 
can finance from either revenue or borrowing, where Rt is government revenue and 
Bt is the affordable budget deficit, in other words, the deficit ceiling which is 
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representative of fiscal rules.  If the government intends to keep a balanced budget, 
the constraint can be written as equation (2.3) which indicates that the government 
cannot borrow. 
         ≤   +                                                                                  (2.2)     
         ≤     ( = 0)                                                                              (2.3) 
The optimal decision of the government will be to spend all its revenue and 
borrowing at each period regardless of economic situation (  =  +  ) 19 as long as 
the government has normal monotone preferences20.  Therefore, if the economy is in 
good times, the government will increase spending because revenue is forecasted to 
increase.  If the economy is in bad times, the government will decrease spending 
because revenue is forecasted to decrease.  Fiscal policy inevitably becomes 
procyclical due to the budget maximization behaviour of government.        
However, if one assumes that the government operates fiscal policy from the 
long-term perspective, for example, n periods, then the budget constraint can be 
written as equation (2.4).  The government can borrow or save at the rate of r at each 
period.  If the government intends to keep a balanced budget over n periods, the 
budget constraint can be written as equation (2.5).   
       
∑ ()
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                    (2.4) 
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                                               (2.5) 
The equilibrium trajectory of government spending is determined by the present 
value of future revenue and borrowing21.  The government can maximize its utility 
                                                 
19. We can solve government’s maximization problem in one period by utilizing the Lagrangian 
function   () = (  ) −  ( −  − ).  The first order conditions of maximization problem 
are  ′(  )   =    where λ (Lagrange multiplier) indicates marginal effect of government spending 
and   =  +   . 
20. The assumption of monotone preferences implies that large commodities are preferred to small 
ones.  It can be satisfied when commodities are ‘goods’ rather than ‘bads’ (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green, 1995). 
21 . In a two-period framework, we solve government’s maximization problem by utilizing 
Lagrangian function   (,  ) = ( ,  ) −   {! +  "# − ! + 
"
# − ! + 
"
#}  (see 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, for example of private consumption).  The first order conditions of 
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by smoothing spending across periods through saving and borrowing.  If the 
economy is in boom in the first period, then tax revenue is expected to increase, so 
the government can spend a fraction of this expected increase in revenue and save a 
fraction of it.  If the economy is in recession, then tax revenue is expected to 
decrease.  Therefore, the government have to decrease spending, but it can 
supplement some parts of decreases in spending by borrowing from the credit market 
or by utilizing savings.  The government could operate fiscal policy in a less 
procyclical way because it could save some portion of its revenue or borrow some 
source of spending from the financial markets.   
This simple model implies that the time horizon of fiscal policy could play an 
important role in determining fiscal stance.  If the government operates fiscal policy 
from the short-term perspective, fiscal policy might be procyclical.  However, if the 
government operates fiscal policy from the long-term perspective, the government 
could reduce the level of procyclicality.  These results imply that fiscal policy from 
the long-term perspective, such as multi-year fiscal rules, could be more efficient in 
mitigating the level of fiscal procyclicality than fiscal policy from the short-term 
perspective, such as annual fiscal rules.   
 
2.4.  The existing literature on the role of fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules are introduced to keep government spending more affordable by 
compelling governments to tax and spend within fixed constraints (Schick, 2003).  
They have been considered to be an essential part of budget reforms since 1990s.  
Proponents argue that fiscal rules under weak fiscal institutions can raise 
responsibility and credibility of fiscal policy, while opponents argue that they keep 
                                                                                                                                          
maximization problem are %&'("  ) &'(  )  =

 and ! + 
"
# = ! + 
"
# + ! + 
"
#.  The former 
indicates that government’s marginal rate of substitution of government spending at period 1 for 
period 2 equals the relative price of government spending in period 2 relative to period 1, which 
implies that government will reduce current government spending if the interest rate (r) or discount 
factor (δ) increases since the cost of borrowing will also increase.  If we assume that subjective 
discount factor equals market discount factor ! = #, then government spending in periods 1 and 2 
are same (  =   =  ̅ ).  Therefore, optimal government spending can be obtained as ̅ =
()( )("" )
  , which is determined by current and future revenue and borrowing as well as the 
interest rate. 
20 
 
governments from operating countercyclical fiscal policy since they focus more on 
long-run fiscal sustainability rather than short-run output stabilization over business 
cycle (Tanner, 2004; Wyplosz, 2005).    
A common form of fiscal rules which have been studied prevalently is the 
balanced budget rule, requiring spending not to exceed revenue.  This rule can be 
considered as fiscal policy under the short-term perspective above, when combined 
with an annual budget.  According to the existing literature, it generally tends to 
make fiscal policy more procyclical except under special circumstances.  Sorensen 
and Yosha (2001) suggest that a balanced budget rule could limit the ability of 
governments to borrow in recessions.  The authors show that the US state 
government which has a less strict rule could accumulate rainy day funds in booms, 
in other words, the state could operate more countercyclical fiscal policy.  Manasse 
(2005) also argues that a balanced budget rule could induce procyclical fiscal policy.  
The author points out that if policymakers could observe the output gap, a strict 
balanced budget rule could mitigate the political distortions but restricting the 
countercyclicality of fiscal policy.  Tanner (2004) also argues that a balanced budget 
rule could prevent countercyclical policy.  However, the author shows that a 
balanced budget rule could be compatible with a tax smoothing policy under 
practical situations that permits persistent deficit and debt accumulation, and 
therefore governments could operate countercyclical fiscal policy.   
Other studies in this literature debate the effect of the SGP rules on the fiscal 
stance of the Euro area after its implementation22.  It has been a controversial issue 
whether the SGP rules should be more flexible or not.  Mackiewicz (2006) argues 
that strict fiscal rules could be helpful to operate countercyclical fiscal policy 
sometimes.  The author points out that making the SGP rules more flexible could 
lead to more procyclical fiscal policy rather than countercyclical policy because high 
deficits could arouse credit constraints, and it finally leads to a reduction in the room 
for countercyclical policy.  Galí and Perotti (2003) show that the fiscal policy of 11 
EMU countries has become more countercyclical after introducing the SGP rules by 
comparing the fiscal stance before and after introducing the SGP rules.  However, 
                                                 
22. On the other hand, Carmignani (2010) argues that supernational fiscal rules by Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) could prevent governments from implementing countercyclical fiscal policy.  
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the authors also show that there is a global trend towards a more countercyclical 
fiscal policy by showing not only the trend of 11 EMU countries but also the trend of 
three non-EMU European countries and five OECD countries; therefore the authors 
argue that there is no empirical evidence on the effect of the SGP rules on fiscal 
cyclicality.   
On the other hand, Arreaza, Sorensen, and Yosha (1999) suggest that SGP rules 
should be relaxed because the government deficit helps provide large consumption 
smoothing.  Schick (2003) argues that the SGP rules could induce procyclical fiscal 
policy.  Marinheiro (2007) also shows that SGP rules force fiscal policy to be 
procyclical.  The author points out that the conclusion of Galí and Perotti (2003), that 
fiscal policy of EU countries become more countercyclical after introducing the SGP 
rules, is not supported by the robust test which utilizes real-time data instead of ex-
post data.  Afonso and Claeys (2008) also show that the SGP rules have not removed 
procyclical fiscal policy of four EMU countries (France, Germany, Portugal, and 
Spain) by analysing three periods of the fiscal procyclicality of these countries.  
Candelon, Muysken, and Vermeulen (2010) also show that the discretionary fiscal 
policy of EMU countries remains procyclical after introducing the SGP rules even 
though they utilize the same data source as Galí and Perotti (2003).  Frankel (2011c) 
argues that SGP rules could make governments’ official forecasts about economic 
growth more optimistic, especially in booms, and they in turn could lead to 
procyclical fiscal policy.   
However, there are several weaknesses in the existing literature.  It mainly 
analyses a sample of annual fiscal rules, such as balanced budget rules or the SGP 
rules, without considering the time coverage of these rules.  In addition, it focuses on 
the theoretical explanation on the effect of fiscal rules without being supported by 
the empirical evidence 23 , or it simply examines the effect of fiscal rules by 
comparing each period.  Therefore, this chapter analyses the effect of fiscal rules 
empirically discriminating between annual fiscal rules and multi-year fiscal rules to 
assess the effect of fiscal rules more accurately.  
                                                 
23. To the best of our knowledge, only Manasse (2006) analyses the role of fiscal rules empirically by 
including the dummy variable for fiscal rules into the regression equation through a sample of 49 
emerging and industrial countries, and the author shows that fiscal rules enable fiscal policy more 
countercyclical.      
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3. Empirical analysis  
This chapter analyses the role of the time coverage of fiscal rules in determining 
fiscal procyclicality.  This section firstly analyses the cyclical properties of fiscal 
policy of OECD countries across spending categories through a correlation approach.  
We also compare the level of fiscal procyclicality of each country before and after 
introducing fiscal rules dividing annual fiscal rules and multi-year fiscal rules 
respectively.  Then, this section analyses the cyclical properties of fiscal policy of 
OECD countries across spending categories through a regression approach.  We 
estimate the level of fiscal procyclicality of OECD countries both individually and 
collectively through time series and panel analysis.  Finally, this section examines 
the role of fiscal rules in determining fiscal procyclicality through a panel data model.  
We compare the effect of annual fiscal rules with multi-year fiscal rules on fiscal 
procyclicality.    
 
3.1.  Data description 
The sample consists of 26 OECD countries24, and we employ annual data for 
the period 1970–200825.  For the data on GDP and fiscal variables, this chapter 
utilizes the data of OECD Economic Outlook No.86, published in 2010.  All nominal 
data are converted into constant prices by using the GDP deflator following the 
existing literature26.  This chapter analyses six categories of government spending27: 
government consumption (CGAAV), interest payments (GGINTPV), current 
transfers (TCTV), current expenditure (YPGV), government investment (IGAAV), 
and total expenditure (YPGTV): where those references in brackets are the 
                                                 
24. Czech Republic, Poland, Mexico, and Turkey are excluded because their fiscal data are not 
provided by the OECD Economic Outlook database or can be used only after mid-1990s.  
 
25. It does not start at 1970 for all countries because of the data availability.  
 
26. Utilizing nominal fiscal variables has a weakness that it could eliminate a change in fiscal 
variables that takes the form of the relative price (Lane, 2003). 
 
27. Total spending consists of current expenditure and capital expenditure.  Current expenditure is 
made up of government consumption (purchases of goods and services, and salary of employees), 
interest payments, and current transfers (spending on property, social security benefit, subsidy, etc).  
Capital expenditure is comprised of government investment (gross fixed capital formation) and other 
capital spending on land and intangible asset.  
23 
 
databases’ references.  This classification of government spending is based on 
economic characteristics of government spending following the existing literature 
(Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008; Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 
2003).  Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the data.  The fifth and sixth 
columns indicate the share of government spending relative to total expenditure and 
GDP respectively.  The fifth column shows that government consumption (CGAAV) 
occupies nearly a half of total expenditure (YPGTV) followed by current transfer 
(TCTV, 28.8%), government investment (IGAAV, 17.1%), and interest payments 
(GGINTPV, 6.7%).         
Table 2.1  Summary statistics of fiscal data 
 No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations 
Mean (A) A/H A/B 
GDPV (B) 26 889 36.817 - 100% 
CGAAV (C) 26 889 5.159 49.6% 14.0% 
GGINTPV (D) 26 863 0.700 6.7% 1.9% 
TCTV (E) 26 862 2.988 28.8% 8.1% 
YPGV (F=C+D+E) 26 870 8.637 83.1% 23.5% 
IGAAV (G) 26 881 1.781 17.1% 4.8% 
YPGTV (H=F+G) 26 857 10.392 100.0% 28.2% 
Note : (1) Unit of each variables is 1,000 billion unit of local currency.                                                                  
(2) The sample period is 1970–2008.  Some variables have a shorter period due to the data availability. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
With regard to the main control variables, we employ five main variables which 
have been commonly utilized in the existing literature, and we additionally include a 
dummy variable for fiscal rules.  The summary statistics of control variables are 
explained in Table 2.2.    
Table 2.2  Summary statistics of control variables 
 
No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
OPEN 26 865 58.824 % 42.404 10.193 301.412 
POLCON 26 852 0.468 0.094 0.148 0.718 
GDPPC 26 865 $23,130   9,091 3,030 77,766 
GOVSIZE 26 857 43.553 % 9.563 17.078 70.928 
DEBTRT 26 704 57.818 % 29.599 4.980 175.274 
RULE 26 889 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Note : (1) OPEN is a measure of trade openness, POLCON is a political power dispersion index, GDPPC is 
income per capita, GOVSIZE is the size of public sector, DEBTRT is the government debt to GDP ratio, and 
RULE is a dummy variable for the fiscal rules.                                                                                                                                                          
(2) The sample period is 1970–2008.  Some variables have a shorter period due to the data availability. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, Henisz database (2010), and IMF 
fiscal rules database (2009).  
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Trade openness (OPEN) is included to assess the effect of credit constraints 
following Woo (2009), Mackiewicz (2008), Aghion and Marinescu (2007), and Lane 
(2003).  This variable is defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP which 
is taken from Penn World Tables 6.3 (2009).   
Power dispersion index (POLCON) is included to assess the effect of political 
constraints following Lane (2003) and is taken from Henisz database (2010).  It 
measures political risk by considering the number of independent branches of the 
government with veto power over policy change, and the distribution of preferences 
across branches of the government and within each legislative branch.  Therefore, a 
high index means a lower probability that policy will change due to the veto power 
in the government.  This index measures political risk range from zero when it is 
most hazardous (concentrated power) to one when it is most constrained (dispersed 
power).  
Income per capita (GDPPC) is included to check the effect of the level of 
development and is in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms taking from Penn World 
Tables 6.3.  This variable is defined as the log of GDP per capita.  The size of public 
sector (GOVSIZE) is included to check whether the cyclical properties of fiscal 
policy are different depending on the government size and is defined as the ratio of 
total expenditure relative to GDP following Woo (2009).  The government debt to 
GDP ratio (DEBTRT) is also included to check the effect of fiscal space following 
Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009) and Mackiewicz (2008). 
Table 2.3  The types of fiscal rules 
Expenditure 
Rule 
A nominal expenditure ceiling  
A real expenditure ceiling  
A nominal expenditure growth rate  
A real expenditure growth rate 
Revenue Rule 
Constraints on the allocation of higher than an expected revenues in good times 
A tax rate cannot be raised 
Balance Rule 
A specific budget balance in nominal terms  
A specific budget balance as a % of GDP 
A specific budget balance as a % of GDP in cyclically adjusted or structural terms 
As a % of GDP  within a range of possible value on growth development 
Improvement budget balance as a % of GDP   
Debt Rule 
A specific amount of debt in nominal terms 
A specific debt/GDP ratio 
A given reduction in specific debt/GDP ratio 
A ceiling for government debt 
 Source : 2007 OECD survey of budget practices and procedures.   
25 
 
A dummy for fiscal rules (RULE) is included to check the effect of introducing 
fiscal rules.  Regarding the data about fiscal rules, this chapter employs the survey 
which was conducted by IMF.  According to the IMF fiscal rules database (2009), 27 
countries out of 30 OECD countries utilize several types of fiscal rules to respond to 
their fiscal situation.  Table 2.3 presents the detailed types of fiscal rules: 
expenditure rule, revenue rule, budget balance rule, and debt rule.  Four countries 
utilize only one fiscal rule and 23 countries utilize two or more than two fiscal rules.  
Most countries introduced budget balanced rules and debt rules at the same time.  
EU countries have adopted supranational rules through the Stability and Growth Pact 
as well as their own national fiscal rules.  Table 2.4 shows the time coverage of fiscal 
rules across countries.  Ten countries set fiscal target annually, and 17 countries 
target multi-year or over business cycle.  Our empirical analysis divides OECD 
countries into three groups depending on both the existence of fiscal rules and the 
time coverage of fiscal rules regardless of the types of fiscal rules which each 
country introduces.  This analysis can be consistent with our theoretical model in 
subsection 2.3 considering the fact that most countries are adopting the budget 
balance rules.  
Table 2.4  The time coverage of fiscal rules 
Time coverage Countries 
Annual rules
2) 
(10 countries) 
Austria(1995, BD), Belgium(1992, BD) Canada(1998, EBD), Greece(1992, BD), 
Hungary(2004, BD), Ireland(1992, BD), Italy(1992, BD), Poland(2004, BD), 
Portugal(1992, BD), Slovakia(2004, BD) 
Multi-year rules 
(17 countries) 
Australia(1998, RBD), Czech Republic(2004, EBD), Denmark(1992, ERBD), 
France(1992, ERBD), Finland(1995, EBD), Germany(1972, EBD),  
Iceland(2004, E), Japan
3)
 (1947, E), Mexico(2006, RB),  
Netherlands(1992, ERBD), New Zealand(1994, BD), Norway(2001, B), 
Luxembourg(1992, EBD), Spain(2003, BD), Sweden(2000, EBD), 
Switzerland(2003, B), UK(1997, BD) 
No fiscal rules  
(3 countries) 
Korea, Turkey, USA
4)
 
Note : 1) Start year of fiscal rules and the types of fiscal rules which are introduced are in parentheses                  
(E: expenditure rule, R: revenue rule, B: budget balance rule, D: debt rule). 
2) Five countries (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Slovakia) have only the SGP rules.       
3) The expenditure rule of Japan is similar to the budget balance rule rather than an expenditure ceiling. However, 
the Japanese government has waived this rule since 1975 except for the period 1990-1993.  Therefore, it will be 
classified as ‘the countries with no fiscal rules’ in our correlation analysis.  
4) The USA government introduced multi-year fiscal plans from 1985 to 2002 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 
1985, replaced by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990).  However, we include the USA in the ‘No fiscal rules 
country’ because it covered only discretionary spending and IMF database exclude the USA in their list.  
Source: IMF fiscal rules database. 
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3.2.  Empirical methodology 
There are two methodologies adopted in the existing literature in measuring the 
cyclicality of fiscal policies.  One is the correlation based measure of cyclicality 
(Lane 2003; Riascoc and Végh, 2004; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Carmignani, 2010; 
Ilzetzki, 2011; Huart, 2011), and the other is the regression based measurement.  The 
former has a weakness that the result of correlation might be misleading under 
different volatilities of samples (Lane, 2003; Woo, 2009) even though it has an 
advantage of simplicity.  Therefore, the latter is prevalently utilized in the literature.  
This chapter employs both of methods.  
With regard to the correlation based method, this chapter analyses the 
correlation between the cyclical component of government spending and the cyclical 
component of GDP.  This chapter calculates the cyclical component of government 
spending and GDP utilizing two types of methods; the difference of log real 
variables and detrended series using Hodrick-Prescott filter following the existing 
literature28.   
With regard to the regression based method, this chapter utilizes both time 
series analysis and panel data analysis.  Firstly, this chapter conducts country by 
country time series regression of the form (2.6) and the panel data model of the form 
(2.7) in order to obtain measures of procyclicality in the various categories of 
government spending. 
       ) log - = .- + ∑ /-0)01 23456-,70 + 8-                                           (2.6) 
       ) log - = .- + ∑ /0)01 23456-,70 + 8-                                            (2.7) 
where ∆log Git is various categories of first difference of the log real government 
spending in country i and year t.  The lagged values of the first difference of log real 
GDP are included in this equation to control the effect of past economic growth on 
current government spending.  We choose two years lags by nature of budget process 
                                                 
28. Utilizing the difference of log real variables refers to a classical notion of business cycle while 
utilizing detrended series corresponds to a notion of cycles in deviation (Carmignani, 2010).    
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and regression results.  A positive value of β0 implies procyclical behaviour of 
government spending. 
Secondly, to find out the effect of fiscal rules, this chapter estimates a one-step 
approach of the form (see, for example, Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; 
Mackiewicz, 2008; Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009; Diallo, 2009): 
         ) log - = .- + ∑ /0)01 23456-,70 + 9:- × )23456- +  8-       (2.8) 29 
where Z
 it  is a set of control variables including trade openness (OPEN), political 
power dispersion index (POLCON), income per capita (GDPPC), the size of public 
sector (GOVSIZE), the government debt to GDP ratio (DEBTRT), and the dummy 
variable for the existence of fiscal rules (RULE) .  All control variables are included 
as the form of interaction variables to estimate the effect of these variables on fiscal 
procyclicality.  This is because the coefficient of the interaction term measures the 
change in the coefficient β0 when each control variable changes by one unit 
(Preacher, 2003).  In other words, it indicates the effect of each control variable on 
the level of fiscal procyclicality. 
Some existing literature (Lane, 2003; Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Woo, 2009) 
utilize a two-step approach30 to examine the determinants of fiscal procyclicality.  
This approach could reflect a different output elasticity of each country avoiding 
unitary elasticity assumption of a one-step approach (Lane, 2003).  However, it is 
likely to be biased and overestimate the true effect of control variable on the level of 
procyclicality even though it is weak or insignificant because the procedure 
considers the estimated variables in the first stage to be observable (Mackiewicz, 
2008) even though it could give a nosy signal of true values (Aghion, Hemous, and 
Kharroubi, 2009).   
This chapter employs the one-step approach to check the effect of fiscal rules 
on fiscal procyclicality in line with most existing literature.  This is because the 
                                                 
29. The reason for including constant is the existence of structural balance (see Schick, 2003) or 
inflexible spending.  
 
30. At first stage, an indicator of fiscal procyclicality is estimated using time series analysis of each 
country, and then the determinants are found by regressing estimated fiscal procyclicality indicators 
on control variables using a cross-section analysis.   
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dummy variables for fiscal rules are different across each period, but the two-step 
approach cannot allow time invariant regressors in the second stage.  This is also 
because the two-step analysis could suffer from small sample bias since our sample 
includes only 26 countries. 
 
 
3.3.  Estimation results  
 
3.3.1. Correlation approach 
This section firstly analyses the cyclical properties of government spending of 
OECD countries across spending categories and country groups, and then examines 
the difference of the cyclical properties between before and after introducing fiscal 
rules through correlation approach. 
 
 (1) The cyclical properties of fiscal policy across spending categories 
 Table 2.5 presents the average of the correlation between the cyclical 
component of government spending and the cyclical component of GDP in OECD 
countries by utilizing the first difference of log real variables.  One can see from the 
results that the cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries are different 
across spending categories.  Government consumption (CGAAV) and investment 
(IGAAV) have a positive correlation with GDP, while interest payments (GGINTPV) 
and current transfers (TCTV) have a negative correlation with GDP.  These results 
could be interpreted that government consumption and investment show a 
procyclical pattern, while interest payments and current transfers show a 
countercyclical pattern.  Current expenditure (YPTV) and total expenditure 
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(YPGTV), therefore, appear to have an acyclical pattern31.  These results could be 
rationalized if one considers the characteristics of spending categories.  Government 
consumption and investment are spending categories which policymakers control 
discretionarily.  On the other hand, current transfers can be functioned as automatic 
stabilizers since they include cyclical sensitive spending items such as 
unemployment benefit, and governments cannot adjust current transfers easily. 
Table 2.5  The average of correlation between government spending and GDP 
  Mean S.D. Max Min 
 Government consumption (CGAAV) 0.141 0.240 0.648 -0.264 
 Interest payments (GGINTPV) -0.063 0.282 0.521 -0.447 
 Current transfers (TCTV) -0.101 0.272 0.456 -0.700 
 Current expenditure (YPGV) -0.011 0.265 0.414 -0.689 
 Government Investment (IGAAV) 0.180 0.168 0.484 -0.106 
 Total expenditure (YPGTV) 0.006 0.240 0.507 -0.395 
Note : All variables are expressed in the first difference of log real  terms. The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
These results are generally consistent with the existing literature which analyses 
the cyclical properties of fiscal policy across spending categories.  Ilzetzki (2011) 
analyses data with 21 high-income countries and 81 developing countries using the 
correlation approach, and the author shows that government consumption and 
investment appear to be procyclical both in high-income and developing countries.  
Lane (2003) examines the cyclical properties of fiscal policy of 22 traditional OECD 
countries by both the correlation approach and the two-step regression approach, and 
the author shows that government consumption and investment appear to be 
procyclical, while current expenditure and total expenditure to be acyclical or 
countercyclical32.  Galí and Perotti (2003) find that government investment of 11 
                                                 
31. When we calculate the correlation between the cyclical component of government spending and 
GDP collectively following Talvi and Végh (2005), the results show a large degree of similarity with 
our results.  Government consumption and investment have a significantly positive correlation with 
GDP as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.2.     
32. Lane (2003) analyses the cyclical properties of fiscal policy across six spending categories: 
government consumption, current expenditure, current expenditure net of interest payments, 
government investment, total expenditure, and total expenditure net of interest payments.  However, 
one needs not to deal with total (current) expenditure net of interest payments.  One can suggest two 
factors for the reason.  From the short term viewpoints, there is no strong reason to exclude only 
interest payments rather than other nonflexible expenditure.  From the long term viewpoints, 
governments can adjust the amount of interest payments by changing the combination of debt and tax.  
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EMU countries shows mild procyclical behaviour.  Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández 
de Cos, and Marqueés (2003) also show that government investment appears to be 
procyclical while current transfers and interest payments are countercyclical by 
analysing 14 EU member countries. 
Government spending can be divided by discretionary component which is 
decided by fiscal authorities and the cyclical component which is affected by 
business cycle fluctuations (Candelon, Muysken, and Vermeulen, 2010; Alberola, 
Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003). 
Automatic stabilizers are mainly related to current transfers, not government 
consumption and investment (Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008).  The only item of 
government spending which is treated as cyclically sensitive is unemployment-
related current transfers (Girouard and André, 2005; CBO, 2008), which implies that 
the existence of automatic stabilizers make government spending more 
countercyclical since unemployment benefit payments increase in recessions and 
decrease in booms.  Table 2.6 confirms these arguments, which presents the average 
of the correlation between the cyclical component of cyclically adjusted government 
spending33 and the cyclical component of GDP.  One can see from the results that 
government spending generally becomes less countercyclical when the effect of 
automatic stabilizers is excluded.  These results are consistent with the existing 
literature (Galí and Perotti, 2003; Braun, 2001). 
Table 2.6  The average of correlation between government spending and GDP                                  
(cyclically adjusted government spending) 
  Mean S.D. Max Min 
 Cyclically adjusted current transfers (TCTAV) -0.023 0.263 0.569 -0.520 
 Cyclically adjusted current expenditure (YPGAV) 0.032 0.262 0.535 -0.585 
 Cyclically adjusted total expenditure (YPGTAV) 0.057 0.243 0.607 -0.311 
Note : All variables are expressed in the first difference of log real  terms. The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Empirical results also show that there is no big difference between the cyclical properties of total 
(current) expenditure and total (current) expenditure exclusive of interest payments. 
 
33. Cyclically adjusted government spending is government spending net of the effect of automatic 
stabilizers.     
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To check the robustness of our results, this section also examines the average of 
the correlation between the cyclical component of government spending and the 
cyclical component of GDP by utilizing detrended series using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.  Table 2.7 generally confirms our baseline results.  The results show that 
government investment appears to be procyclical, while current transfers appear to 
be countercyclical.  The level of procyclicality is lower than that of when the first 
difference of log real variables is utilized in Tabel 2.5 and 2.6.  These results are 
consistent with Riascoc and Végh (2004) who show that the level of procyclicality of 
government consumption is lower when detrended series are utilized in the G7 and 
industrial countries.  However, the interest payments move from countercyclical to 
procyclical.  There are contradictive arguments about the cyclical properties of 
interest payments in the existing literature.  Lane (2003) argues that interest 
payments can be procyclical considering the strategic behaviour of public debt 
managers.  Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) show that interest payments are acyclical by 
analysing 21 high-income and 81 developing countries, while Alberola, Mínguez, 
Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés (2003) show that interest payments are 
countercyclical by analysing the 14 EU member countries. 
Table 2.7  The average of correlation between government spending and GDP       
(HP filter) 
  Mean S.D. Max Min 
 Government consumption (CGAAV) 0.001 0.286 0.603 -0.408 
 Interest payments (GGINTPV) 0.078 0.259 0.406 -0.471 
 Current transfers (TCTV) -0.261 0.277 0.377 -0.861 
 Current expenditure (YPGV) -0.158 0.313 0.381 -0.773 
 Government Investment (IGAAV) 0.173 0.185 0.558 -0.199 
 Total expenditure (YPGTV) -0.150 0.274 0.420 -0.781 
 Cyclically adjusted current transfers (TCTAV) -0.109 0.273 0.373 -0.779 
 Cyclically adjusted current expenditure (YPGAV) -0.067 0.314 0.564 -0.691 
 Cyclically adjusted total expenditure (YPGTAV) -0.065 0.284 0.596 -0.697 
Note : All variables are the cyclical components which are derived by HP filter. The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
To conclude, government consumption and investment seem to be procyclical, 
while current transfers appear to be countercyclical, in general.  The procyclical 
properties of government consumption and investment are offset by automatic 
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stabilizers in budget system such as current transfers.  Therefore, the fiscal policy of 
OECD countries appears to be acyclical from the viewpoint of total expenditure.  
However, one should note that governments cannot adjust the amount of total 
expenditure timely and easily because of automatic stabilizers.  Therefore, 
government consumption and investment could be the most appropriate indices to 
measure fiscal cyclicality.  These results could provide meaningful policy 
implications in the sense that government consumption and investment34  are the 
important fiscal policy tools which policymakers can control discretionarily.  
 
(2) The cyclical properties of fiscal policy across countries 
Table 2.8 and 2.9 present the cyclical properties of government spending across 
countries.  Table 2.8 shows the correlation between the cyclical component of 
government spending and the cyclical component of GDP across three different 
groups of countries according to the type of fiscal rules which each country is 
adopting, and Table 2.9 shows the correlation between the cyclical component of 
government spending and the cyclical component of GDP across four different 
groups of countries according to the level of development and region.  One can see 
from the results of Table 2.8 that the fiscal policy of OECD countries seems to be 
procyclical from the viewpoint of some spending categories.  The countries with 
annual fiscal rules seem to operate procyclical fiscal policy on average across all 
spending categories except interest payments (GGINTPV), while the countries with 
multi-year fiscal rules seem to operate procyclical fiscal policy on average only in 
terms of government consumption (CGAAV) and investment (IGAAV).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34. Average shares of government consumption and investment relative to total expenditure is about 
50-70% across countries. 
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Table 2.8  Correlation between government spending and GDP across countries             
(type of rules) 
rule country 
(1) 
CGAAV 
(2) 
GGINTPV 
(3) 
TCTV 
(4) 
YPGV 
(5) 
IGAAV 
(6) 
YPGTV 
Annual 
rules 
(9) 
Austria 0.317 -0.069 0.069 0.162 0.175 0.166 
Belgium 0.161 0.019 -0.005 0.080 0.041 -0.043 
Canada -0.125 0.173 -0.266 -0.140 -0.017 -0.184 
Greece 0.061 -0.203 0.290 0.048 0.471 0.125 
Ireland 0.238 -0.390 -0.173 -0.116 0.386 -0.009 
Hungary 0.231 -0.412 0.456 0.277 -0.097 0.379 
Italy 0.214 0.215 -0.168 0.103 0.052 0.081 
Portugal 0.648 -0.007 0.158 0.414 0.402 0.460 
Slovakia 0.487 -0.418 0.103 0.285 0.267 0.115 
Mean 0.248 -0.121 0.052 0.124 0.187 0.121 
Multi-
year 
rules 
(14) 
 
Australia -0.055 0.158 -0.553 -0.212 -0.048 -0.056 
Denmark -0.191 0.178 -0.160 -0.108 0.163 -0.219 
France 0.266 -0.447 0.003 0.062 0.177 -0.219 
Finland 0.015 -0.433 -0.538 -0.448 0.291 -0.395 
Germany 0.347 0.305 -0.248 0.040 0.322 0.030 
Iceland 0.524 -0.341 -0.101 0.185 0.347 0.001 
Luxembourg -0.047 0.081 0.172 0.110 -0.106 0.085 
Netherlands 0.158 -0.154 0.006 0.029 0.067 -0.042 
Norway 0.242 0.183 0.119 0.216 0.181 0.208 
New Zealand 0.223 0.277 -0.083 0.204 0.166 0.507 
Spain 0.294 -0.335 0.018 0.009 0.140 -0.068 
Sweden -0.062 -0.215 -0.228 -0.259 0.055 -0.301 
Switzerland -0.264 -0.443 -0.700 -0.689 0.315 -0.237 
UK -0.169 0.132 -0.437 -0.349 0.135 -0.214 
Mean 0.092 -0.075 -0.195 -0.086 0.157 -0.066 
No rules 
(3) 
Japan 0.376 0.521 0.114 0.350 0.484 0.302 
Korea -0.114 -0.135 -0.091 -0.149 0.289 0.053 
USA -0.119 0.131 -0.393 -0.377 0.024 -0.359 
Mean 0.047 0.172 -0.123 -0.059 0.266 -0.002 
All  
(26) 
Mean 0.141 -0.063 -0.101 -0.011 0.180 0.006 
S.D. 0.240 0.282 0.272 0.265 0.168 0.240 
MAX 0.648 0.521 0.456 0.414 0.484 0.507 
MIN -0.264 -0.447 -0.700 -0.689 -0.106 -0.395 
Note : CGAAV is government consumption, GGINTPV is interest payments, TCTV is current transfers, YPGV 
is current expenditure, IGAAV is government investment, and YPGTV is total expenditure.  All variables are 
expressed in the first difference of log real terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
With regard to explaining government consumption (CGAAV) in column (1), 
about two thirds of OECD countries seem to operate their government consumption 
in a procyclical pattern as can be seen from Graph 2.1.  All countries, except Canada, 
which introduce annual fiscal rules (black bars in graph) show a procyclical pattern 
while a half of countries which introduce multi-year fiscal rules (white bars in graph) 
show procyclical pattern.   
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Graph 2.1  Correlation between government consumption and GDP 
 
Note: Black bars are the countries which adopt annual fiscal rules, white bars are the countries which adopt 
multi-year fiscal rules, and grey bars are the countries with no fiscal rules.  The height of bar graphs represents 
the level of correlation between the cyclical component of government consumption and GDP, which indicates 
the level of procyclicality.  The average of correlation coefficients is 0.141. 
 
With regard to explaining government investment (IGAAV) in column (5) of 
Table 2.8, most OECD countries seem to operate their government investment in a 
procyclical pattern as can be seen from Graph 2.2.  With regard to explaining other 
spending categories, such as current transfers (TCTV), current expenditure (YPGV), 
and total expenditure (VPGTV), the countries which introduce annual fiscal rules 
show a more procyclical patterns than the countries with multi-year fiscal rules35.   
Graph 2.2  Correlation between government investment and GDP 
 
Note: Black bars are the countries which adopt annual fiscal rules, white bars are the countries which adopt 
multi-year fiscal rules, and grey bars are the countries with no fiscal rules.  The height of bar graphs represents 
the level of correlation between the cyclical component of government investment and GDP, which indicates the 
level of procyclicality.  The average of correlation coefficients is 0.180. 
                                                 
35. When we calculate the correlation between the cyclical component of government spending and 
GDP collectively following Talvi and Végh (2005), the results show a large degree of similarity with 
our results.  The countries which introduce annual fiscal rules show more procyclical patterns than the 
countries with multi-year fiscal rules, as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.2.     
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One can also see from the results in Table 2.9 that the fiscal policy of the EMU 
countries shows a more procyclical pattern than that of other advanced countries36.   
Table 2.9  Correlation between government spending and GDP across countries            
(country groups) 
 
country 
(1) 
CGAAV 
(2) 
GGINTPV 
(3) 
TCTV 
(4) 
YPGV 
(5) 
IGAAV 
(6) 
YPGTV 
EMU(12) 
Austria 0.317 -0.069 0.069 0.162 0.175 0.166 
Belgium 0.161 0.019 -0.005 0.080 0.041 -0.043 
France 0.266 -0.447 0.003 0.062 0.177 -0.219 
Finland 0.015 -0.433 -0.538 -0.448 0.291 -0.395 
Germany 0.347 0.305 -0.248 0.040 0.322 0.030 
Greece 0.061 -0.203 0.290 0.048 0.471 0.125 
Ireland 0.238 -0.390 -0.173 -0.116 0.386 -0.009 
Italy 0.214 0.215 -0.168 0.103 0.052 0.081 
Luxembourg -0.047 0.081 0.172 0.110 -0.106 0.085 
Netherlands 0.158 -0.154 0.006 0.029 0.067 -0.042 
Portugal 0.648 -0.007 0.158 0.414 0.402 0.460 
Spain 0.294 -0.335 0.018 0.009 0.140 -0.068 
Mean 0.223 -0.118 -0.035 0.041 0.201 0.014 
Other 
Advanced 
European 
countries  
(7)  
 
Denmark -0.191 0.178 -0.160 -0.108 0.163 -0.219 
Iceland 0.524 -0.341 -0.101 0.185 0.347 0.001 
Norway 0.242 0.183 0.119 0.216 0.181 0.208 
Slovakia 0.487 -0.418 0.103 0.285 0.267 0.115 
Sweden -0.062 -0.215 -0.228 -0.259 0.055 -0.301 
Switzerland -0.264 -0.443 -0.700 -0.689 0.315 -0.237 
UK -0.169 0.132 -0.437 -0.349 0.135 -0.214 
Mean 0.081 -0.132 -0.201 -0.103 0.209 -0.092 
Other 
Advanced  
non-
European 
countries 
 (6)  
 
Australia -0.055 0.158 -0.553 -0.212 -0.048 -0.056 
Canada -0.125 0.173 -0.266 -0.140 -0.017 -0.184 
Japan 0.376 0.521 0.114 0.350 0.484 0.302 
Korea -0.114 -0.135 -0.091 -0.149 0.289 0.053 
New Zealand 0.223 0.277 -0.083 0.204 0.166 0.507 
USA -0.119 0.131 -0.393 -0.377 0.024 -0.359 
Mean 0.031 0.187 -0.212 -0.054 0.150 0.044 
Emerging(1) Hungary 0.231 -0.412 0.456 0.277 -0.097 0.379 
Note : CGAAV is government consumption, GGINTPV is interest payments, TCTV is current transfers, YPGV 
is current expenditure, IGAAV is government investment, and YPGTV is total expenditure.  All variables are 
expressed in the first difference of log real terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
With regard to explaining government consumption (CGAAV) in column (1), 
current transfers (TCTV) in column (3), current expenditure (YPGV) in column (4),   
                                                 
36. With regard to the classification of countries, this thesis follows that of IMF World Economic 
Outlook.  OECD countries can be divided into 26 Advanced Economies and four Emerging market 
Economies.  This thesis divides 26 Advanced Economies into three groups: 12 EMU countries (we 
include Slovakia into other European countries because it joined EMU in 2009), seven other 
European countries, and six other non-European countries.  The results of emerging market countries 
are difficult to be considered to be meaningful since the sample is only one.   
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and total expenditure (YPGTV) in column (6), EMU countries generally show a 
procyclical or acyclical pattern while other advanced countries show an acyclical or 
countercyclical pattern.  These results are consistent with Huart (2011) who shows 
that procyclical fiscal policy is more frequent in EMU countries than in other OECD 
countries by analysing panel data from 20 OECD countries which is the same dataset 
as we utilize.  This relationship between EMU countries and other advanced 
countries is similar to the relationship between the countries which introduce annual 
fiscal rules and multi-year fiscal rules.  This could be because a large number of 
EMU countries introduce only annual fiscal rules compared with the other advanced 
countries37.  This implies that the countries which adopt annual fiscal rules are more 
likely to implement procyclical fiscal policy while the countries which adopt multi-
year fiscal rules are more likely to implement countercyclical fiscal policy.    
 
(3) The effect of introducing fiscal rules  
This subsection examines the difference of the cyclical properties of fiscal 
policy before and after the introduction of fiscal rules.  Three countries (Hungary, 
Iceland, and Slovakia) are excluded from the analysis because of the data 
availability38.  Table 2.10 presents the average change in the correlation between the 
cyclical component of government spending and the cyclical component of GDP 
before and after the introduction of fiscal rules.  The correlation between spending 
and GDP generally becomes more negative after introducing fiscal rules except 
interest payments (GGINTPV).  However, this phenomenon cannot be interpreted as 
the only effect of fiscal rules because it could come from a global trend (Galí and 
Perotti, 2003).  In this subsection, we compare the change in correlation either side 
of the implementation of fiscal rules by dividing OECD countries into several groups 
to assess the role of the different time coverage of fiscal rules. 
In the case of countries which introduce annual fiscal rules, the correlations 
between spending and GDP do not show meaningful differences except interest 
                                                 
37. The ratio of countries which introduce only annual fiscal rules is 50% in EMU countries (six out 
of 12 countries) and 14% in other advanced countries (two out of 13 countries).   
38. The number of data in these countries is only four since they introduced fiscal rules in 2004. 
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payments (GGINTPV).  On the other hand, in the case of countries which introduce 
multi-year fiscal rules, the correlation between spending and GDP becomes more 
negative after introducing fiscal rules except interest payments (GGINTPV).  It 
shows meaningful differences except government investment (IGAAV).     
Table 2.10  The change in correlation between government spending and GDP 
 (1) 
CGAAV 
(2) 
GGINTPV 
(3) 
TCTV 
(4) 
YPGV 
(5) 
IGAAV 
(6) 
YPGTV 
All countries 
(23) 
Overall 0.105 -0.020 -0.134 -0.044 0.181 -0.014 
Before 0.123 -0.131 -0.167 -0.089 0.161 -0.046 
After -0.034 -0.027 -0.244 -0.179 0.140 -0.173 
Difference -0.158 0.104 -0.077 -0.090 -0.020 -0.127 
Annual rules 
(7) 
Overall 0.216 -0.037 -0.013 0.079 0.216 0.085 
Before 0.192 -0.133 -0.039 0.007 0.177 -0.001 
After 0.194 -0.026 -0.129 -0.016 0.178 -0.016 
Difference 0.002 0.107 -0.090 -0.023 0.001 -0.015 
Multi-year 
rules (13) 
Overall 0.058 -0.055 -0.202 -0.107 0.143 -0.071 
Before 0.080 -0.130 -0.249 -0.150 0.150 -0.074 
After -0.180 -0.029 -0.318 -0.282 0.116 -0.273 
Difference -0.260 0.102 -0.069 -0.132 -0.034 -0.199 
Note : CGAAV is government consumption, GGINTPV is interest payments, TCTV is current transfers, YPGV 
is current expenditure, IGAAV is government investment, and YPGTV is total expenditure.  All variables are 
expressed in the first difference of log real terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
If one compares the effect of both types of rules, one can see the fact that the 
countries which introduce multi-year fiscal rules generally tend to become more 
countercyclical than the countries which introduce annual fiscal rules.  In the case of 
government consumption (CGAAV), the annual rules do not affect the level of 
procyclicality very much while multi-year rules tend to make it more 
countercyclical39.  For example, government consumption of Finland had maintained 
a similar level of procyclicality after 1995 when annual rules was adopted, but it 
became clearly more countercyclical after introducing multi-year rules in 199940.   
To conclude, the introduction of fiscal rules could reduce the level of fiscal 
procyclicality of some spending categories such as government consumption and 
                                                 
39. Huart (2011) compares the correlation between the change in cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
and the change in output gap dividing pre and post 1999.  The result for each country is generally 
consistent with our results. 
40. The correlations between the cyclical component of government consumption and GDP in Finland  
are:      (1971-1994) 0.015  (1995-1998) 0.149  (1999-2008) -0.839                   
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current transfers.  Multi-year fiscal rules tend to enhance the countercyclicality of 
fiscal policy, but the favourable effect of annual rule is not certain41.   
 
3.3.2.  Regression approach  
This section examines the cyclical properties of fiscal policy and the role of the 
time coverage of fiscal rules in determining fiscal cyclicality through regression 
analysis.  At first, this section explores the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in 
OECD countries by analysing across various spending categories through both time 
series analysis and panel data analysis.  Then, this section examines the role of fiscal 
rules by dividing annual fiscal rules and multi-year fiscal rules using a panel data 
model.  We conduct several analyses to check robustness using instrumental 
variables, the dynamic panel model, and a sample of the SGP rules.    
 
(1) The cyclical properties of fiscal policy across spending categories and countries 
We first analyse the cyclical properties of government spending across 
countries utilizing time series analysis of the form of equation (2.6).  Table 2.11 
presents the average coefficients of GDP growth across spending categories.  
Government consumption (CGAAV) and investment (IGAAV) are both positively 
associated with GDP, while interest payments (GGIMTPV) and current transfers 
(TCTV) are negatively associated with GDP.  Government consumption and 
investment are estimated to increase by 0.26 and 0.88 percentage points on average, 
while interest payments and current transfers are estimated to decrease by 0.55 and 
0.25 percentage points on average, for every one percentage point increase in GDP.  
These results could be interpreted as government consumption and investment 
showing a procyclical pattern, while interest payments and current transfers showing 
a countercyclical pattern.  Therefore, current expenditure and total expenditure seem 
                                                 
41 . If one examines the average change in the correlation between the cyclical component of 
government spending and the cyclical component of GDP before and after introducing fiscal rules 
across country groups, we cannot find a clear picture among county groups since the sample of other 
advanced European countries (5) and other non-European countries (3) are small.   
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to show acyclical patterns, which could be interpreted that the procyclical behaviours 
of government consumption and investment are offset by the countercyclical 
behaviours of interest payments and current transfers. 
Table 2.11  Fiscal procyclicality of OECD countries across spending categories 
 Dependent variable Mean S.D. Max Min 
 Government consumption (CGAAV) 0.255 0.752 3.091 -0.359 
 Interest payments (GGINTPV) -0.552 1.336 2.016 -3.304 
 Current transfers (TCTV) -0.245 0.813 3.152 -1.379 
 Current expenditure (YPGV) -0.028 0.578 2.212 -0.916 
 Government Investment (IGAAV) 0.875 1.244 4.510 -1.142 
 Total expenditure (YPGTV) 0.000 0.818 3.320 -0.854 
 Cyclically adjusted current transfers (TCTAV) -0.050 0.773 3.182 -1.124 
 Cyclically adjusted current expenditure (YPGAV) 0.001 0.536 2.224 -0.631 
 Cyclically adjusted total expenditure (YPGTAV) 0.040 0.778 3.333 -0.993 
Note: (1) Explanatory variables are GDP (real gross domestic product) and the lagged values of GDP.  (2) All 
variables are expressed in the first difference of the log of real terms.  (3) The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
These results are consistent with the correlation analysis of section 3.3.1 and the 
existing literature (Ilzetzki, 2011; Lane, 2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003; Alberola, 
Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003), even though the absolute values 
of coefficients are larger than those of the correlation analysis.  One can also see 
from Table 2.11 that government spending generally becomes less countercyclical 
when the cyclical component, which is affected by the automatic stabilizers, is 
excluded.   
Table 2.12 presents the coefficient of GDP growth across three different groups 
of countries according to the type of fiscal rules which each country has introduced.  
One can see from the results that the fiscal policy of OECD countries seems to be 
procyclical from the viewpoint of some spending categories, which are consistent 
with the correlation analysis of section 3.3.1.  Government investment, especially, 
appears to be the most procyclical across all county groups, which is consistent with 
the existing literature (Ilzetzki, 2011; Lane, 2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003; Alberola, 
Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003).  Lane (2003) emphasizes the 
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effect of government investment which has more than unitary output elasticity42, and 
Ilzetzki (2011) also shows more than unitary output elasticity.  This could be because 
government investment is the main spending category which policymakers control 
discretionarily regardless of economic situation.  Policymakers can adjust the 
amount of capital stock across periods by government investment.  This 
characteristic could give the opposite impacts on the level of procyclicality, but our 
results could be interpreted as that the behaviour of government investment in 
recessions43 is overwhelmed by the procyclical behaviour of government investment 
in booms.   
 The results also indicate that the countries which introduce annual fiscal rules 
generally show a procyclical pattern across all spending categories except interest 
payments (GGINTPV), while the countries which introduce multi-year fiscal rules 
show a countercyclical pattern across all spending categories except government 
consumption (CGAAV) and investment (IGAAV) which are functioned as the main 
tools of spending adjustment.  We can see from the results that fiscal spending 
generally shows a more countercyclical or less procyclical pattern in the countries 
with multi-year fiscal rules than in the countries with annual fiscal rules.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42. Tornell and Lane (1999, pp.85-86) suggest the “voracity effect” as the reason for this effect.  If 
multiple political groups compete for government resource under the lack of strong legal and political 
institutions, expenditure increases more-than-proportionate increase in revenue respond to revenue 
shock.     
43. Governments tend to focus on an increase in government investment when they conduct fiscal 
stimulus package (Padoan, 2009).   
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Table 2.12  Fiscal procyclicality of OECD countries across the type of rules  
 
Rule country 
(1) 
CGAAV 
(2) 
GGINTPV 
(3) 
TCTV 
(4) 
YPGV 
(5) 
IGAAV 
(6) 
YPGTV 
Annual 
rules 
(9) 
Austria 0.449 -0.133 -0.027 0.190 0.171 0.148 
Belgium -0.027 -0.017 -0.255 -0.131 -0.295 -0.331 
Canada -0.281 0.353 -0.788 -0.380 -0.456 -0.487 
Greece 0.036 -1.156 0.379 -0.022 1.972 -0.008 
Ireland 0.075 -0.769 -0.406 -0.297 0.767 -0.233 
Hungary 3.091 -3.106 3.152 2.212 3.672 3.320 
Italy 0.315 1.114 -0.366 0.088 0.041 0.012 
Portugal 0.983 -1.398 -0.306 0.139 0.850 0.336 
Slovakia 2.003 -1.624 -0.053 0.867 4.510 1.171 
Mean 0.738 -0.749 0.148 0.296 1.248 0.436 
Multi-
year 
rules 
(14) 
 
Australia -0.124 0.561 -1.379 -0.462 -0.233 -0.278 
Denmark -0.193 1.176 -0.385 -0.182 1.071 -0.306 
France 0.105 -3.304 -0.124 -0.108 0.638 -0.280 
Finland -0.359 -1.476 -0.749 -0.635 0.718 -0.686 
Germany 0.314 1.246 -0.037 0.186 1.990 -0.589 
Iceland 0.448 -1.829 -0.616 -0.042 1.341 -0.388 
Luxembourg -0.098 0.326 0.239 0.094 -1.142 0.078 
Netherlands -0.042 -0.447 -0.244 -0.180 -0.165 -0.342 
Norway 0.153 -0.438 -0.091 0.118 0.063 0.071 
New Zealand 0.237 0.290 -0.312 0.164 0.333 0.958 
Spain 0.221 -2.486 -0.636 -0.410 0.938 -0.654 
Sweden -0.081 -1.365 -0.412 -0.322 0.218 -0.854 
Switzerland -0.348 -1.455 -1.235 -0.916 1.558 -0.112 
UK -0.176 -0.149 -1.154 -0.576 2.089 -0.512 
Mean 0.004 -0.668 -0.510 -0.234 0.673 -0.278 
No rules 
(3) 
Japan 0.241 2.016 0.027 0.312 1.373 0.206 
Korea -0.214 -0.615 -0.087 -0.201 0.466 -0.010 
USA -0.087 0.327 -0.502 -0.233 0.251 -0.230 
Mean -0.020 0.576 -0.187 -0.041 0.697 -0.011 
All  
(26) 
Mean 0.255 -0.552 -0.245 -0.028 0.875 0.000 
S.D. 0.752 1.336 0.813 0.578 1.244 0.818 
MAX 3.091 2.016 3.152 2.212 4.510 3.320 
MIN -0.359 -3.304 -1.379 -0.916 -1.142 -0.854 
Note : (1) CGAAV is government consumption, GGINTPV is interest payments, TCTV is current transfers, 
YPGV is current expenditure, IGAAV is government investment, and YPGTV is total expenditure.  (2) 
Explanatory variables are GDP (real gross domestic product) and the lagged values of GDP.  (3) All variables are 
expressed in the first difference of log real terms.  (4) The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
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(2) The trend of fiscal procyclicality across country 
Next, this subsection explores the trend of fiscal procyclicality across spending 
categories making the use of a rolling window estimation following Aghion and 
Marinescu (2007), Alberola and Montero (2007), and Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández 
de Cos, and Marqueés (2003)44.  The trend of fiscal procyclicality of government 
consumption and investment in each countries can be seen in Graphs 2.3 and 2.4.  
One can see from the figures that the trend of fiscal procyclicality of government 
consumption is a reasonably stable fluctuation45 even though that of some countries, 
such as  Norway, have a deceasing trend.  The trend of fiscal procyclicality of 
government investment, however, is quite volatile.  This could be because 
government investment is the main spending category which policymakers adjust as 
already argued in this subsection.  Also, it appears to become more procyclical since 
the end of the 1990s in a number of countries such as Austrailia, Austria, Belgium, 
Greece, and New Zealand, while it appears to become more countercyclical in other 
countries such as Netherlands and Norway.   
The existing literature also does not suggest consistent empirical evidence about 
the trend of fiscal procyclicality.  Galí and Perotti (2003) show that there is a global 
trend towards more countercyclical fiscal policy.  However, Aghion and Marinescu 
(2007), and Marinheiro (2007) show that fiscal policy of EMU countries became less 
countercyclical since 1980s, and Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and 
Marqueés (2003) show that the government investment of 14 EU countries became 
more procyclical since late 1980s.  On the other hand, Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin 
(2011) show that fiscal policy of advanced countries has become less countercyclical 
since 2000 while that of emerging market countries has become more 
countercyclical because of the improvement of institutional quality. 
 
 
                                                 
44. Rolling window estimation can be utilized to check how the estimated coefficients change over 
time.  The window period is set as 10 years, so the first regression covers 1971 to 1980, the second 
covers 1972 to 1981, and so on.  Four countries (Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, and Switzerland) are 
excluded in the rolling estimation because of the data availability.   
45. The trends of fiscal procyclicality of current transfers, total expenditure, and cyclically adjusted 
spending also show a similar pattern even though the level of procyclicality is different across 
spending categories, as you can be seen from Appendix 2. Graph 2A.1 and 2A.2.  
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Graph 2.3  The trend of fiscal procyclicality of government consumption  
 
A. EMU countries – Annual fiscal rules   
   
   
 
B. EMU countries – Multi-year fiscal rules 
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C. Other advanced European countries– Multi-year fiscal rules 
 
 
  
 
D. Other advanced non-European countries 
                        [ Multi-year fiscal rules ]                               [ Annual fiscal rules ]                                            
          
[ No fiscal rules ] 
   
Note: The vertical line represents the year when fiscal rules were adopted.  In case of EMU countries, it is the 
same as the year when the SGP rules were adopted. 
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Graph 2.4  The trend of fiscal procyclicality of government investment 
 
A. EMU countries – Annual fiscal rules  
   
   
 
B. EMU countries – Multi-year fiscal rules 
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C. Other advanced European countries– Multi-year fiscal rules 
   
D. Other advanced non-European countries 
                        [ Multi-year fiscal rules ]                               [ Annual fiscal rules ]                                            
   
[ No fiscal rule ] 
   
Note: The vertical line represents the year when fiscal rules were adopted.  In case of EMU countries, it is the 
same as the year when the SGP rules were adopted.  The reason why the procyclicality of investment in the UK is 
severely volatile is that government investment is volatile in spite of stable GDP growth.  It decreased by 70% in 
2005 and returned back to normal level in 2006.   
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(3) The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries 
This subsection also explores the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in OECD 
countries collectively by panel data model.  Estimation is based on the application of 
a Fixed effects model to consider the heterogeneity of each country46.  The results 
from Table 2.13 show that the government investment of OECD countries 
demonstrates a procyclical pattern, while current transfers and interest payments a 
countercyclical pattern.  Current GDP (GDPt) is positively associated with 
government consumption and investment, while it is negatively associated with 
interest payments and current transfers 47 .  The coefficients of GDP growth are 
significant in explaining interest payments, current transfers, and government 
investment.  Government investment is estimated to increase by 0.74 percentage 
points on average, while current transfers and interest payments are estimated to 
decrease by 0.24 and 0.56 percentage points respectively, for every one percentage 
point increase in current GDP.  These results are consistent with the correlation 
analysis of section 3.3.1, country by country analysis of this section, and the recent 
literature (Ilzetzki, 2011; Lane, 2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003; Alberola, Mínguez, 
Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003) 48.  One can also see from the results that 
the GDP growth from previous periods is positively associated with spending growth 
in general.  These results could be rationalized considering the fact that actual fiscal 
policy is affected by past economic growth in practice because a considerable 
portion of tax revenues is determined by past economic performances (e.g., corporate 
tax).   
                                                 
46. This chapter employs country fixed effects to consider country distinctive features which cannot 
be observed in the model.  Also it is reasonable to consider error terms, which represent individual 
effects, to be group specific constant term rather than group specific random element because our data 
set includes almost of all OECD countries.  The Hausman test also suggests that a fixed effects model 
is more efficient than a random effects model. 
47. When one considers time fixed effects, the result shows that government consumption and 
investment are significantly positively associated with GDP, while interest payments are significantly 
negatively associated with GDP as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.3.  However, one cannot 
rely on these results because the F-statistic cannot be calculated because of small degree of freedom.  
If we employ GDP gap instead of GDP growth following Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008), 
the results show a large similarity with our results.  The differences are below: (1) the coefficient of 
the GDP gap in explaining government consumption becomes significant. (2) the coefficient of the 
GDP gap in explaining current expenditure moves from negative to positive.   
48. We additionally examine the cyclical properties of budget balance by regressing the primary 
budget balance on the GDP gap following some of the existing literature (Huart, 2011; Aghion and 
Marinescu, 2007; Mackiewicz, 2008; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008).  The results show that 
the primary budget balance is positively associated with the GDP gap, which indicates a 
countercyclical pattern of the primary budget balance as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.4.  
These results are consistent with the existing literature.   
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Table 2.13   The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  0.115 -0.558**   -0.244** -0.102   0.736*** -0.104 
(1.54) (-2.29) (-2.38) (-1.58) (3.44) (-1.37) 
GDPt-1 0.281*** 0.184 -0.035 0.130* 0.580* 0.258*** 
(4.57) (0.80) (-0.37) (1.98) (1.90) (3.04) 
GDPt-2 0.322*** -0.894* 0.365*** 0.289*** 0.461* 0.284*** 
(3.93) (-1.94) (4.93) (4.58) (1.97) (3.56) 
F- statistics 52.67*** 5.84*** 9.79*** 18.79*** 18.00*** 11.58*** 
R
2
 0.190 0.011 0.058 0.125 0.055 0.105   
No.of Obs. 820 799 798 804 816 795 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008. 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. **  5% level.  ***  1% level. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
The same regressions are run with cyclically adjusted government spending to 
remove the effect of automatic stabilizers in budget systems.  Table 2.14 shows that 
government spending generally becomes less countercyclical when the cyclical 
component is excluded.  The coefficients on GDP growth are larger than 
corresponding coefficients when the cyclical component is included in Table 2.13, 
and therefore the effect of GDP growth in explaining current transfers becomes 
insignificant.  These results are consistent with the correlation analysis of section 
3.3.1 and the existing literature (Galí and Perotti, 2003; Braun, 2001).    
Table 2.14   The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries                
(Cyclically adjusted spending)  
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) Current Transfers (2) Current Expenditure (3) Total Expenditure 
GDPt  -0.146 -0.030 -0.049 
(-1.34) (-0.44) (-0.52) 
GDPt-1 0.052 0.156*   0.280** 
(0.47) (1.88) (2.59) 
GDPt-2 0.314*** 0.272*** 0.267*** 
(3.60) (3.70) (3.15) 
F- Statistics 7.628*** 13.310*** 9.624*** 
R
2
 0.043 0.082 0.073   
No.of Observations 715 715 715 
No.of Groups 24 24 24 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. **  5% level.  ***  1% level. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
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To check the robustness of our results, we include the lagged value of 
government spending as an independent variable and run the same regressions 
utilizing the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)49  following some existing 
literature (Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009; Mackiewicz, 2008; Candelon, 
Muysken, and Vermeulen, 2010).  The results generally confirm our baseline results.  
Table 2.15 shows that the current GDP growth is significantly positively associated 
with government investment while it is significantly negatively associated with 
current transfers.  These results are not different with the baseline analysis of Table 
2.13 except the fact that the coefficient of GDP growth in explaining current 
expenditure becomes significant and that of GDP growth in explaining interest 
payments becomes insignificant.  When we conduct the same regressions with 
cyclically adjusted government spending, the results generally confirm that of Table 
2.14.  If we run the same estimations using the system GMM methods as a further 
robustness check, the results show a large degree of similarity with the difference 
GMM estimation in Table 2.15.  Appendix 2. Table 2A.5 shows that government 
consumption and investment of OECD countries appear to be procyclical. 
Table 2.15  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries (GMM) 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  0.115 -0.392 -0.261** -0.110** 0.779*** -0.111 
(1.45) (-1.61) (-2.41) (-2.07) (4.15) (-1.58) 
GDPt-1 0.262*** 0.229 0.019 0.161*** 0.673** 0.261*** 
(4.40) (1.08) (0.19) (2.61) (2.28) (3.24) 
GDPt-2 0.277*** -0.948*** 0.336*** 0.206*** 0.566** 0.263*** 
(3.60) (-2.69) (4.99) (3.48) (2.57) (3.39) 
dependent t-1 0.164*** 0.419*** 0.210*** 0.346*** -0.139** 0.060 
(2.91) (7.49) (3.42) (7.41) (-2.15) (1.01) 
Wald chi
2
  238.62*** 185.66*** 37.17*** 104.38***   77.73***   36.17*** 
Hansen chi
2
 22.76 18.08 23.63 24.44 21.22 24.78 
No.of Obs. 790 767 766 773 785 762 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008 
(2) Regression methods are Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
(4) A statistics for Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions are accepted in all specifications, which suggests 
that the instruments used are all valid. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
                                                 
49. This section employs the GMM approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) which employs lagged 
values of the regressors as instrumental variables.  It is known that GMM could be more efficient than 
the Fixed effect model in the case of dynamic panel data model since the Fixed effects estimator is 
typically inconsistent when the time period is finite (finite sample bias) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).    
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This section conducts the same analysis utilizing instrumental variables to deal 
with the endogeneity problem which can arise from several reasons such as omitted 
variables, measurement errors, and simultaneity.  We focus on the simultaneity that 
fiscal policy and output growth have an effect on each other.  Most existing literature 
has ignored the endogeneity problem even though Keynesians argue that fiscal 
policy have an effect on economic growth at least short term.  Some studies (Huart 
2011; Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008; Galí and Perotti, 2003; Lane, 2003) deal with the 
endogeneity of output and show that the results will not change even when this 
problem is considered50.  To the best of our knowledge, only Jaimovichny and 
Panizza (2007) argue that the results of fiscal procyclicality tests will be changed if 
this endogeneity problem is considered.  They show that the fiscal procyclicality of 
developing countries disappears when the endogeneity problem is controlled for.   
This section employs two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation utilizing the 
growth in GDP of the USA as the instrument of the growth in GDP 51 following the 
existing literature (Candelon, Muysken, and Vermeulen, 2010; Galí and Perotti, 
2003) because the lagged value of GDP growth is already included in our estimation.  
Table 2.16 shows that current GDP is significantly negatively associated with 
government spending except interest payments in column (2) and government 
investment in column (5).  The results of the Hausman test52  imply that one needs to 
consider the potential endogeneity problem in explaining government consumption, 
current transfers, current expenditure, and total expenditure.  One can also see from 
the result that the coefficients of 2SLS estimations are smaller than those of Fixed 
effects estimations.   These results are consistent with the existing literature (Lledó, 
Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009) which shows that the reverse causality effect of 
fiscal policy on output growth is positive in advanced countries.  To sum up, 
government consumption can be countercyclical if one considers endogeneity 
problem, and in turn current expenditure and total expenditure can be 
                                                 
50. Huart (2011) shows that both OLS and IV estimations provide similar results.  Ilzetzki and Végh 
(2008) show that the fiscal policies of developing countries are procyclical regardless of whether one 
considers the endogeneity problem.  Lane (2003) argues that there is no strong reason to consider the 
endogeneity problem.  The author also shows that the results for political determinants improved 
when this problem is considered. 
51. With regard to the USA, we utilize the average GDP growth of other countries as instrument.  
52. Hausman (1978) suggests the test for endogeneity of an explanatory variable by comparing the 
estimates of OLS and 2SLS directly.  If the null hypothesis of an exogeneous explanatory variable is 
rejected, then we have to consider the potential endogeneity problem since it indicates 2SLS estimates 
are consistent.  
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countercyclical 53 .  These results could be interpreted as that the level of 
procyclicality of government consumption can lessen if we consider the reverse 
causality effect of fiscal policy on economic growth.  These results are consistent 
with our country by country analysis and the existing literature (Ilzetzki, 2011; Lane, 
2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003; Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 
2003).  Our country by country analysis of Table 2.12 shows that about half of 
OECD countries appear to have countercyclical government consumption while half 
appear to have procyclical government consumption.  The existing literature shows a 
clear picture of procyclical government investment, but it does not suggest a 
consistent picture of procyclical government consumption.    
Table 2.16  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries (FE 2SLS) 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  -0.844*** -0.519 -0.996*** -0.865*** -0.190 -0.916*** 
(-4.58) (-0.85) (-4.44) (-5.22) (-0.28) (-4.30) 
GDPt-1 0.588*** 0.170 0.234** 0.396*** 0.882*** 0.548*** 
(6.74) (0.56) (2.11) (4.79) (2.71) (5.17) 
GDPt-2 0.262*** -0.891*** 0.303*** 0.230*** 0.399* 0.216*** 
(4.06) (-4.14) (3.88) (3.85) (1.67) (2.88) 
Wald 761.61*** 96.53*** 688.52*** 1020.41*** 39.52*** 607.21*** 
R
2
 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.034 0.017 
Hausman chi
2
 29.68*** 0.00 12.57*** 23.49*** 2.05 16.17*** 
No.of Obs. 820 799 798 804 816 795 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008.  
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects 2SLS Instrumental variables estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
To conclude, our empirical findings suggest that the current transfers of OECD 
countries seem to be countercyclical on average due to the existence of automatic 
stabilizers, while government investment appears to be procyclical on average.  
However, we cannot confirm the cyclical properties of government consumption and 
interest payments considering the causality effect of government spending on 
economic growth. 
                                                 
53. When one runs the same regressions with cyclically adjusted government spending to remove the 
effect of automatic stabilizers, the results show that government spending generally becomes less 
countercyclical when the cyclical component is excluded as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.6.  
The results also show that cyclically adjusted current expenditure and total expenditure can be 
countercyclical if one considers the endogeneity problem.  
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(4) The effect of introducing fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality  
Next, this subsection analyses the effect of introducing fiscal rules on the level 
of fiscal procyclicality across spending categories.  We include a dummy variable for 
fiscal rules which is the form of an interaction variable into the estimation equation, 
following the existing literature54.  This is because the coefficient of the interaction 
term measures the change in the coefficient of fiscal procyclicality when fiscal rules 
are introduced (Preacher, 2003).  In other words, it indicates the effect of fiscal rules 
on the level of fiscal procyclicality55.     
  Table 2.17 shows that the introduction of fiscal rules could mitigate the level 
of procyclicality or fortify the level of countercyclicality.  The coefficients on the 
interaction variables for fiscal rules and GDP growth are significantly negative 
except in explaining government investment in column (5) 56.  The introduction of 
fiscal rules causes an additional decrease in spending growth of 0.18~0.40 
percentage points on average, for every one percentage point increase of current 
GDP57.  This result is consistent with Manasse (2006) who shows that fiscal rules 
could enhance countercyclical fiscal policy.  What one should note is that fiscal rules 
do not play any role in mitigating the procyclicality of government investment.  We 
can think of the characteristics of government investment as the reason for this result.  
Government investment is the main spending category which policymakers control 
discretionarily regardless of economic situation as already argued in section 3.3.2.  
The discretionary fiscal policy is mainly carried out by the adjustment of government 
investment (Padoan, 2009).  Therefore, the procyclicality of government investment 
is not affected by the introduction of fiscal rules compared to the other spending 
categories.                  
                                                 
54. The literature on the determinants of fiscal procylicality generally does not include control 
variables themselves as separate regressors (see, for example, Alesina, 2008; Diallo, 2009).    
55. The coefficient of control variables means the effect of each control variable on the change in 
government spending, not the level of fiscal procyclicality itself.  If we include RULE as a separate 
regressor, we cannot find the effect of control variable on procyclicality properly because of 
collinearity of two variables.    
56. The change in correlation between government spending and GDP after introducing fiscal rules is 
also smallest in explaining government investment, as can be seen from Table 2.10.   
57. The coefficient of the interaction term for control variables and GDP growth denotes the change 
in the level of fiscal procyclicality (the coefficient of GDPt) when the control variable changes by one 
unit.   
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Table 2.17 also shows that the government investment of OECD countries 
seems to be procyclical while current transfers and interest payments show 
countercyclical patterns, which are consistent with baseline results of Table 2.13.  
The marginal effects of GDP growth on government spending growth have the same 
sign as the coefficient of GDP growth of Table 2.13 and show similar sizes. 
Table 2.17  The effect of fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  0.166*    0.062 -0.160* 0.022   0.657*** -0.008   
(1.87) (0.21) (-1.74) (0.31) (2.85) (-0.11) 
GDPt-1 0.292*** 0.302 -0.019 0.152**    0.563* 0.274*** 
(4.64) (1.32) (-0.20) (2.27) (1.87) (3.18) 
GDPt-2 0.332*** -0.785 0.380*** 0.310*** 0.447* 0.301***   
 (3.92) (-1.71) (5.01) (4.67) (1.91) (3.64) 
RULE *GDP t -0.184*** -2.081*** -0.283** -0.404*** 0.281 -0.307*** 
(-3.07) (-5.38) (-2.65) (-5.39) (1.13) (-3.79) 
*marginal 
effect 
0.100 -0.692 -0.262 -0.125 0.758 -0.119 
 (<=> ) 3.00* 38.77*** 9.21*** 20.74*** 6.14*** 8.82*** 
F- Statistics 38.09*** 13.83*** 7.58*** 17.21*** 16.16*** 13.37 *** 
R
2
 0.199 0.105 0.087 0.187 0.056 0.131   
No.of Obs. 820 799 798 804 816 795 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product and RULE is the dummy variable for the fiscal rules.  All variables 
are expressed in the first difference of the log real terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008.   
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
(4) FGDP is for testing joint significance of GDPt and interaction variable for GDPt and RULE. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86 and IMF fiscal rules database (2009). 
 
To check robustness of these results, we include five additional control 
variables which are commonly employed in the existing literature.  Table 2.18 also 
shows that fiscal rules could be one of main determinants of fiscal procyclicality.  
The results show a large similarity with Table 2.17 that all coefficients of the 
interaction for fiscal rules and GDP growth have the same signs in spite of the 
different levels of statistical significance.  The coefficients associated with interest 
payments and current transfers are significantly negatively.  The introduction of 
fiscal rules decreases interest payments by 1.56 percentage points and current 
transfers by 0.38 percentage points, on average, for every one percentage point 
increase in GDP.  However, the coefficients of interaction for fiscal rules and GDP 
growth in explaining government consumption and total expenditure become 
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insignificant, and the coefficient of interaction for fiscal rules and GDP growth in 
explaining government investment becomes significant when other control variables 
are included.  This could be because the effect of fiscal rules is less precisely 
estimated here than in the baseline estimation of Table 2.17 because of the possible 
collinearity with fiscal rules and other control variables58.  
Table 2.18 also shows that the government investment of OECD countries 
seems to be procyclical, while other spending categories show a countercyclical 
pattern.  The marginal effects59 of GDP growth on government spending growth are 
all negative except for government investment, and significant jointly.  These results 
are generally consistent with the baseline results of Table 2.13 except that 
government consumption is countercyclical.  The other five control variables 
generally show the expected sign in line with the existing literature, and some of 
them seem to play a significant role in determining fiscal procyclicality of some 
spending categories, especially government consumption and investment even 
though the statistical significances of coefficients are low.  Income per capita 
(GDPPC) and government the debt ratio (DEBTRATIO) generally play a role in 
reducing the level of fiscal procyclicality. 
Trade openness (OPEN) shows a significantly negative effect in explaining 
government investment.  A one percentage point increase of trade openness, which is 
measured by the ratio of exports and imports with respect to GDP, could lead to a 
decrease in the level of procyclicality of government investment (coefficient of GDP 
growth) of 0.007 on average, holding other variables constant.  This coefficient 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in trade openness could additionally 
reduce government investment by 0.007 percentage points for every one percentage 
point increase in GDP.  However, there are contradictive arguments about the 
interpretation of trade openness.  Some studies argue that high openness makes fiscal 
policy less procyclical since it indicates high access to international capital (Woo, 
2009) 60 , but others argue that high openness could make fiscal policy more 
                                                 
58. When the same estimations are run excluding the interaction for two variables (income per capita 
and the debt ratio) and GDP growth, the coefficients of the interaction for fiscal rules and GDP 
growth become similar with those of the baseline estimations in Table 2.17.   
59. The marginal effect can be obtained by calculating the sum of the coefficients of GDP growth and 
Σ(estimated coefficient*average value of control variable).   
60. Woo (2009) could not confirm his argument empirically since the coefficient was not significant. 
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procyclical since it leads to an increase in the cost of financing from the international 
market, especially during recessions (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Lane, 2003) 61.  
Our results show that the effect of trade openness is not certain according to the 
spending categories, which could be consistent with the contradictive empirical 
evidence of the existing literature. 
Table 2.18  The effect of fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality                                
(additional control variables) 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  2.215 -0.075 0.165 1.465 3.839 1.565 
(1.48) (-0.02) (0.06) (0.85) (1.10) (0.99) 
GDPt-1 0.134*** 0.165 -0.209*** 0.008 0.559*** 0.168* 
(2.99) (0.73) (-2.91) (0.16) (3.02) (1.75) 
GDPt-2 0.402*** -0.914 0.395*** 0.327*** 0.567*** 0.281*** 
(7.33) (-1.55) (4.22) (5.32) (3.28) (2.88) 
OPEN*GDPt 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.007* 0.000 
(0.78) (-0.22) (1.56) (0.95) (-1.82) (0.15) 
POLCON*GDPt  0.762 -2.547 0.154 0.124 1.859 0.130 
(1.40) (-0.95) (0.18) (0.17) (1.05) (0.16) 
GDPPC*GDPt -0.291* 0.203 -0.031 -0.165 -0.529 -0.160 
(-1.72) (0.54) (-0.10) (-0.93) (-1.13) (-0.99) 
GOVSIZE*GDPt 
 
0.014 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.052 0.009 
(1.68) (0.16) (0.34) (0.79) (1.55) (0.69) 
DEBTRT*GDPt 
 
-0.006** -0.017 -0.010*** -0.009** -0.012 -0.011*** 
(-2.38) (-1.35) (-2.83) (-2.63) (-1.52) (-3.11) 
RULE *GDPt -0.073 -1.560*** -0.383** -0.332** 0.728** -0.172 
(-0.64) (-3.04) (-2.54) (-2.76) (2.13) (-1.25) 
*marginal effect -0.028 -0.597 -0.456 -0.252 0.869 -0.313 
 (<=> ) 2.76** 20.48*** 6.89*** 8.61*** 5.11*** 11.56*** 
F-statistics 17.80*** 35.10*** 19.44*** 16.21*** 18.62*** 13.42*** 
R
2
 0.212 0.135 0.133 0.223 0.086 0.160 
No.of Obs. 636 635 635 636 635 634 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product, OPEN is trade openness, POLCON is a political power dispersion 
index, GDPPC is the log of income per capita, GOVSIZE is the size of public sector, DEBTRT is the 
government debt to GDP ratio, and RULE is a dummy variable for the fiscal rules.  All variables are expressed in 
the first difference of the log real terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008. 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
(4) FGDP is for testing joint significance of GDPt and interaction variables with GDPt . 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, Henisz database (2010), and IMF 
fiscal rules database (2009). 
  
                                                 
61. Mackiewicz (2008) argues that the two effects work in the opposite direction and shows that the 
coefficient is negative, but it is insignificant. 
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Political power dispersion (POLCON) shows a positive effect in general, which 
implies that more dispersed political power leads to a more procyclical pattern of 
government spending.  A 0.1 unit increase of political power dispersion index, which 
ranges from zero to one, could lead to an increase in the level of fiscal procyclicality 
by 0.076 in explaining government consumption and by 0.186 in explaining 
government investment on average.  However, all coefficients are insignificant.  
There is also contradictive empirical evidence about the effect of political power 
dispersion.  Lane (2003) shows that power dispersion could worsen fiscal 
procyclicality, whereas Woo (2009) shows that it could mitigate the level of fiscal 
procyclicality by reducing harmful effects on fiscal behaviour of social polarization 
through checks and balances62.  
 Income per capita (GDPPC) shows a significantly negative effect in explaining 
government consumption, which indicates that the developing countries are more 
likely to run procyclical fiscal policy.  The level of procyclicality of government 
consumption is estimated to be decreased by 0.291 for every one percent increase in 
income per capita.  This result is consistent with the existing literature (Lane, 2003; 
Çiçek and Elgin, 2011) 63.  
Government size (GOVSIZE) shows a positive effect, which implies that the 
countries with bigger public sectors tend to operate a more procyclical fiscal policy.  
However, all coefficients are insignificant.  The existing literature presents different 
empirical evidence. Lane (2003) shows that the effect of government size, which 
indicates the power of government employees on fiscal policy making, is different 
across spending categories.  Woo (2009) shows that government size is negatively 
associated with fiscal procyclicality since it indicates the strength of the automatic 
stabilizers, while Mackiewicz (2008) shows that it does not play any role in fiscal 
procyclicality. 
The government debt ratio (DEBTRT) generally shows a significantly negative 
effect, and a one percentage point increase in the government debt ratio reduces 
                                                 
62. Mackiewicz (2008) also assumes that political power dispersion could contribute to reducing 
fiscal procyclicality because dispersed power implies lower probability of policy change.  However, 
the author could not confirm the hypothesis empirically since the coefficient was not significant.  
63. Mackiewicz (2008) also suggest the negative effect of income per capita on the level of fiscal 
procyclicality, but it is not significant.  
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government spending by 0.006~0.017 percentage points for every one percentage 
point increase in current GDP growth.  This result is not consistent with the existing 
literature (Mackiewicz, 2008) which argues that high debt could arouse a financial 
constraint.  However, high debt could reduce the incentive on an increase in 
spending by arousing the concern about fiscal sustainability in practice, namely high 
debt could provide “debt stabilization motive” in fiscal policy (Huart, 2011, p.411; 
Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel, and André, 2007), so it could reduce the level of 
procyclicality, especially in booms.  
One issue we have to consider is that we should interpret the size of coefficients 
carefully.  This is because each variable has different measurement units and a 
different distibution, so the size of the coefficient does not mean the real effect on 
fiscal procyclicality.  Table 2.19 presents the change in government spending growth 
for every one percentage point increase in GDP when each control variables change 
by one standard deviation of that variable, in other words, the variation of the level 
of procyclicality across control variables.  The results show that the discrepancy 
among the size of the real effects of control variables on government spending is not 
as big as the discrepancy among the size of coefficients in Table 2.18. 
Table 2.19  The additional change in the level of procyclicality across control variables 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Change in spending growth 
(1) 
Consump
tion 
(2) 
Interest 
Payments 
(3) 
Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5)Invest 
ment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
OPEN 58.824 42.404 0.059 -0.078 0.132 0.077 -0.286 0.010 
POLCON 0.468 0.094 0.071 -0.238 0.014 0.012 0.174 0.012 
GDPPC 9.974 0.400 -0.116 0.081 -0.012 -0.066 -0.212 -0.064 
GOVSIZE 43.553 9.563 0.135 0.063 0.037 0.084 0.501 0.082 
DEBTRT 57.818 0.481 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
RULE 0.362 0.481 -0.035 -0.750 -0.184 -0.160 0.350 -0.083 
Note: OPEN is trade openness, POLCON is a political power dispersion index, GDPPC is the log of income per 
capita, GOVSIZE is the size of public sector, DEBTRT is the government debt to GDP ratio, and RULE is a 
dummy variable for the fiscal rules.   
 
The correlation analysis of section 3.3.1 shows that the effect of annual fiscal 
rules and multi-year fiscal rules on the level of fiscal procyclicality could be 
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different.  To verify this result, this section analyses the effect of annual fiscal rules 
and multi-year fiscal rules respectively64. 
Table 2.20  The effect of annual and multi-year fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality   
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
<Anuual fiscal rules> 
 RULE *GDPt -0.169** -2.296*** -0.179 -0.416*** 0.031 -0.335*** 
(-2.36) (-4.90) (-1.36) (-4.43) (0.09) (-2.98) 
F-statistics 29.08*** 10.30*** 8.59*** 14.61*** 11.00*** 11.15*** 
R
2
 0.201 0.093 0.078 0.175 0.071 0.138 
No.of Obs. 654 634 633 638 650 629 
No.of Groups 24 24 24 24 24 24 
<Multi-year fiscal rules> 
RULE *GDPt -0.213*** -1.503** -0.417*** -0.362*** 0.543  -0.261** 
(-2.84) (-2.64) (-2.85) (-3.17) (1.64) (-2.16) 
F-statistics 27.37*** 4.98*** 7.29*** 14.71*** 9.73*** 10.17*** 
R
2
 0.199 0.056 0.079 0.169 0.044 0.115 
No.of Obs. 671 652 651 655 667 646 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) All regressions include GDPt  (real gross domestic product) and the lagged values of GDPt  as 
independent variables.  All spending variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real terms.  RULE is 
the dummy variable for the fiscal rules 
(2) The sample period is 1970–2008. 
(3) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(4) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86 and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
 
Table 2.20 presents the results for the effect of introducing annual fiscal rules 
and multi-year fiscal rules on the level of fiscal procyclicality across spending 
categories.  The coefficients of interaction for fiscal rules and GDP growth are all 
negative except in explaining government investment in both types of rules.  With 
regard to government consumption, the size of coefficients in multi-year fiscal rules 
are smaller than that of annual fiscal rules, which indicates that the effects of multi-
year fiscal rules are bigger than annual fiscal rules.  The introduction of annual fiscal 
rules and multi-year fiscal rules decrease government consumption additionally by 
0.169 percentage points and 0.213 percentage points, for every one percentage point 
increase in current GDP.  With regard to current transfers, the coefficient for multi-
year fiscal rules is significant while that of annual fiscal rules is insignificant.   These 
                                                 
64. We conduct regressions separately because to estimate a regression including a dummy variable 
for both annual and multi-year fiscal rules together will cause multicollinearity bias since they are 
strongly correlated. 
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results imply that multi-year fiscal rules are more efficient to mitigate the 
procyclicality of government consumption and current transfers, but both do not 
seem to play any role in reducing procyclicality of government investment65.   
To conclude, one can see that introducing fiscal rules can help governments 
operate fiscal policy in a less procyclical way and that multi-year fiscal rules tend to 
be more effective in reducing the level of procyclicality of government consumption 
and current transfers compared with annual fiscal rules.  These results are generally 
consistent with those of correlation analysis of section 3.3.1. 
 
(5) The effect of the SGP rules 
Lastly, this subsection explores the effect of introducing the SGP rules on fiscal 
procyclicality.  This subsection analyses the 16 EU countries66 that have adopted the 
SGP rules.  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy in the 16 EU countries are similar 
to those of baseline analysis in the 26 OECD countries, in spite of different levels of 
significance.  Government investment of 16 EU countries appears to be procyclical 
as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.767.  Table 2.21 presents the coefficients 
of interaction for various kinds of fiscal rules and GDP growth respectively.  To 
allow for a comparison with the results of the effect of fiscal rules in OECD 
countries, we present those results of Table 2.17 in the bottom of Table 2.21.  The 
results show that the effect of fiscal rules and the SGP rules in the 16 EU countries 
                                                 
65. We additionally examine the cyclical properties of the budget balance by regressing the primary 
budget balance on the output gap, following some existing literature (Huart, 2011; Aghion and 
Marinescu, 2007; Mackiewicz, 2008; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008).  The results show that 
the coefficients of interaction for fiscal rules and the output gap are significantly positive in both 
annual fiscal rules and multi-year fiscal rules, and they also show that the effect of multi-year fiscal 
rules are bigger than that of annual fiscal rules, as can be seen from Appendix 2. Table 2A.4.  These 
results are generally consistent with our results.  
  
66. Twelve EMU countries and four other advanced European countries (Denmark, Slovakia, Sweden, 
and the UK). 
 
67. The only difference with the results of 26 OECD countries is the coefficient of GDP growth in 
explaining current transfers becomes insignificant and that of GDP growth in explaining total 
expenditure becomes significant.  This could be because the share of EU countries which introduced 
annual fiscal rules is bigger than that of OECD countries.  The ratio of countries which introduced 
only annual fiscal rules is 43.8% in EMU countries (seven out of 16 countries) and 38.5% (nine out of 
26 countries) in all OECD countries.  The countries with annual fiscal rules generally operate less 
countercyclical current transfers than in the countries with multi-year fiscal rules, as can be seen from 
the results of Table 2.21.       
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are generally similar to the effect of fiscal rules in the 26 OECD countries.  However, 
one cannot be certain that this effect in the 16 EU countries is due to entirely the 
function of the SGP rules.  This is because a large number of EU countries adopted 
their own national fiscal rules as well as the SGP rules.  
Table 2.21  The effect of the SGP rules on fiscal procyclicality 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
Fiscal rules -0.223*** -2.561*** -0.308** -0.477*** 0.042 -0.357*** 
Annual rules -0.217** -2.405*** -0.206 -0.447*** -0.057 -0.321** 
Multi-year rules -0.269** -2.249*** -0.517** -0.487*** 0.098 -0.395** 
SGP rules -0.206*** -2.523*** -0.342** -0.486*** 0.027 -0.377*** 
SGP rules only -0.205** -2.362*** -0.180 -0.429*** -0.039 -0.299** 
* Fiscal rules(OECD) -0.184*** -2.081*** -0.283** -0.404*** 0.281 -0.307*** 
Note: (1) All regressions include GDPt  (real gross domestic product) and lagged values of GDPt  as independent 
variables.  All spending variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real terms. RULE is a dummy 
variable for the fiscal rules       (2) The sample period is 1970–2008. 
(3) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(4) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86 and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
Therefore, one should differentiate the effect of the SGP rules and that of own 
initiative fiscal rules to assess the exact effect of the SGP rules.  One can see the 
effect of the SGP rules from the fifth row of Table 2.21 where we exclude the period 
during which national rules were operated68.  The coefficients of the SGP rules have 
a large similarity with those of when the effects of national rules are included in the 
fourth row of Table 2.21.  However, one can see from the results that the size of 
coefficients becomes smaller and less significant, which indicates that the effect of 
the SGP rules becomes less when the effect of national fiscal rules is excluded.  This 
could be because the types of national rules are mainly multi-year rules.  Nine 
countries out of 11 EU countries, which have adopted both SGP rules and national 
fiscal rules, operate multi-year fiscal rules.  This explanation can be confirmed by 
the results of Table 2.21 that the coefficients of the SGP rules, when national rules 
are excluded in the fifth row, are similar to those of annual fiscal rules in the second 
                                                 
 
68. Eleven countries (Austria, since 1999; Denmark, since 1992; Finland, since 1999; France, since 
1998); Germany, since 1982; Luxembourg, since 1992; Netherlands, since 1994; Portugal, since 2002; 
Spain, since 2003; Sweden, since 1996; the UK, since 1997) operate their own initiative fiscal rules as 
well as the SGP rules. On the other hand, five countries (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Slovakia) 
operate only the SGP rules. 
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row while they are larger than those of multi-year rules in the third row.  These 
results imply that the effect of the SGP rules is similar to that of annual fiscal rules 
and that the SGP rules are less effective in mitigating the level of fiscal 
procyclicality than multi-year fiscal rules.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Our main findings from both the correlation and regression analyses could be 
summarized as follows.  First, we find that a large number of OECD countries seem 
to operate their fiscal policy in a procyclical way, especially in government 
consumption and investment, in line with recent literature.  These findings suggest 
that discretionary fiscal policy is mainly carried out by the adjustment of government 
consumption and investment.  Second, one can see that some control variables which 
were commonly introduced in the existing literature seem to play a certain role in 
determining the level of the procyclicality of government spending.  Income per 
capita and the government debt ratio play a role in reducing the level of fiscal 
procyclicality.  Finally, introducing multi-year fiscal rules could reduce the level of 
procyclicality of fiscal policy or make fiscal policy more countercyclical, which is 
consistent with our theoretical explanation of section 2.3.  Correlation analysis 
shows that multi-year fiscal rules could be an efficient policy tool in reducing fiscal 
procyclicality while the effect of introducing annual fiscal rules on fiscal cyclicality 
is not certain.  Regression analysis also shows that annual fiscal rules as well as 
multi-year fiscal rules could help reduce fiscal procyclicality, but the effect of the 
former does not seem to be as efficient as the latter. 
These findings imply that the level of fiscal procyclicality could be affected by 
the time horizon of fiscal policy.  If government operates fiscal policy from the 
short-term perspective, the level of procyclicality might not be mitigated.  If 
government operates fiscal policy from the long-term perspective, the degree of  
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procyclicality will be mitigated clearly.  Policymakers can operate fiscal policy from 
the long-term perspective by introducing multi-year fiscal rules, and they in turn 
could help policymakers operate fiscal policy in a more countercyclical way.  In 
addition, policymakers should make an effort to find another mechanism to mitigate 
the level of fiscal procyclicality.  They, therefore, should operate fiscal policy from 
the long-term perspective, and countercyclical fiscal policy measures should be 
accompanied by when it is needed69.   
First, policymakers should operate fiscal policy from the long-term perspective.  
Fiscal rules might be helpful to maintain a countercyclical fiscal policy (Manasse, 
2006).  One thing we should remember is that they should be designed in a way that 
induces fiscal policy into mid- and long-term perspective rather than short-term 
perspective70.  The representative policy instrument to introduce fiscal rules might be 
the multi–year fiscal plan.  OECD (2002) suggests in the Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency that governments should report the forecast of budget outcomes 
including the current year and at least the following two years.  Second, 
countercyclical policy measures should be supplemented in the short-term.  Rainy 
day funds could be helpful to operate fiscal policy in a countercyclical way.  Hou 
(2006) shows that budget stabilization funds raised state spending during recessions 
by analysing a sample of 50 states in the USA.  Raising the ratio of automatic 
stabilizers might be one of alternatives for successful fiscal policy (Eskesen, 2009; 
Carmignani, 2010).  An automatic drop in government revenue or an automatic rise 
in government spending, such as social benefits, could alleviate procyclical 
behaviour.  Finally, policymakers should make an effort to solve practical problems 
which arise in the process of fiscal policy making and budget execution.  The most 
urgent problem might be to reduce the gap between budget plan and actual outcomes.  
Enhancing government’s ability to forecast economic variables could make this gap 
smaller (He, 2003; Carmignani, 2010).  Governments can also adjust their plans 
about revenue, spending, and borrowing during the fiscal year by introducing a mid-
                                                 
 
69. Hou (2006, p.737) emphasizes that a multi-year budget without countercyclical fiscal policy 
measures is “an unreliable journey”.   
 
70. For example, Chile introduced structural surplus rule by the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2006, 
and this concept reflects the medium-term fiscal outlook.  The introduction of the structural balance 
rule enables the Chilean government to operate a countercyclical fiscal policy because fiscal rules 
reduce the fluctuation and uncertainty of the economy in terms of medium-term performance (Jorge 
Rodríguez, Carla Tokman, and Alejandra Vega, 2007).   
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term budget reviews to reduce this gap.  The institutional arrangements, which could 
prevent forecasting from estimating optimistically due to political pressures, could 
make fiscal policy more countercyclical (Frankel, 2011b).  Also, governments 
should reduce implementation time lags to respond to the business cycle in a more 
efficient way.  For example, governments can respond to business cycle more timely 
and quickly by reducing the share of nonflexible spending items. 
The contributions of this chapter are two folds.  First, this chapter comfirms the 
results of recent literature on fiscal cyclicality that the fiscal policy of advanced 
countries has been procyclical at times71.  The existing literature mainly focuses on 
the fiscal procyclicality of emerging market countries showing the fiscal policy of 
these countries tend to be procyclical, while that of developed countries not.  
However, this chapter focuses on analysing the cyclical properties of fiscal policy of 
OECD countries across spending categories 72  and shows that government 
consumption and investment of developed countries appear to be procyclical.  
Second, this chapter could provide the basis of research that could assess the effect 
of introducing fiscal rules more comprehensively by analysing the effect of the time 
coverage of fiscal rules for the first time.  Previous studies analyse the effect of fiscal 
rules on fiscal policy without considering the type of fiscal rules, or they mainly 
focus on the theoretical explanation on the effect of fiscal rules without being 
sufficiently supported by empirical evidence.  Our empirical findings suggest that the 
effect of fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality could be different depending on the time 
coverage of fiscal rules.  Therefore, our findings could imply that the existing studies 
about the effect of the SGP rules on fiscal cyclicality could be misleading since they 
do not differentiate the effect of national fiscal rules which each country adopted on 
their own initiative.  The effect of the SGP rules will be lessened if one excludes the 
                                                 
 
71. Only a small number of studies suggest the possibility that fiscal policy of some developed 
countries is procyclical (see, for example, Lane, 2003; Manasse, 2006; Mackiewicz, 2008; Ilzetzki, 
2009). Lane (2003) shows that government consumption and investment of some OECD countries 
appear to be procyclical.  Manasse (2006) shows that fiscal policies of developed countries are 
procyclical in good times and more procyclical in developed countries than in developing countries.  
Mackiewicz (2008) shows that the fiscal policies of developed countries could be procyclical when it 
has weak institutions or a high debt-to-GDP ratio.  Ilzetzki (2009) shows that government 
consumption and investment of high-income countries is procyclical.   
72. Some literature focuses on the case of OECD countries.  Lane (2003) analyses the data of 22 
traditional members of OECD countries, Aghion and Marinescu (2007) analyse 19 OECD countries, 
Mackiewicz (2008) analyses 30 OECD countries and nine recently joined EU countries, and Huart 
(2011) analyses 20 OECD countries. 
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effect of national fiscal rules because national fiscal rules, which generally take 
multi-year fiscal rules, are more efficient than the SGP rules, which are annual fiscal 
rules, in stimulating countercylcical fiscal policy.       
However, our analysis also has several limitations.  First, the analysis in this 
chapter does not deal with other fiscal institutions beyond fiscal rules.  A variety of 
other factors could be important in shaping fiscal policy.  For example, the type of 
budget system and fiscal transparency might have an effect on fiscal stance.  
Forecasting ability and implementation time lags that we mentioned in section 2.1 
could also play a key role in determining fiscal stance.  However, these variables are 
not easy to define and measure, especially in developing and underdeveloped 
countries.  Second, this chapter analyses only the case of OECD countries mainly 
due to the availability and reliability issues regarding fiscal data.  Future research 
needs to extend samples to developing countries to explore whether the negative 
effect of multi-year fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality also applies in emerging 
market countries where the quality of institutions may not be particularly high.    
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Appendix 2 
 
Graph 2A.1   The trend of fiscal procyclicality of total expenditure 
A. EMU countries – Annual fiscal rules 
   
   
 
B. EMU countries – Multi-year fiscal rules 
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C. Other advanced European countries– Multi-year fiscal rules 
 
  
 
D. Other advanced non-European countries 
                        [ Multi-year fiscal rules ]                               [ Annual fiscal rules ]                                            
   
[ No fiscal rules ] 
   
Note: The vertical line represents the year when fiscal rules were adopted.  In case of EMU countries, it is the 
same as the year when the SGP rules were adopted. 
 
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Denmark
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Iceland
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Norway
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Sweden
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
UK
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Australia
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
New Zealand
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Canada
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Japan
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Korea
-
5
-
4
-
3
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
USA
67 
 
Graph 2A.2 The trend of fiscal procyclicality of cyclically adjusted total expenditure 
 
A. EMU countries – Annual fiscal rules 
   
   
 
B. EMU countries – Multi-year fiscal rules 
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C. Other advanced European countries– Multi-year fiscal rules 
 
  
 
D. Other advanced non-European countries 
                        [ Multi-year fiscal rules ]                               [ Annual fiscal rules ]                                            
   
                              [ No fiscal rules ] 
  
Note: The vertical line represents the year when fiscal rules were adopted.  In case of EMU countries, it is the 
same as the year when the SGP rules were adopted. 
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Table 2A.1  Comparison among the existing literature 
 
 
Main reason for 
procyclicality 
Regression equation 
Dependent variable Independent variables 
Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) 
borrowing 
constraints 
the change in the general 
government budget balance 
(spending, consumption) to 
GDP ratio 
real GDP growth 
percent change in terms of trade 
lagged fiscal balance 
Tornell and Lane 
(1999) voracity effect - - 
Arreaza, Sorensen, 
and Yosha (1999) 
the design of 
fiscal institutions - - 
Lane  
(2003) 
output volatility, 
power dispersion 
log government expenditure 
(total expenditure, 
consumption, investment) 
Step 1: log GDP 
Step 2 : output volatility, power 
dispersion index, per capita output, 
trade openness, public sector size 
Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and 
Végh (2004) 
availability of 
international 
capital 
To compare difference between government spending in good and 
bad times 
Riascoc and Végh 
(2004) 
imperfect capital 
markets 
Correlation of government consumption (total revenue, share of 
government consumption)  with GDP 
Talvi and Végh 
(2005) 
political 
distortion Correlation of real government consumption with real GDP 
Manasse (2006) different policy 
reaction 
general government primary 
balance 
output gap 
total general government public 
debt 
fiscal rules (dummy) 
institutional variables 
Aghion and 
Marinescu (2007) 
low financial 
development, 
higher openness 
real budget balance/GDP 
GDP gap 
financial development 
average years of education over 25 
openness 
population growth 
government share of GDP 
invest share of GDP 
inflation targeting (dummy) 
Alesina, 
Campante, and 
Tabellini  
(2008) 
corruption 
change in central government 
budget surplus or government 
consumption 
output gap 
lag of  central government 
budget surplus or government 
consumption 
initial GDP per capita 
corruption index 
credit ratings 
the spread of sovereign debt over 
the US debt 
Ilzetzki and Végh 
(2008) - 
real central government spending 
or consumption change in log real GDP 
70 
 
Mackiewicz 
(2008) 
weak institutions, 
high debt ratio 
log general government primary 
surplus / GDP 
log output gap 
institutional quality 
political constraints 
corruption 
gini coefficient 
level of development 
openness of economy 
public debt/GDP 
Woo (2009) social inequality, political instability 
change in log real general 
government consumption 
Step 1: change in log real GDP 
Step 2: government size, income 
inequality, educational 
inequality, trade openness, 
multimensional aspect 
Lledó, 
Yackovlev, and 
Gadenne (2009) 
fiscal space, 
financing restriction 
growth in real central 
government expenditures 
real GDP growth 
terms of trade growth 
lagged growth in government 
spending 
political institutions 
financing restrictions 
fiscal space 
growth in oil price 
Diallo 
(2009) 
the existence of 
democratic 
institutions 
real government total 
expenditure minus interest 
payments/ 
real government current 
expenditure 
terms of trade shock 
political rights index 
civil liberty index 
democratic institution index 
presidential electoral dummy 
lagged government expenditure 
lzetzki 
(2011) political friction 
Correlation of HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central 
government expenditures or consumption with real GDP 
Frankel, Végh, 
and Vuletin  
(2011 ) 
institutional 
quality real government expenditure 
foreign liabilities/GDP 
liguid liabilities/GDP 
output volatility 
political check and balance 
institutional quality 
Çiçek and Elgin 
(2011) 
the size of 
shadow economy budget balance/GDP 
Step 1: de-trended GDP 
Step 2 : output volatility 
financial development 
financial risk 
corruption 
political stability 
GDP per capita 
level of democracy 
Badinger (2012) - change in log real government 
consumption change in log real GDP 
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Table 2A.2  The correlation between government spending and GDP 
 
All countries Annual rules Multi-year rules No rules 
Government consumption (CGAAV) 0.255*** 0.263*** 0.184*** 0.283*** 
Interest payments (GGINTPV) -0.054 -0.173*** -0.108** 0.156 
Current transfers (TCTV) 0.030 0.064 -0.128*** 0.141 
Current expenditure (YPGV) 0.144*** 0.112* -0.001 0.299*** 
Government Investment (IGAAV) 0.177*** 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.413*** 
Total expenditure (YPGTV) 0.126*** 0.119** -0.008 0.301*** 
Note : (1) All variables are expressed in the first difference of log real  terms. The sample period is 1970–2008. 
(2) * indicates significance at the 10% level. **  5% level.  ***  1% level. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
 
 
Table 2A.3  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries                            
with time fixed effects 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  0.292*** -0.506**   -0.071 0.054   1.137*** 0.100 
(2.94) (-2.35) (-0.74) (0.80) (5.44) (1.36) 
GDPt-1 0.212*** 0.166 0.010 0.145** 0.662** 0.279*** 
(3.91) (0.56) (0.10) (2.33) (2.50) (3.75) 
GDPt-2 0.128* -0.993* 0.148** 0.096 0.119 0.134 
(1.86) (-1.80) (2.18) (1.61) (0.44) (1.50) 
F - statistics (time) 23.70*** 45.65*** 28.46*** 125.46*** 6.54*** 23.35*** 
R
2
 0.319 0.314 0.206 0.352 0.109 0.255  
No.of Observations 820 799 798 804 816 795 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
(4) F- statistics (time) tests the joint significance of time effects. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
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Table 2A.4  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries              
(Output gap) 
Dependent Variable : primary budget balance 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
GAPt  0.515*** 0.275** 0.306** 0.394*** 
(5.20) (2.49) (2.57) (4.52) 
GAPt-1 0.096 0.253*** 0.188*** 0.215*** 
(1.68) (5.09) (3.24) (3.76) 
GAPt-2 -0.130* -0.122* -0.134 -0.150* 
(-1.83) (-1.73  ) (-1.71) (-2.01) 
RULE* GAPt   58.493***   
  (5.53)   
Annul Rule* GAPt    51.804***  
   (3.04)  
Multi Rule* GAPt     58.198*** 
    (5.91) 
F- Statistics 32.29*** 50.12*** 24.63*** 27.75*** 
R
2
 0.123 0.202 0.144   0.251 
No.of Observations 718 718 561 575 
No.of Groups 25 25 23 25 
Note: (1) GAP is output gap and RULE is a dummy variable for fiscal rules. The sample period is 1970–2008. 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86 and IMF fiscal rules database (2009). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2A.5  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries            
(system GMM) 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  0.130** -0.202 -0.157 -0.062 0.783*** -0.049 
(2.24) (-0.88) (-1.21) (-1.42) (3.58) (-0.66) 
GDPt-1 0.272*** 0.412** 0.080 0.196*** 0.649** 0.295*** 
(3.97) (2.20) (0.91) (2.71) (2.28) (3.33) 
GDPt-2 0.286*** -0.681*** 0.416*** 0.239*** 0.515** 0.302*** 
(4.04) (-3.21) (5.06) (4.56) (2.57) (4.84) 
dependent t-1 0.194*** 0.453*** 0.269*** 0.405*** -0.103 0.118** 
(3.55) (10.08) (4.93) (9.60) (-1.43) (2.35) 
Wald chi
2
  280.28*** 224.32*** 84.78*** 161.54***   121.08***   96.33*** 
Hansen chi
2
 22.10 12.54 24.11 21.20 18.94 23.34 
No.of Obs. 816 793 792 799 811 788 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008 
(2) Regression methods are Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
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Table 2A.6  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy of OECD countries – FE 2SLS 
(Cyclically adjusted spending) 
 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) Current Transfers (2) Current Expenditure (3) Total Expenditure 
GDPt  -0.597*** -0.521*** -0.665*** 
(-2.84) (-3.31) (-3.29) 
GDPt-1 0.241** 0.361*** 0.538*** 
(2.03) (4.07) (4.72) 
GDPt-2 0.268*** 0.222*** 0.204*** 
(3.33) (3.70) (2.64) 
F- Statistics 610.51*** 954.09***   545.45*** 
R
2
 0.020 0.031 0.029 
Hausman chi
2
   5.35 11.24** 10.76** 
No.of Observations 715 715 715 
No.of Groups 24 24 24 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects 2SLS Instrumental variables estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.   
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
 
 
Table 2A.7  The cyclical properties of fiscal policy in 16 EU countries 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
GDPt  0.140 -0.836*** -0.226 -0.127 1.004*** -0.178* 
(1.50) (-3.08) (-1.59) (-1.44) (3.09) (-1.82) 
** GDPt  
(OECD coutries) 
0.115 -0.558**   -0.244** -0.102   0.736*** -0.104 
GDPt-1 0.192*** 0.071 -0.046 0.069 0.400 0.171* 
(4.33) (0.22) (-0.48) (0.97) (1.14) (1.95) 
GDPt-2 0.449*** -0.666 0.353*** 0.334*** 0.442 0.333*** 
(5.93) (-1.72) (3.48) (5.20) (1.27) (3.29) 
F- Statistics 34.45*** 5.50*** 4.20** 9.75*** 10.32*** 8.54*** 
R
2
 0.178 0.032 0.058 0.097 0.060 0.080 
No.of Obs. 509 507 507 509 509 503 
No.of Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: (1) GDP is real gross domestic product.  All variables are expressed in the first difference of the log real 
terms.  The sample period is 1970–2008 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
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1. Introduction   
  
There is an increasing concern about the sustainability of fiscal finances which 
had been ignored since 1990s when fiscal sustainability temporarily improved73 
(Fatás, 2010).  This is because unsustainable fiscal finances have become considered 
to be one of crucial factors which triggered economic crisis.  A number of EU 
countries including Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain74 are suffering from 
economic crisis which were caused by fiscal crisis even though they have made an 
effort on reducing the level of government debt (Wren-Lewis, 2011). 
In addition, the importance of fiscal policy as an economic policy tool has 
increased following the global financial crisis which started in 2007.  Consequently, 
there is revival of interest in the effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy in the 
recent literature (Wren-Lewis, 2011; Feldstein, 2009; Auerbach, 2009)75.  This is 
mainly because other economic policy tools such as monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy cannot be controlled any more by policymakers, especially in small open 
economies, as the global economy has become increasingly integrated and 
liberalized (Carmignani, 2010).  Furthermore, monetary policy cannot be utilized as 
a stabilization tool in the EMU member countries since national monetary policy 
independence has been lost (Huart, 2011; Wren-Lewis, 2011).  However, this 
discretionary fiscal policy is inevitably accompanied by the deterioration of fiscal 
sustainability (Escario, Gadea, and Sabaté, 2012; Padoan, 2009; Freedman, Kumhof, 
Laxton, Muir, and Mursula, 2009).  As a result, whether the current fiscal finances 
are sustainable has been one of the most critical issues for policymakers because the 
answer indicates the scope of fiscal policy which can be utilized.   
                                                 
73. The government debt of EU countries had been declining owing to the efforts to abide by the 
Maastricht Treaty (Greiner, Köllert, and Semmler, 2007). 
74. These countries belong to the PIIGS countries of which debt sustainability has been questioned 
due to the large deficit and debt (Fincke and Greiner, 2012).   
75 . Auerbach (2009) points out three main factors as the reasons for the effectiveness of 
countercyclical fiscal policy: the first is that the effect of automatic stabilizers have been weaken, the 
second is that Lucas’s critique does not have any effect in imperfect markets, and the third is that 
monetary policy faces unusual challenges by being bounded by the zero-minimal interest rate.   
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Therefore, the issues on fiscal sustainability have been widely explored.  The 
existing literature mainly focuses on the measurement of fiscal sustainability, but 
little is known about the determinants of fiscal sustainability as stated by Menguy 
(2008), even though these determinants could provide policy implications for the 
government to maintain their fiscal finances in a more sustainable way.     
This chapter attempts to explore the main determinants of fiscal sustainability 
utilizing a sample of OECD countries.  We identify these main determinants of fiscal 
sustainability by comprehensively surveying the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature, and examining the role of each factor in determining fiscal sustainability 
in our empirical analysis.  We also explore the role of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) rules in determining fiscal sustainability in a sample of EMU countries.  Our 
findings from empirical analyses point to a number of factors that play an important 
role in determining fiscal sustainability.  The growth rate has a positive effect on 
fiscal sustainability while aging populations have a negative effect.  The advanced 
countries are more likely to have sustainable fiscal finances.  Our findings also show 
that the SGP rules appear to have helped policymakers maintain fiscal sustainability 
in EMU countries while other fiscal rules do not seem to play any role in the fiscal 
sustainability of OECD countries.   
  The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
discussion on the theoretical issues on fiscal sustainability and the determinants of 
fiscal sustainability which are identified in the existing literature.  Section 3 contains 
empirical analysis on the level of fiscal sustainability of OECD countries and the 
main determinants of fiscal sustainability.  Finally, this chapter ends with some 
concluding remarks and policy implications. 
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2. The theoretical issues on fiscal sustainability 
 
2.1.  The concept and measurement of fiscal sustainability 
There is a general consensus on the definition of fiscal sustainability in the 
existing literature although there are a few controversies76.  Fiscal sustainability 
refers to the future implications of current fiscal policies, in other words, the 
question of whether the government can maintain its current fiscal policies in the 
future without endangering its solvency (Croce and Juan-Ramón, 2003).  This policy 
might be either one in which the debt ratio does not increase (Tanner and Samake, 
2008) or one in which the debt ratio increases when the dynamics of debt are under 
control (Pasinetti, 2000) 77.  
Also, it is generally agreed that it is difficult to measure the level of fiscal 
sustainability.  The existing literature has adopted two approaches.  One approach 
performs sustainability tests based on the intertemporal government budget 
constraints, and the other approach focuses on a set of sustainability indicators.  
Studies utilizing the first approach, in turn, can be divided into three groups: studies 
using the stationarity of debt process, studies using the cointegration relationship 
between fiscal variables, and studies using the reaction function between the budget 
deficit and government debt.   
The problem of fiscal sustainability could be interpreted as an investigation of 
the trend of the debt to GDP ratio considering the government budgetary constraint 
(see, for example, Fincke and Greiner, 2012; Byrne, Fiess and MacDonald, 2011; 
Stoian and Cámpeanu, 2010; Polito and Wickens, 2005; Bohn, 1998).  Equation 
(3.1) specifies the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio.   
         ? = 4 − @ + (1 + B − C)?7 = −D + (1 +  9)?7                     (3.1) 
                                                 
76 . For example, Pasinetti (2000) and Harck (2000) debate on whether the concept of fiscal 
sustainability should require a desirable level of the final debt ratio.   
77. Debt sustainability is considered to be the same concept as fiscal sustainability in a great deal of 
the existing literature.   
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in which dt is the debt-GDP ratio, gt is the expenditure exclusive of interest 
payments-GDP ratio, tt is the revenue-GDP ratio, rt is a real interest rate, and θt is the 
growth rate in GDP.  Therefore, st indicates the ratio of primary budget balance to 
GDP, and a discount rate γt indicates the real interest rate minus growth rate.  This 
equation shows that a certain amount of primary surplus is required to maintain the 
certain level of the debt-GDP ratio in dynamically efficient economy where the real 
interest rate is higher than the real growth rate.  Equation (3.1) can be transformed as 
equation (3.2) by successive substitution. 
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(3.2) 
Early literature focused on testing the question of whether the current fiscal 
policy could satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint historically.  It is generally 
agreed in much of the literature that the intertemporal budget constraint holds if the 
current government debt can be offset by the present value of primary surplus, as 
below equation (3.3) when the present-value real debt (the first part of RHS in 
equation (3.2)) should go to be zero in the limit78: in other words, an increase in the 
real debt-GDP ratio should be below an increase in the real interest rate (see, for 
example, Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Bohn, 1998; Wilcox, 1989; Uctum and 
Wickens, 2000).  Then, fiscal policy will be sustainable when the debt-GDP ratio can 
grow at the rate equal to the primary surplus-GDP ratio.    
        
       )1(
)(
1
∑
=
+
+
=
n
i
i
itt
t
sEd
γ
                                                                                  (3.3) 
Some studies find that the intertemporal budget constraint holds if the debt 
process, which is correspondent with dt in equation (3.2), is stationary (Hamilton and 
Flavin, 1986; Wilcox, 1989; Uctum and Wickens, 2000).  Others utilize the 
cointegration relation between fiscal variables such as government expenditure and 
revenue, and they show that the intertemporal budget constraint holds if fiscal 
variables are cointegrated (Trehan and Walsh, 1988; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Ahmed 
and Rogers, 1995; Bravo and Silvestre, 2002).  These early approaches have the 
                                                 
78. This condition is called ‘the transversality condition’. Wilcox (1989) calls this the present-value 
budget constraint.   
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advantage in performing sustainability tests easily by the simple econometric model 
from a long-term perspective.  However, these approaches assume economic 
environments as exogenous and constant (Berenger and Llorca, 2007), for example, 
a constant interest rate, so they have difficulty in providing appropriate policy 
implications responding to future changes in the policy environment such as aging 
populations and a change in interest rate.  Also, the weak power of unit root tests 
might be another critical weakness when the stationarity of fiscal variables are 
tested79.      
Bohn (1998, 2005, 2007) 80 utilizes the reaction function between budget deficit 
and government debt to overcome the weaknesses of earlier studies.  The author 
examines how governments respond to an increase in government debt.  According 
to his framework, the primary budget balance is a function of government debt.  
Equation (3.1) can be rearranged to equation (3.4) assuming dt = dt-1 in the long run 
(Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald, 2011).    
         D = 9 ?7                                                                                              (3.4) 
Bohn (1998, 2005, 2007) provide direct evidence on the corrective actions by 
examining the response of the primary budget balance to changes in the debt-GDP 
ratio after removing the effect of temporary increases in government expenditure 
(GVAR) and temporary variations in the business cycle (YVAR), using the US data 
by estimating equation (3.5).   
         D =  . + /?7 + 9EF +  GEF + H                                         (3.5) 
If the debt-GDP ratio increases, then the government would raise primary 
budget surpluses to respond to debt accumulation and to satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constraint.  The main strength of this approach is that it does not require any 
assumption about the discount rate, and therefore one can rule out the misleading 
results which are caused by an inadequate choice of the discount rate.  However, this 
                                                 
79. The use of too many lags, compared to genuine lags, leads to lack of power while the use of too 
few lags results in the incorrect size of test (Wooldridge, 2006).   
80. A large number of studies have employed Bohn’s response function to explore fiscal sustainability 
(see, for example, Fincke and Greiner, 2012; Fincke and Greiner, 2011; Stoian and Cámpeanu, 2010; 
Berenger and Llorca, 2007; Greiner, Köllert and Semmler, 2007; Redžepagić and Llorca, 2007; 
Valderrama, 2005).   
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approach focuses on the long-term relationship between deficit and debt, and 
therefore it still has a drawback in providing short-term policy implications. 
The second approach focuses on finding appropriate sustainability indicators 
(see, for example, Buiter, 1985; Blanchard, 1990; Uctum and Wickens, 2000; Croce 
and Juan-Ramón, 2003; Polito and Wickens, 2005).  They derive fiscal sustainability 
indicators which could testify whether the current fiscal policy will be sustainable in 
the future.  They consider the budget deficit to be sustainable if the debt-GDP ratio is 
maintained at a certain target level, and they measure how much deficit is deviated 
from the sustainable deficit.  These indicators are simple and transparent, and 
therefore they could clearly provide the guideline for fiscal policy to both 
policymakers and taxpayers, but it is difficult to find an optimal debt level (Wyplosz, 
2005) or to achieve consensus about the target level of debt.  This problem might be 
more serious in emerging market countries because they tend to give priority to 
short-term economic growth and the expansion of a social safety net instead of long-
term fiscal sustainability.  
 
2.2.  The main determinants of  fiscal sustainability  
As mentioned above, there does not appear to be any directly comparable 
literature on the determinants of fiscal sustainability, although there is increasing 
interest about fiscal sustainability.  The existing literature mainly attempts to find out 
the effect of specific factors on fiscal sustainability, but it generally analyses the 
effect of individual factors on the budget balance or debt rather than fiscal 
sustainability per se.  Some studies focus on the main factors underlying successful 
fiscal consolidation, but they do not deal with the determinants of fiscal 
sustainability per se.  This section examines the main determinants of fiscal 
sustainability from the existing theoretical and empirical literature in three groups: 
budget and borrowing constraints, political constraints, and fiscal institutions.   
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2.2.1. Budget and borrowing constraints 
A number of studies examine the relationship between some economic variables 
and fiscal sustainability through intertemporal government budget constraints, an 
overlapping generations model, and borrowing constraints.   
This literature is based on the premise that the condition of fiscal sustainability 
is to satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraint (equation (3.3)).  Hall 
and Sargent (2010) show that the growth rate and interest payments could play a 
crucial role in determining the level of sustainable debt.  They examine the 
contributions of these factors on the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio by analysing the 
US data after the Second World War, and show that interest payments have had 
more effect than growth rates since the 1970s.  Menguy (2008) argues that the 
discrepancy between growth rates and interest rates has an important role in 
determining fiscal sustainability, even though the forecast of these future variables is 
difficult81.  Sakuragawa and Hosono (2011) argue that growth rates could have a 
crucial effect on the fiscal sustainability.  They show that a higher projected growth 
rate contributes to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio in the future by conducting the 
simulation of fiscal sustainability of Japan.  Aspromourgos, Rees, and White (2010) 
present a theoretical explanation on the role of the interest rate.  They show that 
nominal interest rates paid on debt and nominal growth rates have a crucial role in 
determining the size of the sustainable budget balance82, and that low interest rates 
will help the government obtain a sustainable budget balance more easily by 
introducing the fact that monetary policy could choose interest rate.  Fullwiler (2007) 
also argues that the interest rate could play an important role in determining fiscal 
sustainability through examining the US case.  The author argues that interest rates 
on national debt are a matter of monetary policy, mostly affected by the current and 
expected interest rates set by the Federal Reserve Board, rather than fiscal policy.  
Therefore, the author suggests that monetary policy, which is operated through 
adjusting the interest rate, has much to do with fiscal sustainability.  
                                                 
81. The author, therefore, suggests a new deficit rule combining the growth rate and debt to consider 
the long-term sustainability of fiscal finances and different situation of countries to overcome the 
problem of the SGP rules which focused on short-term deficit criterion. 
 
82. sustainable budget balance  =  STUVWVXU WYUV7 ZW[\U] WYUVZW[\U] WYUV ∗ debt  
82 
 
A number of studies examine fiscal sustainability within a general equilibrium 
framework using an overlapping generations model. For example, Chalk (2000) 
employs an overlapping generations model and identifies three factors - the gap 
between growth rate and interest rate, the size of primary deficit, and initial debt - as 
determinants of fiscal sustainability.  They argue that initial public debt above a 
critical level may harm the sustainability of a fiscal program even though the growth 
rate exceeds the interest rate.  Yakita (2008) examines the effect of public capital 
formation on the sustainability of debt by also employing an overlapping generations 
model.  The author argues that initial debt which is smaller than the threshold of 
initial debt for a given stock of public capital could lead to a sustainable fiscal policy.  
The author argues that this initial debt threshold is positively related to the stock of 
public capital, which implies that the countries which have a large stock of public 
capital could maintain high debt levels83.   
Other studies point to borrowing constraints, which is linked to the accessibility 
to capital markets, as a potential determinant of fiscal sustainability in emerging 
market countries.  Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald (2011) explore the effect of global 
capital market’s shock on fiscal sustainability by analysing a sample of 15 industrial 
countries and 27 emerging market countries empirically.  They show that the US 
interest rate, which is a proxy for the liquidity in global credit markets, and fiscal 
sustainability are closely associated in emerging market countries because they 
finance debt from the international capital market.  This result indicates that credit 
constraints in global markets could be one of main determinants of fiscal 
sustainability for emerging market countries.  Hauner and Kumar (2005) argue that 
the easier capital market access through the recent financial globalization could help 
strengthen fiscal sustainability in emerging market countries by reducing the cost of 
external financing by showing that the fiscal savings due to the deepening of 
financial globalization has increased over recent years in emerging market countries.  
Drelichman and Voth (2008) explore the role of fiscal repression accompanied by 
low interest rates by examining the case of 18th century Britain and 16th century 
Spain.  They argue that common sustainability tests cannot establish the real features 
of fiscal sustainability, and suggest that the accessibility to domestic savings by a 
                                                 
83. The author argues that a low public investment ratio and deficit finance rate for public investment 
could strengthen fiscal sustainability by raising the threshold.   
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low cost of borrowing is the main reason for sustainable fiscal finances of 18th 
century Britain.  Izquierdo (2002) argues that sudden stops in capital flows could 
worsen fiscal sustainability due to a rise in the interest rate and a fall in growth rate, 
as was in the case of Argentina.   
A separate line of research considers the role of population aging on the 
sustainability of fiscal finances.  Faruqee and Mühleisen (2003) assess the effect of 
demographic changes on Japan’s public finances. They argue that population aging 
causes slow economic growth and high debt, and therefore they suggest that further 
fiscal adjustments are needed in the pension and health systems to make fiscal 
finances sustainable.  European Commission (2009) also emphasizes the role of 
population aging in the Sustainability Report 2009.  It argues that aging populations 
have an effect on the labour market and economic growth, and will increase ageing-
related expenditure.  It calculates the sustainability indicator considering infinite 
horizon to include the concern about additional expenditure arising from ageing 
populations, and it shows that all EU countries should implement reforms 
endangering the risk of the budgetary challenge over the long-term.  Greiner, Köllert, 
and Semmler (2007) include social surplus ratios84  into Bohn’s (1998) response 
function to assess the effect of a social insurance system on fiscal sustainability of 
four European countries.  They point out that fast population aging should be 
considered not to misinterpret the result of sustainability tests.   
  
2.2.2. Political constraints   
Political constraints could also have important implications for fiscal 
sustainability.  Berenger and Llorca (2007), and Redžepagić and Llorca (2007) 
examine the role of political determinants of fiscal sustainability by employing 
political factors, such as the electoral budget cycle, the partisan cycle, and  
government fragmentation, into Bohn’s (1998) reaction function.  Berenger and 
Llorca (2007) analyse the USA and five European countries (the UK, Germany, 
Greece, France, and Italy), and they show that the fiscal policy of all countries 
                                                 
84 . Social surplus is defined as social benefit paid by the government net of social security 
contribution received by the government.   
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except Germany is sustainable and that the electoral and partisan cycle affect fiscal 
policy in the Mediterranean countries (France, Greece, Italy).  Redžepagić and 
Llorca (2007) analyse seven Central and Eastern European Countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) and show the 
presence of a budget electoral cycle and a partisan cycle in Poland which is a 
comparatively big country.  However, they analyse the effect of these variables on 
the primary budget balance, not fiscal sustainability per se.  
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) argue that government fragmentation could 
play a key role in determining fiscal outcomes.  They show that the higher number of 
decision makers in the fiscal policy making process, such as the number of parties in 
a coalition government and the number of spending ministers, could result in higher 
expenditure and a higher deficit, utilizing a sample of 20 OECD countries for the 
period 1960-1995. 
 
2.2.3. Fiscal institutions - Fiscal rules 
The existing literature generally shows that better fiscal institutions are 
positively associated with fiscal sustainability.  Fatás (2010) summarizes the 
empirical evidence on the role of fiscal institutions on fiscal outcomes85.  The author 
reports that fiscal rules are generally positively associated with fiscal sustainability 
by producing a less volatile fiscal policy.  Rose (2010) synthesizes a variety of the 
existing studies on the relationship between fiscal institutions and fiscal 
sustainability in the US state governments.  The author summarizes the empirical 
effect of various fiscal rules such as balanced budget rules, debt limits, tax and 
expenditure limits on the fiscal sustainability of the US state governments, and 
shows that fiscal rules seem to be effective in improving fiscal sustainability by 
leading to a lower deficit, lower debt, lower borrowing costs, rapid adjustment to 
fiscal shocks, and less political distortion on budget.  Bi and Leeper (2010) argue 
that the adoption of fiscal rules such as an expenditure ceiling could raise the 
                                                 
85. The author identifies transparency, the role of legislature, and the degree of centralization of the 
budget processes as an example of the budget processes and institutions.  The author suggests fiscal 
rules as a narrower set of institutions.   
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economy’s maximum sustainable debt and reduce the risk premium of sovereign 
debt.  They analyse the fiscal data of Sweden for the period 1980-2007 by simulating 
the economic consequence of different fiscal policies through a policy experiment 
based on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.  OECD (2002) suggests 
that well-designed fiscal rules could help attain a sustainable fiscal position even 
though their effect has become weakened since latter part of the 1990s because they 
did not respond adequately to unpredicted unfavourable fiscal situations and political 
pressures, especially in booms.  On the other hand, Debrun and Kumar (2008) argue 
that this positive effect of fiscal rules could be elusive.  They show that fiscal rules 
could be used as an important commitment tool for the improvement of fiscal 
performance in some countries while they do not seem to play any role in other 
countries by analysing a sample of 15 EU countries86.  
Fiscal rules have also been considered as a main determinant of successful 
fiscal consolidation which is identified as one of the policy tools to improve fiscal 
sustainability (IMF, 2009).  Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel, and André (2007) explore 
key determinants of the different dimensions87of fiscal consolidation episodes by 
analysing 85 fiscal consolidation episodes of OECD countries since the late 1970s.  
They show that fiscal rules are positively associated with a successful fiscal 
consolidation, in other words, the existence of fiscal rules is associated with larger 
and longer fiscal adjustments, and higher success rates.  European Commission 
(2007) and Larch and Turrini (2008) also examine the determinants of successful 
fiscal consolidation by analysing episodes of 27 EU countries since 1970.  They 
provide the empirical evidence that the coverage and strength of fiscal rules are 
positively associated with the possibility of starting and success of fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
 
                                                 
86. Debrun and Kumar (2008, p.500) even argue that the introduction of fiscal rules could bring about 
the incentive that governments circumvent their genuine fiscal status by creating off-budget account 
(“Smokescreen hypothesis”).  
87. Three dimensions are the size and intensity of adjustment, the duration of the episode, and the 
probability of success.   
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3. Empirical analysis  
This chapter focuses on analysing the main determinants of fiscal sustainability.  
We examine the role of each factor, which we identified as a potential determinant in 
section 2.2, in determining fiscal sustainability utilizing a panel data model.  We also 
explore the role of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules in determining fiscal 
sustainability in a sample of EMU countries, and examine fiscal sustainability 
utilizing a net debt variable to check the robustness.  
 
3.1. Data description  
The sample consists of 26 OECD countries, and we employ annual data for the 
period 1970–200888.  Four OECD countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, and 
Turkey) are excluded due to the unavailability of uninterrupted data series we 
employ for these countries. 
With regard to the data for the main variables, the primary budget balance-GDP 
ratio (st) and the debt-GDP ratio (dt) are taken from OECD Economic Outlook No.86, 
and the temporary increase in government expenditure (GVAR) and the temporary 
variation in the business cycle (YVAR) are calculated following Bohn (1998) as will 
be seen in section 3.2. 
With regard to the control variables, this chapter assesses the role of three 
groups of variables in determining fiscal sustainability.  Eleven main variables are 
employed following the existing literature both theoretical and empirical.   
First, to examine the role of budget and borrowing constraints, we introduce 
nine economic variables: the growth rate, the interest rate, the gap between growth 
rate and interest rate, trade openness, initial debt, average debt, the average primary 
balance, income per capita, and the old-age dependency ratio. 
                                                 
88. The estimation period is different across countries due to the availability of debt statistics (see 
Appendix 3. Table 3A.1).   
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The growth rate (GROWTH), the interest rate (IRL), and the gap between 
growth rate and interest rate (GAP) are included to assess the effect of budget 
constraints following the argument of Sakuragawa and Hosono (2011), 
Aspromourgos, Rees, and White (2010), Hall and Sargent (2010), Menguy (2008), 
Fullwiler (2007), and Chalk (2000).  These variables are all nominal and are taken 
from OECD Economic Outlook database No.86.  With regard to the interest rate, the 
long-term interest rate which is generally represented by 10-year government bonds 
is utilized.        
Trade openness (OPEN) is included to assess the effect of borrowing 
constraints following Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald (2011), Hauner and Kumar 
(2005), and Drelichman and Voth (2008).  This variable is commonly utilized as a 
proxy for the accessibility to the capital market in several papers in the literature 
concerned with fiscal procyclicality (Lane, 2003; Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; 
Mackiewicz, 2008; Woo, 2009).  This variable is taken from the Penn World Tables 
6.3 and is defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP. 
Initial debt (INIDEBT), average debt (AVEDEBT), and the average primary 
balance (AVEBANANCE) are included to assess the effect of fiscal space following 
Chalk (2000) and Yakita (2008).  These variables are taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook database No.86 and are defined as the ratio relative to GDP.   
Income per capita (GDPPC) is included to assess the effect of the stock of 
public capital following Yakita (2008).  This variable is commonly utilized as a 
proxy for the level of development which is the result of the accumulation of public 
capital.  This variable is in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms taken from the Penn 
World Tables 6.3 and is defined as the log of GDP per capita.   
The old-age dependency ratio (OLD) is included to assess whether aging 
populations have an effect on fiscal sustainability following the suggestion of 
Faruqee and Mühleisen (2003) and European Commission (2009) and is taken from 
World Population Prospects (The 2010 revision).  This ratio is defined as the ratio of 
elderly (65 years old or over) relative to the working age population (15–64 years 
old).  One can see from Graph 3.1 that this variable shows a steep increase in most 
OECD countries except some countries (Luxembourg, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, 
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Slovakia, the UK, and the USA) which show less than a 5% increase.  The average 
of the old-age dependency ratio in 26 OECD countries moved from 16.65% in 1970 
to 23.69% in 2010.   
Graph 3.1  The trend of the old-age dependency ratio  
 
Note: The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of elderly (65 years old or over) relative to the working 
age population (15–64 years old).  The average is 16.65% (1970)  19.69% (1990)  23.69% (2010). 
Source : World Population Prospects (The 2010 revision). 
 
Second, one political variable is included to find out the role of political 
constraints.  Power dispersion index (POLCON) 89 is included to explore the effect 
of government fragmentation and is taken from Henisz database (2010).  The 
existing literature on the political budgetary cycle theory generally shows that 
budgetary performances are affected by electoral cycles and government 
fragmentation (Berenger and Llorca, 2007).  However, the electoral cycle could have 
an effect on the budget deficit cycle rather than fiscal sustainability, and therefore we 
include political power dispersion index to assess the government fragmentation90.   
                                                 
89 . This index measures political power dispersion by considering the number of independent 
branches of government with veto power over policy change, and the distribution of preference across 
branches of government and within each legislative branch.  It measures the dispersion of political 
power range from zero when it is most concentrated to one when it is most disperse. 
90 . Several groups’ participating in the fiscal policy decision-making process gives rise to 
fragmentation (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999).  Therefore, fragmentation of the government can be 
assessed by the level of dispersion of power that controls the executive and the legislative. Berenger 
and Llorca (2007) employ a dummy for government coalition to measure this variable.  Kontopoulos 
and Perotti (1999) employ the number of decision makers such as the number of parties in coalition 
government and the number of spending ministers. 
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Finally, a dummy variable for fiscal rules (RULE) is included to assess the 
effect of introducing fiscal rules following the argument of Fatás (2010), Rose 
(2010), and OECD (2002), and it is taken from IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  All 
OECD countries except three (Korea, Turkey, and the USA) have adopted various 
types of fiscal rules.  The summary statistics of variables are explained in Table 3.1.    
Table 3.1  Summary statistics of variables   
 
No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
st 26 683 0. 397% 3.355 -14.069 16.135 
dt 26 680 57.864% 29.476 4.980 175.274 
GROWTH 26 667 7.838% 5.178 -4.388 37.727 
IRL 26 664 7.731% 3.382 1.003 21.725 
GAP 26 653 -0.242% 3.976 -16.099 16.871 
INIDEBT 26 680 42.270% 20.669 8.742 101.101 
AVEDEBT 26 680 57.864% 22.848 9.175 107.918 
AVEBALANCE 26 680 0.395% 1.659 -4.375 4.151 
GDPPC 26 669 $24,524 8,589 4,066 71,209 
OPEN 26 669 61.346 41.162 10.193 289.095 
OLD 26 680 20.176% 4.575 6 30 
POLCON 26 669 0.480 0.093 0.152 0.718 
RULE 26 680 0.417 0.493 0 1 
Note:  st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, GROWTH is the growth rate, IRL is 
the interest rate, GAP is the gap between the growth rate and interest rate, OPEN is trade openness, INIDEBT is 
initial debt, AVEDEBT is average debt, AVEBANANCE is the average primary balance, GDPPC is income per 
capita, OLD is the old-age dependency ratio, POLCON is a power dispersion index, and RULE is a dummy 
variable for fiscal rules. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, UN World Population Prospects 
(The 2010 revision), Henisz database (2010), and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
 
3.2.  Empirical methodology 
This chapter employs the panel data model as the baseline analysis.  We utilize 
the similar method which has been employed in the literature concerned with the 
analysis of fiscal procyclicality (see, for example, Alesina, Campante and Tabellini, 
2008; Mackiewicz, 2008; Lledó, Yackovlev and Gadenne, 2009; Diallo, 2009).  The 
level of fiscal sustainability is estimated individually and collectively using both a 
time series and a panel data model, and then the determinants will be explored using 
a panel data model.  
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At first, in order to obtain measures of fiscal sustainability both individually and 
collectively, we estimate country-by-country regressions of the form (3.6) and the 
panel data model of the form (3.7) on the basis of Bohn’s model (1998). 
       D- =  .- + /-?-,7 + 9-EF- + -GEF- + C-D-,7 + H-                    (3.6)   
       D- =  .- + / ?-,7 + 9 EF- +  GEF- + C D-,7 + H-                     (3.7) 
         
in which sit is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio and dit is the debt-GDP ratio.  If 
β is positive, then government responds to an increase in debt by raising the primary 
budget surplus, which indicates that the government is maintaining a sustainable 
fiscal policy. We additionally include the lagged primary budget balance-GDP ratio 
(si,t-1) into Bohn’s original model (equation (3.5)) to take into account the inertial 
process of fiscal policy.   
Bohn (1998, 2005, 2007) introduce two non-debt determinants, which are taken 
from Barro (1986), into the regression equation to exclude the effect of outliers.  
GVAR is temporary government expenditure, such as unusual expenditure by war, 
which is constructed by dividing the deviation of real government expenditure net of 
interest payments (G) from its trend (G*) by real GDP ((G–G*)/GDP).  YVAR 
accounts for the fluctuations in revenues due to the proportional short fall of output, 
which is constructed by multiplying the deviation of real GDP and its trend (1-
GDP/GDP*) by the trend of government expenditure relative to real GDP 
(G*/GDP)91.  Two variables are expected to be negatively related to the primary 
budget balance-GDP ratio.  
Secondly, to find out the determinants of fiscal sustainability, this chapter 
estimates the panel data model in the regression of the form: 
       D- =  .- + /?-,7 + 9EF- + GEF- + C D-,7 +   ∑ 
0 0 :-  × ?-,7+H-(3.8) 
in which Zit is a set of control variables.  We employ Bohn’s equation (3.5) by 
including several control variables: the growth rate (GROWTH), the interest rate 
(IRL), the gap between growth rate and interest rate (GAP), trade openness (OPEN), 
                                                 
91. The trends of variables are calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filtering. 
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initial debt (INIDEBT), average debt (AVEDEBT), the average primary balance 
(AVEBALANCE), income per capita (GDPPC), the old-age dependency ratio 
(OLD), the political power dispersion (POLCON), and the dummy variable for fiscal 
rules (RULE).  All variables are included as the form of interaction variables to 
estimate the effect of these variables on fiscal sustainability.  The coefficient of 
interaction term measures the change in the coefficient β when each control variable 
changes by one unit (Preacher, 2003).  In other words, it indicates the effect of each 
control variable on the level of fiscal sustainability.  
 
 
3.3.  Estimation results  
 
3.3.1. Baseline analysis  
 This section presents the estimates of fiscal sustainability indicators in 26 
OECD countries both individually and collectively using Bohn’s (1998) model.  We 
then examine the trend of fiscal sustainability using recursive estimation and rolling 
window estimation.  Finally, we attempt to uncover the main factors which play an 
important role in determining fiscal sustainability using panel data of OECD 
countries.   
 
(1) The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries 
Table 3.2 and Graph 3.2 present the level of fiscal sustainability of 26 OECD 
countries for the period 1970-2008.  The results show that the coefficients of the 
debt-GDP ratio are generally positive in most OECD countries even though it is 
insignificant in many countries.  This indicates that most OECD countries have 
responded to an increase in the debt-GDP ratio by raising the primary balance-GDP 
ratio, with the exception of some countries.  These results could be interpreted that 
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the fiscal finances of most OECD countries is sustainable for the period which we 
estimated, while some countries which are suffering from fiscal crisis (such as 
Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, and Slovakia) seem to have operated fiscal policy in 
a unsustainable way.  OECD countries have responded to one percentage point 
increase in the debt-GDP ratio by increasing the primary balance-GDP ratio by 0.05 
percentage points on average.  When one compares the level of sustainability across 
the group of countries, all three groups show similar levels of sustainability on 
average92.  These results are consistent with the current fiscal situation of each 
country and the existing empirical evidence (see, for example, Fincke and Greiner, 
2012; Fincke and Greiner, 2011; Greiner, Köllert, and Semmler, 2007) 93.   
Graph 3.2  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across countries 
 
Note: (1) Black bars are EMU countries and white bars are not. 
(2) The height of bar graphs represents the coefficients of debt-GDP ratio in the regression equation (3.6).   
(3) The average of coefficients is 0.05. 
(4) The average debt-GDP ratio for the period 1995-2005 of Luxembourg was the smallest (9.2%) in the OECD 
countries, but the average primary budget balance was 1.49% during that period. 
  
                                                 
92. The average coefficient of the debt-GDP ratio of EMU countries is 0.02 when Luxembourg is 
excluded.   
93. Fincke and Greiner (2012) explore the fiscal sustainability of six EMU countries (Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal) for the period from the early 1970s to the late 2000s, and 
they show that all countries have been maintaining sustainable fiscal finances.  Fincke and Greiner 
(2011) examine the fiscal sustainability of seven EMU countries (France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain) for the period from mid-1970s to late 2000s, and they show that all 
countries except Greece have been maintaining sustainable fiscal finances.  Greiner, Köllert, and 
Semmler (2007) explore the fiscal sustainability of four EMU countries (Italy, France, Germany, and 
Portugal) which have either a high debt-GDP ratio or budget deficit, and they show that the fiscal 
policy for the above countries has been sustainable although recently the budget deficit has been 
violating the three percent rule of the Maastricht Treaty.             
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
Sl
o
va
k
G
re
e
ce
N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
Ic
e
la
n
d
K
o
re
a
Ja
p
a
n
U
K
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
A
u
st
ri
a
Fr
a
n
ce
P
o
la
n
d
Fi
n
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
D
e
n
m
a
rk
Sp
a
in
U
SA
Sw
e
d
e
n
A
u
st
ra
lia
B
e
lg
iu
m
G
e
rm
a
n
y
C
a
n
a
d
a
It
a
ly
Sw
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
Ir
e
la
n
d
N
o
rw
a
y
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
93 
 
When the same regressions are run by a reweighted least squares (RWLS) 
procedure94  to reduce the effect of outliers, the results confirms our baseline analysis 
of Table 3.2.  Appendix 3. Table 3A.2 shows that there is a large degree of similarity 
between the baseline estimations and robust estimations, which confirms that our 
baseline estimations are generally not affected by the outliers although it employs 
OLS estimation 95 .  The sign and size of coefficients of the debt-GDP ratio is 
generally consistent with our baseline estimations in most countries except Iceland. 
GVAR variables are generally negatively associated with the primary balance-
GDP ratio in almost all countries.  A one unit increase in GVAR, namely a one 
percentage point increase in the temporary expenditure-GDP ratio, reduces the 
primary budget balance-GDP ratio by approximately 1.2 percentage points on 
average.  This result implies that the primary budget balance could worsen more than 
the proportional increase in the temporary government expenditure.  YVAR 
variables also show a negative effect on the primary balance-GDP ratio even though 
the significance of coefficient is low in many countries.  A one unit increase in 
YVAR, namely a one percentage point decreae in the revenue-GDP ratio due to the 
propotional short fall of output, reduces the primary budget balance-GDP ratio by 
about 0.8 percentage points on average.  This result implies that the change in the  
primary budget balance is smaller than the change in government revenue due to 
business cycle fluctuations.  These results are consistent with theory and the existing 
empirical literature96.  
 
 
 
                                                 
94. At first, outliers are dropped out of samples, and then weight is given to each observation.  The 
observations with small residuals get a weight of one, and observations with large residuals are down-
weighted (Stata Data Analysis Examples, 2012)      
95. Only four countries have outliers in robust estimations.  Number of outliers is three in Ireland and 
one in Iceland, Portugal, and Spain.  The results also show that the existence of outliers does not have 
any effect on estimation result in three countries (Ireland, Portugal and Spain) while the coefficient of 
the debt-GDP ratio of Iceland moves from negative to positive although it is not significant.     
96. Some of the literature shows that the results could be different depending on the types of countries.  
Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald (2011) show that GVAR and YVAR are not significant in emerging 
market countries, while Mendoza and Ostry (2007) show that GVAR and YVAR are significant in 
both industrial countries and emerging markets, although the size of the effect is greatly reduced for 
emerging market countries.          
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Table 3.2  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across countries 
  Debt ratio t-1 GVAR YVAR Balance t-1 Obs. R
2
 
t 
 
t 
 
t  t 
  EMU countries (12) 
Austria 0.01* 1.71 -1.10*** -6.64 -0.79** -2.68 0.63*** 6.76 38 0.76 
Belgium 0.04*** 5.76 -1.40*** -8.32 0.08 0.26 0.74*** 12.65 38 0.96 
France 0.01* 1.88 -1.42*** -4.46 -0.41 -1.07 0.44*** 3.69 30 0.71 
Finland 0.02 1.08 -1.17 -1.28 -0.45 -0.61 0.76*** 7.19 33 0.77 
Germany 0.05** 2.80 -1.32*** -14.74 -1.48** -3.02 0.14* 1.82 15 0.90 
Greece -0.07 -1.24 -0.50 -1.92 1.08 0.60 0.42 1.78 9 0.95 
Ireland 0.10*** 7.51 -1.81*** -10.15 -1.07** -4.04 0.17* 2.68 9 0.98 
Italy 0.07*** 4.19 -0.96** -2.57 -0.26 -0.52 0.62*** 7.31 37 0.92 
Luxembourg 0.70 1.90 -1.08*** -4.01 -0.87 -1.78 0.27** 3.01 11 0.89 
Netherlands 0.01 0.49 -1.29*** -6.74 -0.29 -0.69 0.51*** 3.79 38 0.66 
Portugal 0.02 0.05 -2.07*** -4.76 -0.73 -1.45 0.43*** 4.15 13 0.82 
Spain 0.02 0.02 -0.79*** -3.29 -0.35 -0.61 0.91*** 10.69 20 0.89 
Mean 0.08 
 
-1.24 
 
-0.46 
 
0.50  24.3 
 S.D. 0.20  0.42  0.64  0.24   12.5  
Other Advanced European countries (7) 
Denmark 0.02 0.74 -1.16** -2.51 -1.44** -2.57 0.60*** 5.31 26 0.84 
Iceland -0.03 -0.47 -1.23*** -20.92 -2.00** -3.76 -0.20 -1.08 10 0.98 
Norway 0.15*** 3.23 -1.50*** -3.31 -0.39 -0.50 0.75*** 12.76 37 0.84 
Slovakia -0.09 -1.06 -1.35*** -6.45 0.76 0.75 0.20 1.26 13 0.79 
Sweden 0.03** 2.46 -0.84** -2.29 -0.89** -2.48 0.79*** 11.28 38 0.82 
Switzerland 0.09*** 7.67 -0.77*** -4.10 -1.83*** -4.27 0.39*** 3.65 17 0.88 
UK 0.01 0.17 -1.04*** -3.01 0.01 0.01 0.55*** 6.64 34 0.71 
Mean 0.03 
 
-1.13 
 
-0.83 
 
0.44  25.0 
 S.D. 0.08 
 
0.26 
 
1.01 
 
0.35  11.8 
 Other Advanced non-European countries (6) 
Australia 0.03 1.39 -0.76 -1.14 -0.86 -0.63 0.74*** 6.32 20 0.76 
Canada 0.05*** 7.19 -1.27*** -7.88 -0.52 -1.38 0.71*** 19.14 38 0.95 
Japan 0.00 0.58 -1.65*** -5.27 -0.99 -1.44 0.85*** 10.54 37 0.84 
Korea 0.00 0.01 -1.17*** -11.02 -0.76*** -2.95 0.52*** 6.33 32 0.76 
New Zealand -0.03 -1.50 -1.28*** -4.32 -1.84** -3.04 0.31* 2.23 14 0.79 
USA 0.03** 2.35 -1.72*** -3.24 -1.41*** -5.59 0.58*** 6.75 38 0.77 
Mean 0.02 
 
-1.31 
 
-1.06 
 
0.62  29.83 
 S.D. 0.03  0.35  0.48  0.19   10.4  
Emerging Market countries (1) 
Poland 0.01 0.14 0.25 0.39 -2.21 -1.11 0.11 0.14 12 0.69 
All countries (26) 
Mean 0.05 
 
-1.17 
 
-0.77 
 
0.50  25.3 
 S.D. 0.14 
 
0.45 
 
0.79 
 
0.27  11.6 
 MAX 0.70 
 
0.25 
 
1.08 
 
0.91  38 
 MIN -0.09  -2.07  -2.21  -0.20   9  
Note: (1) Dependent variable is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st).   
(2) Regression methods are OLS with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
With respect to the lag value of the primary balance-GDP ratio, Table 3.2 
shows that the previous primary balance is positively associated with the current 
primary balance in most OECD countries97.  These results could be interpreted as the 
                                                 
97. The coefficients of the lag value of the primary balance-GDP ratio (si,t-1) are significant in the 5% 
significance level in 19 countries out of 26 countries.  When we run the same regressions without the 
lagged primary budget balance-GDP ratio like Bohn’s original model (equation (3.5)), the results 
show differences with baseline results depending on the significance of the lag value of the primary 
balance-GDP ratio as can be seen from Appendix 3. Table 3A.3.  With regard to the countries whose 
coefficient of the lagged primary budget balance-GDP ratio is significant, the results show much 
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inertia properties of fiscal policy, which means that fiscal policy tends to be non-
flexible98.  We could consider several factors as the reason.  First, the habit of 
governments might be one important reason.  In other words, governments will not 
change their fiscal stance, such as the amount of spending, immediately following a 
change in economic situation.  Second, it might take time to adjust spending because 
a large number of spending items are non-flexible.  Lastly, one could think possible 
time lags which are caused by political procedure.  The current budget is generally 
decided in the end of the previous fiscal year through the review of the national 
assembly in most OECD countries.   
A simple comparision of average coefficients of each group in Table 3.2 could 
be misleading due to the variation across countries within each group.  Table 3.3 
presents the level of fiscal sustainability of OECD countries collectively.  Estimation 
is based on the application of a Fixed effects model (FE) to consider the 
heterogeneity of each country and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to check 
the robustness.  The result of the FE estimation shows that the coefficient of the 
debt-GDP ratio (dt-1) is positively related to the primary balance-GDP ratio (st).  
OECD countries have responded to one percentage point increase in the debt-GDP 
ratio by increasing the primary balance-GDP ratio by 0.02 percentage points on 
average.  The result of the GMM estimation confirms the baseline results since there 
is a large similarity between FE and GMM estimations99.  This result could be 
interpreted that the fiscal finances of OECD countries are sustainable for the period 
which we estimated (see Appendix 3. Table 3A.1) collectively.  Our results also 
                                                                                                                                          
differences with baseline analysis.  The signs of coefficients of the debt-GDP ratio have opposite 
signs in seven out of 19 countries, and the values of R2 are dropped.  The average value of R2 
decreases from 0.82 to 0.52.  With regard to the countries whose corresponding coefficient is not 
significant, the results show a large degree of similarity with baseline analysis.  The signs of 
coefficients of the debt-GDP ratio are same except one country, and the values of R2 are similar.  The 
average value of R2 is 0.87 and 0.85 respectively.          
98. The values of R2 in our results are higher than the existing literature (Fincke and Greiner, 2012 ; 
Fincke and Greiner, 2011 ; Greiner, Köllert, and Semmler, 2007) because our estimation captures the 
inertia properties of fiscal policy by including the lagged primary budget balance-GDP ratio in the 
estimation.  The values of R2 are considerably high in the existing literature also.  The average value 
of R2 of six EMU countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal) in Fincke 
and Greiner (2012) is 0.69, that of seven EMU countries (France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) in Fincke and Greiner (2011) is 0.88, and that of four EMU countries (Italy, 
France, Germany, and Portugal) in Greiner, Köllert, and Semmler (2007) is 0.79.          
99.  This could be because there is no endogeneity problem in these estimations as will be argued in 
the next page considering GMM can be one of instrumental variable estimation.  When we run the 
same estimation by the system GMM to check the robustness of our results, the results show a large 
degree of similarity with baseline results except in other European countries.  Appendix 3. Table 3A.4 
shows that EMU countries seem to maintain sustainable fiscal finances while other countries not.   
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show that the coefficients of estimates are highly significant, especially GVAR and 
YVAR variables.  These results are consistent with the existing literature (Byrne, 
Fiess, and MacDonald, 2011; Mendoza and Ostry, 2007) who show that fiscal 
finances of advanced countries are sustainable collectively, and GVAR and YVAR 
variables are highly significant in advanced countries.     
When one compares the level of fiscal sustainability across country groups, all 
three groups show a sustainable fiscal stance even though the coefficient of the debt-
GDP ratio is not significant in other advanced non-European countries.  GVAR and 
YVAR variables are significantly negatively associated with the primary balance-
GDP ratio, and the lag value of the primary balance-GDP ratio has a significantly 
positive effect on the current primary balance-GDP ratio indicating the inertial effect 
of fiscal policy, which is consistent with baseline analysis and the existing literature.    
Table 3.3  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across country groups 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
All countries EMU  Other European Other non-European 
 
(FE) (GMM) (FE) (GMM) (FE) (GMM) (FE) (GMM) 
d t-1 
 
0.020** 0.027** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.039** 0.039*** 0.008 0.008 
(2.28) (2.50) (4.78) (5.27) (2.31) (2.53) (1.05) (1.17) 
GVAR 
 
-1.208*** -1.248*** -1.178*** -1.171*** -1.215*** -1.215*** -1.383*** -1.383*** 
(-14.13) (-17.47) (-9.61) (-10.28) (-9.40) (-10.27) (-13.47) (-14.92) 
YVAR 
 
-0.490*** -0.510*** -0.375*** -0.379*** -0.564** -0.564*** -0.762** -0.762*** 
(-4.55) (-4.61) (-3.47) (-3.64) (-2.68) (-2.93) (-3.00) (-3.33) 
s t-1 0.740*** 0.730*** 0.716*** 0.713*** 0.713*** 0.713*** 0.792*** 0.792*** 
 (22.09) (22.30) (17.92) (18.4) (10.72) (11.71) (16.51) (18.29) 
F (Wald) 326.92*** 1925.57*** 309.08*** 1317.03*** 383.11*** 1829.91*** 419.17*** 2058.26*** 
R
2
 0.768  0.752 
 
0.733  0.850 
 
No. of Obs. 657 631 291 279 175 168 179 173 
No.of Groups 26 26 12 12 7 7 6 6 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary increase in 
government expenditure, and YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
We conduct the same analysis using instrumental variables to deal with the 
endogeneity of the debt-GDP ratio.  This section employs two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation utilizing the lagged value of debt-GDP ratio as the instrument.  
Table 3.4 shows that the results are generally consistent with those of the FE 
estimation and GMM estimation except the coefficient of the debt-GDP ratio in other 
advanced non-European countries is significant, but one can also see from the result 
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of the Hausman test that one needs not consider the endogeneity problem in other 
advanced non-European countries.  To sum up, our baseline estimation properly 
addresses the endogeneity issue although it employs OLS estimation.  This could be 
because the lagged value of the debt ratio is utilized as independent variables instead 
of the current value of the debt ratio in our estimations.  The current primary budget 
balance does not have any effect on the previous debt ratio, so we can avoid 
endogeneity problem (Fincke and Greiner, 2012).   
Table 3.4  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries (FE 2SLS) 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
All countries EMU  Other European Other non-European 
d t-1 
 
0.021*** 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.008** 
(7.12) (7.9) (3.37) (2.35) 
GVAR 
 
-1.242*** -1.237*** -1.213*** -1.390*** 
(-22.22) (-15.03) (-12.17) (-10.15) 
YVAR 
 
-0.477*** -0.376*** -0.521** -0.815*** 
(-4.19) (-2.65) (-1.95) (-3.95) 
s t-1 0.734*** 0.699*** 0.717*** 0.792*** 
 (38.83) (26.17) (17.69) (23.46) 
Wald 2575.97*** 1391.10*** 675.60*** 765.02*** 
R
2
 0.768 0.752 0.731 0.852 
Hausman chi
2
 16.77*** - - 2.95 
No. of Obs. 631   279 168 173 
No.of groups 26 12 7 6 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary increase in 
government expenditure, and YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects 2SLS Instrumental variables estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
(2) The trend of fiscal sustainability 
Next, we explore the trend of fiscal sustainability using recursive estimation100, 
with special reference to the change by introducing fiscal rules.  We examine 16 
OECD countries since the size of their sample of the other 10 countries101 is not 
enough to conduct this analysis.  Graph 3.3 displays the trend of slope parameter of 
equation (3.6) in recursive estimations.  The results show that the level of fiscal 
sustainability is generally very stable except in a few countries where the debt ratio 
                                                 
100. Recursive estimation can be utilized to check how the estimated coefficients change over time as 
new data become available.  The initialization period is set as 10 years, and estimation starts with the 
period 1970-1979 and adding one observation at next estimation.  
101. Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and 
Switzerland.  
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heavily fluctuates such as in Finland and Sweden.  It moves in a very narrow range 
between -0.2 and 0.2.    
The debt ratio of Finland dramatically increased from 8.0% in 1976 to 66.0% in 
1996.  Notwithstanding debt accumulation, the primary balance of Finland generally 
had been worsening, and deficit soared from 1991 to 1996 due to the worst recession 
in the OECD countries 102 .  As such, these factors lead to unsustainable fiscal 
finances until the mid-1990s.  After that the debt ratio decreased gradually due to 
fiscal consolidations for the period 1992‐98, which were based mainly on tax 
increases (Perotti, 2011).  Finally, the primary budget balance recovered back to 
surplus and the debt ratio stabilized to 40.7% in 2008.  As a result, the fiscal finances 
of Finland became sustainable since 1996.  The case of Sweden is more dramatic.  
The debt ratio of Sweden had increased rapidly from 26.1% in 1976 to 70.3% in 
1985 but returned back to 46.3% in 1990 due to the economic boom.  However, it 
started to increase again and peaked at 84.4% in 1996 due to the recession, and in 
turn the fiscal sustainability of Sweden, which had been very sound, deteriorated 
rapidly.  After the effort of Swedish government, called “Consolidation Programme”, 
to stabilize government debt since 1994 (Bi and Leeper, 2010, p.5), the debt ratio 
returned to a downward trend, and the trend of deterioration of fiscal sustainability 
has been stopped.    
 
Graph 3.3  The trend of fiscal sustainability  
[ EMU countries ] 
  
 
                                                 
102. The GDP growth rate of Finland was minus for the period 1991-1993.  
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[ other advanced European countries ] 
  
[ other advanced non-European countries ] 
 
  
Note: The vertical line represents the year when fiscal rules were adopted.  In the case of EMU countries, it is the 
same as the year when the SGP rules were adopted. 
 
This phenomenon that the level of sustainability is generally stable becomes 
much clearer after fiscal rules were adopted as can be seen from Graph 3.3, but one 
cannot assure this fact as the evidence that the introduction of fiscal rules could 
guarantee fiscal sustainability.  This is because these results could be interpreted as 
the inertial properties of fiscal policy, in other words, there is no sudden change in 
fiscal policy stance.  In practice, the countries which operate fiscal policy in an 
unsustainable way in the past tend to maintain unsustainable fiscal stances in the 
future as well.  
When one explores the short-term trend of fiscal sustainability utilizing a 
rolling window regression, it appears to be more volatile than the long-term trend of 
fiscal sustainability under the recursive estimation, but again it is relatively stable 
with the exception of a few countries, such as Finland and Sweden, as you can see 
from Graph 3.4.  The graph also shows that the level of sustainability seems to have 
generally improved after introducing fiscal rules in some EMU countries such as 
Finland and Italy.           
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Graph 3.4  The trend of fiscal sustainability   (Rolling window estimation) 
 
[ EMU countries ] 
  
 
[ other advanced European countries ] 
 
[ other advanced non-European countries ] 
 
Note: The vertical line represents the year when fiscal rules were adopted.  In the case of EMU countries, it is the 
same as the year when the SGP rules were adopted. 
 
These results are not consistent with the results of  European Commission 
(2009) which points out that the sustainability of fiscal finances deteriorated 
compared with their 2006 analysis in 21 EU countries except four countries 
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(Hungary, Portugal, Italy, and Germany) by calculating the sustainability gap103.  The 
difference in basic assumptions and measurement methods might be one of the 
reasons for different results between these two analyses.  Our analysis, which is 
based on Bohn’s response function, measures fiscal sustainability historically 
assuming that current fiscal policy will be maintained in the future, while European 
Commission’s analysis, which is based on the sustainability indicator, measures a 
necessary amount of adjustment of the primary balance which should be conducted 
in the future.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that our backward-looking analysis and 
European Commission’s forward-looking analysis provide different implications.  
Our analysis does not refute the results of European Commission’s analysis, the need 
for future fiscal adjustment, if one considers varying fiscal circumstances such as 
aging populations as will be argued in the next subsection in detail. 
 
 (3) The main determinants of fiscal sustainability  
This section explores the main determinants of fiscal sustainability employing 
Bohn’s response function including 11 main control variables in the form of 
interaction variables following the methodology of chapter 2.  This is because the 
coefficient of the interaction term for control variables and the lag value of the debt-
GDP ratio denotes the change in the level of fiscal sustainability (the coefficient of 
the lag value of the debt-GDP ratio) for every one unit change in the control variable 
(Preacher, 2003).  In other words, it indicates the effect of the control variables on 
the level of fiscal sustainability104.     
Regression (1) and (2) in Table 3.5, which are based on the application of the 
Fixed effects model (FE), show that the signs of coefficients of control variables are 
generally as expected and that some control variables seem to play a role in 
determining fiscal sustainability.  The growth rate (GROWTH), the gap between 
                                                 
103. The average sustainability gap (the amount of adjustment in the primary balance which is need to 
satisfy infinite intertemporal budget constraint) of 25 EU countries has increased by 3.1%, from 3.4% 
of GDP on 2006 analysis to 6.5% of GDP in 2009 analysis. 
104. The coefficient of control variables means the effect of each control variable on the change in 
primary budget balance-GDP ratio, not the level of fiscal sustainablity itself.  If we include control 
variables themselves as separate regressors, we cannot find the effect of control variable on 
procyclicality properly because of collinearity of variables.    
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growth rate and interest rate (GAP), and income per capita (GDPPC) have a positive 
effect on fiscal sustainability, while the old-age dependency ratio (OLD) produces a 
negative effect.  The results also show that the fiscal finances of 26 OECD countries 
appear to be sustainable collectively.  The marginal effects105 of the lag value of the 
debt-GDP ratio on the primary balance-GDP ratio are 0.026~0.027 which are similar 
to the corresponding coefficient when control variables were not included in Table 
3.3 (0.020) and are significant jointly.  GVAR and YVAR variables are negatively 
associated with the primary balance-GDP ratio, and the lag value of the primary 
balance has a significantly positive effect on the primary balance-GDP ratio 
indicating the inertial properties of fiscal policy, which are consistent with the results 
of baseline estimation of Table 3.3.  These results could be generally confirmed by 
the results of GMM estimations (regression (3) and (4)) and FE 2SLS estimations 
(regression (5) and (6)) even though one needs not consider the potential 
endogeneity problem according to the result of the Hausman test.   
The growth rate (GROWTH) and the gap between growth rate and interest rate 
(GAP) have a significantly positive effect on the sustainability of fiscal finances, 
which is consistent with the argument of the existing theoretical literature 
(Sakuragawa and Hosono, 2011; Aspromourgos, Rees, and White, 2010; Hall and 
Sargent, 2010; Menguy, 2008; Fullwiler, 2007; Chalk, 2000106).  A one percentage 
point increase of GDP could lead to an increase in the level of fiscal sustainability 
(the coefficient of the lag value of debt-GDP ratio) of 0.002 on average.  This 
suggests that governments respond to a one percentage point increase in the debt-
GDP ratio by raising primary budget balance 0.002 percentage points on average for 
every one percentage point increase in GDP.  A one percentage point increase in the 
gap between growth rate and interest rate brings about an increase in the level of 
fiscal sustainability of 0.001.  These results could be explained as the following.  
Economic growth could lead to not only an increase in revenue by raising the income 
of taxpayers: both individuals and corporations, but also the reduction in spending 
                                                 
105. The marginal effect can be obtained by calculating the sum of coefficients of the lag values of 
the debt-GDP ratio and Σ(estimated coefficient*average value of control variable).   
106. Chalk (2000) points out that a high growth economy could maintain a higher sustainable deficit 
and suggests that a two percentage point increase in the growth rate could give rise to triple the 
sustainable deficit by calibration of the post-war US data.   
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such as unemployment benefit, so it could result in the improvement of fiscal 
sustainability.  
Table 3.5  The main determinants of fiscal sustainability  
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) GMM (4) GMM (5) FE 2SLS (6) FE 2SLS 
d t-1 
 
-0.444** -0.397** -0.504** -0.399** -0.212 -0.179 
(-2.20) (-2.07) (-2.48) (-2.16) (-0.40) (-0.45) 
*marginal effect 0.027 0.026 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.031 
GVAR 
 
-1.155*** -1.160*** -1.184*** -1.190*** -1.163*** -1.165*** 
(-17.03) (-17.34) (-17.94) (-18.54) (-18.60) (-18.48) 
YVAR 
 
-0.328** -0.383*** -0.322** -0.406*** -0.408* -0.450*** 
(-2.18) (-2.91) (-2.12) (-3.03) (-1.87) (-3.13) 
s t-1 
 
0.642*** 0.633*** 0.644*** 0.635*** 0.651*** 0.645*** 
(18.98) (19.65) (18.39) (18.77) (19.93) (18.16) 
GROWTH*d t-1 0.002*  0.002* 
 
0.001**  
 
(1.87)  (1.89) 
 
(2.30)  
IRL*d t-1 -0.001  -0.000 
 
-0.001  
 
(-1.16)  (-0.58) 
 
(-1.20)  
GAP*d t-1  0.001* 
 
0.001*  0.001*** 
 
 (1.88) 
 
(1.69)  (4.02) 
INIDEBT*d t-1 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.001* 0.000* 0.000** 
 
(1.94) (2.54) (1.55) (1.85) (1.90) (2.07) 
AVEDEBT*d t-1 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.80) (1.93) (1.47) (1.63) (1.21) (1.21) 
AVEBALANCE *d t-1 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 
(1.06) (1.12) (1.21) (1.32) (0.93) (0.95) 
GDPPC*d t-1 0.045** 0.041** 0.051** 0.042** 0.023 0.02 
 
(2.22) (2.11) (2.51) (2.24) (0.44) (0.50) 
OPEN*d t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.66) (-0.62) (-0.58) (-0.51) (-0.07) (-0.07) 
OLD*d t-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 
 
(-3.85) (-3.96) (-2.43) (-2.79) (-1.67) (-1.63) 
POLCON*d t-1 -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 -0.020 -0.027* -0.024 
 
(-1.04) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.88) (-1.80) (-1.62) 
RULE*d t-1 
 
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.008** 0.007 
 
(1.52) (1.19) (1.62) (1.13) (2.16) (1.58) 
F (Wald) 2324.24*** 613.58*** 14321.43*** 11027.55*** 2847.08*** 2843.23*** 
R
2
 0.628 0.623 - - 0.645 0.644 
Hausman chi
2
 - - - - 4.71   3.70 
No. of Obs. 623 623 597 597 600 600 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary increase in 
government expenditure, YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle, GROWTH is the growth rate, 
IRL is the interest rate, GAP is the gap between growth rate and  interest rate, OPEN is trade openness, INIDEBT 
is initial debt, AVEDEBT is average debt, AVEBANANCE is the average primary balance, GDPPC is the log of 
income per capita, OLD is the old-age dependency ratio, POLCON is a power dispersion index, and RULE is a 
dummy variable for fiscal rules.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors in regression (1)-(2), 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors in regression (3)-(4), and Fixed effects 
2SLS Instrumental variables estimation (FE 2SLS) in regression (5)-(6).  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, UN World Population Prospects 
(The 2010 revision), Henisz database (2010), and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
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However, one cannot confirm the role of the interest rate which is emphasized 
in the existing literature (Aspromourgos, Rees, and White, 2010; Fullwiler, 2007).  
The result shows that the interest rate (IRL) is negatively associated with fiscal 
sustainability, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
Initial debt (INIDEBT) and average debt (AVEDEBT) are positively related to 
the primary balance-GDP ratio in spite of relatively low statistical significance, but 
they become insignificant in GMM estimation.  The level of fiscal sustainability is 
estimated to increase by 0.001 for every one percentage point increase in the initial 
debt-GDP ratio.  High debt could reduce the incentive of an increase in spending by 
arousing the concern about fiscal sustainability in practice as is argued by Guichard, 
Kennedy, Wurzel, and André (2007), so it in turn could lead to fiscal consolidation.  
Huart (2011) also argues that high debt could trigger fiscal efforts to improve 
primary budget balance.  
The average primary budget balance (AVEBALANCE) has a positive effect on 
fiscal sustainability, but the coefficient is not significant.  A one percentage point 
increase in the average primary balance-GDP ratio will raise the level of 
sustainability by 0.006.  This positive effect of the average primary budget balance is 
consistent with Chalk (2000) who argues that past fiscal policy plays an important 
role in determining current fiscal sustainability, and therefore the countries which 
have low performance in fiscal policy, such as large deficit, could have a greater 
likelihood of unsustainable fiscal position.   
Income per capita (GDPPC) has a significantly positive effect on fiscal 
sustainability.  The level of fiscal sustainability is estimated to increase by 0.045 for 
every one percent increase in GDP per capita.  This positive effect of income per 
capita is consistent with the existing theoretical literature (Yakita, 2008) and 
empirical analysis (IMF, 2003).  The countries with higher income per capita tend to 
have a larger stock of public capital facilitating sustainable fiscal policy.  IMF (2003) 
shows that the level of fiscal sustainability could be higher in industrial countries 
than in emerging market countries, in other words, the former tend to increase 
sharply the primary surplus response to debt accumulation, while this feature is not 
prevalent in the latter.   
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Trade openness (OPEN) has a negative effect on the level of sustainability, but 
the coefficient is small and insignificant.  The negative effect of trade openness is 
not consistent with the literature (Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald, 2011; Hauner and 
Kumar, 2005;  Drelichman and Voth, 2008) which argue that borrowing constraints 
can be determinants of fiscal sustainability in emerging countries, but our results 
could be rationalized by the fact that our sample mainly consists of advanced 
countries.  Our result could also be rationalized by the contradictive arguments about 
the interpretation of trade openness as already stated in chapter 2107.   
The old-age dependency ratio (OLD) is negatively associated with fiscal 
sustainability.  The level of fiscal sustainability is estimated to decrease by 0.001 for 
every one percentage point increase in the old-age dependency ratio.  This result 
could indicate that an aging society is likely to have difficulty in maintaining a 
sustainable fiscal policy.  According to the World Population Prospects (The 2010 
revision), the old-age dependency ratio will be doubled in 2050 compared with 2010 
in most OECD countries as can be seen in Graph 3.5.  The average of old-age 
dependency ratio in 26 OECD countries will move from 23.69% in 2010 to 48.15% 
in 2050.  Our results imply that aging populations could lead to the additional 
decrease in the level of fiscal sustainability of 0.029 in 2050 compared with 2010.  
This indicates that governments will respond to a one percentage point increase in 
debt-GDP ratio by reducing primary budget balance additionally by 0.029 
percentage points when the old-age dependency ratio changes from 23.69% to 
48.15%.  In other words, governments should increase the primary budget balance 
0.029 percentage points additionally for every one percentage point increase of the 
debt-GDP ratio to avoid the deterioration of fiscal sustainability due to aging 
populations108.  This implies that fiscal sustainability will worsen if governments 
maintain the current fiscal stance, so the government’s action to adjust spending will 
be essential for maintaining fiscal sustainability in the future.   
 
                                                 
107. Some literature argues that high openness means high access to international capital (Woo, 2009), 
but others argue that high openness leads to increase of cost of financing from international market, 
especially during recessions (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Lane, 2003).  
108 . These results are generally consistent with Balassone, Pavot, Cunha, Prammer, Langenus, 
Tommasino, and Manzke (2009) who show that the budget balance for the period 2010-2050 of 11 
EMU countries will worsen about 5.3% point on average due to the aging population related spending. 
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Graph 3.5  The forecast of the old-age dependency ratio  
 
Note: The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of elderly (65 years old or over) relative to the working 
age population (15–64 years old).  The average is 23.69% (2010)  37.31% (2030)  48.15% (2050). 
Source : World Population Prospects (The 2010 revision). 
 
Political power dispersion (POLCON) has a negative effect on the level of 
sustainability, but it is not significant.  The level of fiscal sustainability is estimated 
to decrease by 0.002 for every 0.1 unit increase in power dispersion index.  This 
result indicates that the more disperse the political power within the government, the 
less the level of fiscal sustainability.  The negative effect of political power 
dispersion is consistent with the political budgetary cycle theory (Berenger and 
Llorca, 2007).  More fragmented governments, which have a number of decision 
makers within them, are likely to experience more unsustainable fiscal finances 
because governments have to satisfy the demand for spending of different interest 
groups.   
Fiscal rules do not seem to play any role in determining the level of fiscal 
sustainability.  The coefficients of introducing fiscal rules are positively associated 
with fiscal sustainability, but this effect is not statistically significant109.  This result 
indicates that the effect of fiscal rules is not certain because fiscal rules are 
prevalently violated in practice although fiscal rules could improve the level of fiscal 
sustainability theoretically by restricting policymaker’s decision on fiscal stance.  
                                                 
109. Also, the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal sustainability does not show a consistent picture when we 
explore it country by country.  The effect of fiscal rules is likely to vary across countries, which is 
consistent with Debrun and Kumar (2008).  The coefficients of interaction for fiscal rules and GDP 
growth are significantly positive in nine countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland) while they are significantly negative in one country 
(France).  By contrast, they are insignificant in eight countries.     
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Japan adopted fiscal rules in 1947, but the Japanese government waived this rule 
since 1975 except the period 1990-1993 (IMF, 2009).  Also, the concern about 
waiving the SGP rules has increased (OECD, 2002), and many countries have 
violated the rules by permitting more than 3% of the budget deficit-GDP ratio.  The 
ratio of the breaches of the SGP rules was 25.4% (45 out of 177 possible cases) for 
the period 1999-2007 (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011).  These results are 
consistent with Wyplosz (2012) who argues that fiscal rules are not sufficient to 
ensure fiscal sustainability.  
One can consider different effects of fiscal rules on fiscal sustainability 
depending on the time coverage of fiscal rules.  This section estimates the effect of 
fiscal rules on fiscal sustainability by distinguishing between multi-year fiscal rules 
and annual fiscal rules as we employed in chapter 2.   
Table 3.6  The effect of annual fiscal rules and multi-year fiscal rules on fiscal sustainabiliy 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) GMM (4) GMM (5) FE 2SLS (6) FE 2SLS 
RULE*d t-1 
 
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.008** 0.007 
(1.52) (1.19) (1.62) (1.13) (2.16) (1.58) 
Hausman chi
2
     4.71   3.70 
No. of Obs. 623 623 597 597 600 600 
No.of Groups 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Annual RULE*d t-1 
 
0.009** 0.008** 0.006** 0.005 0.026 0.020** 
(2.47) (2.29) (1.99) (1.55) (0.86) (1.98) 
Hausman chi
2
     0.34 1.89 
No. of Obs. 478 448 454 454 459 459 
No.of Groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Multi-year RULE*d t-1 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.005 0.004 
 
(-0.01) (-0.19) (0.22) (-0.00) (0.78) (0.63) 
Hausman chi
2
     6.93   4.84 
No. of Obs. 502 502 473 473 481 481 
No.of Groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Note: (1) Other independent variables are st-1 (the lag value of the primary budget balance-GDP ratio), dt-1 (the 
lag value of the debt-GDP ratio), GVAR (the temporary increase in government expenditure), YVAR (the 
temporary variation in the business cycle), GROWTH (the growth rate), IRL (the interest rate), GAP (the gap 
between growth rate and interest rate), OPEN (trade openness), INIDEBT (initial debt), AVEDEBT (average 
debt), AVEBANANCE (the average primary balance), GDPPC (log of income per capita), OLD (the old-age 
dependency ratio) and POLCON (a power dispersion index). 
(2) RULE is the dummy variable for fiscal rules, Annual RULE is the dummy for annual fiscal rules, and Multi-
year RULE is the dummy for multi-year fiscal rules.
 
(3) Regression methods are the Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors in regression (1)-(2), 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors in regression (3)-(4), and Fixed effects 
2SLS Instrumental variables estimation (FE 2SLS) in regression (5)-(6).  
(4) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, UN World Population Prospects 
(The 2010 revision), Henisz database (2010), and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
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Table 3.6 shows that the coefficients of interaction term for multi-year fiscal 
rules and the debt-GDP ratio are insignificant, while corresponding coefficients of 
annual fiscal rules are significantly positive.  And the coefficients of interaction term 
for annual fiscal rules are larger than the corresponding coefficients of multi-year 
fiscal rules.  This could be because most countries which adopt annual fiscal rules 
are also adopting the SGP rules 110 .  Fiscal rules are basically functioned as a 
restriction on fiscal policy by giving governments the numerical targets on budget or 
debt over certain periods to improve fiscal sustainability.  Therefore, whether fiscal 
rules have enforceability affects fiscal sustainability as will be seen in section 
3.3.2111.   
One could examine the long term effect of each of the control variables since 
estimation equations are dynamic such that they include the lag value of the 
dependent variable.  One can see from Table 3.7 that the long-term effect of each of 
the control variables is about 2.8 times more than short term effect112.  
Table 3.7  Long term effect of control variables  
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) GMM (4) GMM (5) FE 2SLS (6) FE 2SLS 
GROWTH 0.005  0.005 0.004  
IRL -0.002  -0.001 -0.002  
GAP  0.004 0.004  0.004 
INIDEBT 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AVEDEBT 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AVEBALANCE 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.014 0.015 
GDPPC 0.126 0.111 0.144 0.115 0.065 0.056 
OPEN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OLD -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
POLCON -0.063 -0.056 -0.062 -0.056 -0.077 -0.068 
RULE 0.017 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.022 0.019 
Note: GROWTH is the growth rate, IRL is the interest rate, GAP is the gap between growth rate and interest rate, 
OPEN is trade openness, INIDEBT is initial debt, AVEDEBT is average debt, AVEBANANCE is the average 
primary balance, GDPPC is log of income per capita, OLD is the old-age dependency ratio, POLCON is a power 
dispersion index, and RULE is a dummy variable for fiscal rules. 
                                                 
110. Six countries out of 10 countries which adopt annual fiscal rules have the SGP rules also.  When 
we run same regression of a sample of 12 EMU countries, the effect of the SGP rules are significantly 
positive, and the size of coefficients are similar with those of annual fiscal rules as can be seen from 
Table 3.12.        
111. When we run same regression excluding the samples when the SGP rules is adopting, the 
coefficients of interaction for fiscal rules and the debt-GDP ratio become smaller.  This result implies 
that the effect of fiscal rules becomes weak if the effect of the SGP rules is excluded.       
112. The long term effect can be obtained by dividing estimated coefficient by (1- coefficient of the 
lag value of debt-GDP ratio).   
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One thing we have to consider is that we should interpret the size of coefficients 
carefully.  This is because each variable has a different measurement unit and 
different distribution, so the size of each coefficient does not mean the real effect on 
fiscal sustainability in practice, as already explained in chapter 2.  Table 3.8 presents 
the variation of the level of fiscal sustainability across control variables, which 
indicates the change in the primary balance-GDP ratio responds to a one percentage 
point  increase in the debt-GDP ratio when each control variables change by one 
standard diviation of that variable.  These results show that the effects of the growth 
rate (GROWTH), the initial debt-GDP ratio (INIDEBT), the average debt-GDP ratio 
(AVEDEBT), the average budget balance (AVEBALANCE), and income per capita 
(GDPPC) are relatively bigger than those of other variables.  
Table 3.8  The variation of the level of fiscal sustainability across control variables 
 
 
coefficient Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Change in the primary balance-GDP ratio 
GROWTH 0.002 7.84% 5.18 0.009%p 
IRL -0.001 7.73% 3.38 -0.003%p 
GAP 0.001 -0.24% 3.98 0.006%p 
INIDEBT 0.001 42.27% 20.67 0.011%p 
AVEDEBT 0.000 57.86% 22.85 0.011%p 
AVEBALANCE 0.006 0.39% 1.66 0.010%p 
GDPPC 0.045 10.05 0.37 0.016%p 
OPEN 0.000 61.35 41.16 -0.004%p 
OLD -0.001 20.18% 4.58 -0.005%p 
POLCON -0.023 0.48 0.09 -0.002%p 
RULE 0.006 0.42 0.49 0.003%p 
Note: (1) GROWTH is the growth rate, IRL is the interest rate, GAP is the gap between growth rate and interest 
rate, OPEN is trade openness, INIDEBT is initial debt, AVEDEBT is average debt, AVEBANANCE is the 
average primary balance, GDPPC is log of income per capita, OLD is the old-age dependency ratio, POLCON is 
a power dispersion index, and RULE is a dummy variable for fiscal rules. 
 
To conclude, our results imply that governments could operate their fiscal 
finances in a sustainable way even under continuous budget deficits and debt 
accumulation, if the economy could maintain a growth rate above the interest rate.  
And one can see from the results that advanced countries are more likely to maintain 
sustainable fiscal finances.  Also, these results suggest that governments should 
operate fiscal policy in a way that alleviates the spending pressures, especially 
ageing population related spending.    
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3.3.2.  Additional robustness checks  
This section presents the additional robustness checks of the baseline analysis 
using a net debt variable and a sample of EMU countries. 
 
(1) Net debt 
A number of studies argue that net debt rather than gross debt should be utilized 
to assess fiscal sustainability properly, even though they do not conduct empirical 
analysis (Milesi-Ferreti and Moriyama, 2006113 ; Coeure and Pisani-Ferry, 2005; 
Buiter and Grafe, 2004; OECD, 2002).  This section makes use of general 
government net financial liabilities as net debt variable.  We exclude two countries 
(Luxembourg and Switzerland) and adjust the sample period of two countries 
(Austria and Norway) because of data availability. 
Table 3.9 presents the level of fiscal sustainability of 24 OECD countries 
utilizing the net debt variable.  The fiscal sustainability coefficients of each country 
shows a few differences from the corresponding coefficients when gross debt is 
utilized in Table 3.2 of section 3.3.1.   
The average coefficient of the debt-GDP ratio decreases by 0.03 from 0.05 to 
0.02, but it is the same if one excludes Luxembourg and Switzerland from the 
samples of using gross debt to allow for a fair comparison between both results.  One 
thing we should note is that the number of countries whose fiscal finances are 
unsustainable increase from Four countries (Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, and 
Slovakia) to five countries.  Three countries (Norway, Korea, and Portugal) are 
included and two countries (Iceland and Slovakia) are excluded when one 
concisiders net debt rather than gross debt114.          
                                                 
113. Milesi-Ferreti and Moriyama (2006) suggest their own valuation of non-financial assets based on 
the 2001 Government Financial Statistics Manual, and they show that decreases in gross debt in EU 
countries has been accompanied by asset sale. 
114. The level of fiscal sustainability of Iceland improved from -0.03 to 0.00, and that of Slovakia 
improved from -0.09 to 0.07.  On the other hand, that of Norway decreased from 0.15 to -0.05, that of 
Korea from 0.00 to -0.03, and that of Portugal from 0.02 to -0.02.  However, the net debt-GDP ratio 
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Table 3.9  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across countries           
(utilizing net debt) 
 Net debt ratio t-1 GVAR YVAR Balance t-1 Obs. R
2
 
  t  t  t  t   
EMU countries (11) 
Austria 0.06*** 2.73 -0.98*** -6.84 -0.70** -2.47 0.50*** 3.69 28 0.76 
Belgium 0.04*** 6.22 -1.38*** -8.64 0.09 0.29 0.71*** 12.43 38 0.96 
France 0.01 1.49 -1.41*** -4.36 -0.38 -0.96 0.46*** 3.89 30 0.70 
Finland 0.00 0.09 -1.21 -1.27 -0.51 -0.68 0.71*** 6.49 33 0.76 
Germany 0.04** 2.81 -1.33*** -14.70 -1.56*** -3.21 0.15* 1.83 15 0.90 
Greece -0.07 -1.62 -0.60** -4.20 1.24 0.81 0.27 1.08 9 0.96 
Ireland 0.08*** 7.07 -1.86*** -10.62 -1.36*** -4.68 0.19* 2.45 9 0.98 
Italy 0.05*** 4.26 -0.99*** -3.54 -0.35 -0.73 0.64*** 7.05 37 0.92 
Netherlands 0.05** 2.73 -1.22*** -5.23 -0.62 -1.47 0.42*** 3.64 38 0.72 
Portugal -0.02 -1.08 -2.02*** -5.27 -0.58 -1.48 0.31*** 3.64 13 0.83 
Spain 0.02 1.30 -0.81*** -3.41 -0.34 -0.58 0.92*** 10.78 20 0.89 
Mean 0.02 
 
-1.25 
 
-0.46 
 
0.48  24.6 
 S.D. 0.04 
 
0.42 
 
0.73 
 
0.24  11.7 
 Other Advanced European countries (6) 
Denmark 0.02 0.35 -1.17** -2.32 -1.49** -2.70 0.59** 4.91 26 0.84 
Iceland 0.00 0.03 -1.24***  -17.53 -1.83**  -3.00 -0.10 -0.41 10 0.98 
Norway -0.05** -2.51 -1.63*** -4.12 -0.64 -0.72 0.64*** 5.08 28 0.85 
Slovakia 0.07** 2.45  -1.15***  -5.65 -1.20 -1.44 0.36** 2.49 13 0.82 
Sweden 0.03*** 2.76 -0.83** -2.25 -0.88** -2.41 0.78*** 11.10 38 0.81 
UK 0.01 0.54 -1.04*** -3.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.55*** 6.57 34 0.72 
Mean 0.02  -1.18  -1.01  0.47  24.8  
S.D. 0.04  0.26  0.65  0.31  11.2  
Other Advanced non-European countries (6) 
Australia 0.00 0.03 -0.90 -1.31 -1.04 -0.72 0.65*** 4.25 20 0.75 
Canada 0.04*** 6.24 -1.28** -7.28 -1.28 -1.14 0.76*** 20.21 38 0.94 
Japan 0.01 1.00 -1.66*** -5.50 -0.98 -1.44 0.88*** 10.10 37 0.85 
Korea -0.03*** -3.49 -1.11*** -10.81 -0.85*** -3.73 0.36*** 5.45 32 0.82 
New Zealand -0.02 -1.39 -1.27*** -4.22 -1.65** -2.61 0.30* 2.01 14 0.79 
USA 0.04*** 3.12 -1.70***  -3.27  -1.39*** -5.60 0.59*** 6.84 38 0.78 
Mean 0.01  -1.32  -1.20  0.59  29.8  
S.D. 0.03  0.31  0.30  0.22  10.4  
Emerging Market countries (1) 
Poland 0.01 0.18 0.34 0.71 -2.42 -1.59 0.05 0.10 12 0.69 
All countries (24) 
Mean 0.02  -1.18  -0.86  0.49  25.4  
S.D. 0.04  0.47  0.75  0.26  11.1  
MAX 0.08  0.34  1.24  0.92  38  
MIN -0.07  -2.02  -2.42  -0.10  9   
Note: (1) Dependent variable is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st). 
(2) Regression methods are OLS with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
Table 3.10 presents the level of fiscal sustainability of 24 OECD countries 
collectively utilizing net debt variables.  These results have a large similarity with 
the baseline results when we utilize gross debt except other advanced European 
                                                                                                                                          
of Norway and Korea is below zero, so we cannot conclude that the fiscal finances of two countries 
are unsustainable.  
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countries.  The coefficients of the net debt-GDP ratio in EMU countries and other 
advanced non-European countries are similar in sign, size, and statistical significance.  
However, the coefficient of the net debt-GDP ratio in other advanced European 
countries, which was significantly positive, became insignificant and negative.  
These results could be interpreted that one cannot confirm that the fiscal finances of 
OECD countries are sustainable except EMU countries if one considers net debt 
instead of total debt.   
Table 3.10  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across country groups 
(utilizing net debt) 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
All countries EMU  Other European Other non-European 
 
(FE) (GMM) (FE) (GMM) (FE) (GMM) (FE) (GMM) 
d t-1 
 
0.017* 0.019* 0.034*** 0.035*** -0.011 -0.011 0.016 0.016* 
(1.77) (1.85) (4.58) (4.83) (-0.47) (-0.52) (1.71) (1.89) 
GVAR 
 
-1.210*** -1.250*** -1.174*** -1.174*** -1.289*** -1.289*** -1.371*** -1.371*** 
(-13.20) (-16.12) (-9.43) (-9.97) (-8.12) (-9.02) (-12.43) (-13.77) 
YVAR 
 
-0.468*** -0.455*** -0.398*** -0.400*** -0.563* -0.563*** -0.773** -0.773*** 
(-3.74) (-3.56) (-3.81) (-4.07) (-2.33) (-2.59) (-3.22) (-3.57) 
s t-1 0.751*** 0.749*** 0.693*** 0.692*** 0.673*** 0.673*** 0.796*** 0.796*** 
 (20.16) (20.15) (13.73) (14.50) (14.20) (15.76) (16.90) (18.73) 
F (Wald) 317.01*** 1950.11*** 409.29*** 1830.09*** 388.83*** 1918.21*** 772.93*** 3795.33*** 
R
2
 0.756  0.664 0.756  0.844 
No. of Obs. 610 586 270 259 149 143 179 173 
No.of Groups. 24 24 11 11 6 6 6 6 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the net debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary 
increase in government expenditure, and YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
When one conducts the same analysis through two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation utilizing instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity of the net 
debt-GDP ratio, the results are generally consistent with those when total debt was 
utilized except other advanced European countries as can be seen from Appendix 3. 
Table 3A.5.  To sum up, one can see from the results that the fiscal finances of EMU 
countries are generally sustainable collectively even when we utilize net debt 
variables instead of gross debt while those of other advanced countries are not 
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Next, our results show that the role of the control variables on fiscal 
sustainability is not certain.  This subsection includes the initial net debt-GDP ratio 
and the average net debt-GDP ratio into the regression equation, instead of the inital 
debt-GDP ratio and the average debt-GDP ratio as control variables.  Tabel 3.11 
shows totally differnt results with those when gross debt was utilized in Table 3.5 of 
section 3.3.1.  The growth rate (GROWTH), the gap between growth rate and 
interest rate (GAP), income per capita (GDPPC) and the old-age dependency ratio 
(OLD), which are significant in baseline estimation of Table 3.5, become 
insignificant and even have oppsite signs.  On the other hand, the interest rate (IRL), 
the average primary balance (AVEBALANCE), and trade openness (OPEN) play a 
certain role in determing fiscal sustainability, but all coefficients show the opposite 
signs of the results when gross debt is utilized in the regression equation.  
To conclude, the fiscal sustainabilty of each country shows a few differences 
when we utilize net debt instead of gross debt even though both cases show a similar 
level of sustainability collectively.  Furthermore, the results of the determinant 
analysis show that the use of net debt might provide misleading implications.  One 
possible explanation could be the limitation of net financial liabilities which are 
utilized as the concept of net debt.  Net financial liabilities cannot give exact figures 
for net debt because this concept cannot consider real assets such as military assets 
or historical assets (e.g., Buckingham Palace).  Another possible explanation could 
be that fiscal policymakers do not seem to be affected by net debt when determining 
a fiscal stance in practice.  For example, the countries with a negative net debt-GDP 
ratio will not decide their fiscal stance according to the variation of net-debt.  This 
could be because the amount of the total debt is the main interest of politicians and 
voters since assets cannot be utilized immediately in a crisis due to low liquidity.  
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Table 3.11  The main determinants of fiscal sustainability (utilizing net debt) 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) GMM (4) GMM (5) FE 2SLS (6) FE 2SLS 
d t-1 
 
0.121 0.172 0.161 0.215 5.830** 3.732*** 
(0.72) (1.07) (0.97) (1.24) (2.25) (2.94) 
GVAR 
 
-1.152*** -1.150*** -1.166*** -1.163*** -0.928*** -1.029*** 
(-12.77) (-12.71) (-14.16) (-13.98) (-5.11) (-8.39) 
YVAR 
 
-0.680*** -0.693*** -0.717*** -0.734*** -1.433*** -0.966*** 
(-6.10) (-6.46) (-6.93) (-7.23) (-3.26) (-4.17) 
s t-1 0.658*** 0.657*** 0.652*** 0.649*** 0.681*** 0.718*** 
 (15.62) (15.96) (15.18) (15.52) (12.81) (15.05) 
GROWTH*d t-1 -0.002  -0.002  
-0.007***  
 
(-1.30)  (-1.27) 
 
(-2.62)  
IRL*d t-1 0.002*  0.002*  
-0.011*  
 
(1.84)  (1.82) 
 
(-1.79)  
GAP*d t-1  -0.002  
-0.002  -0.001 
 
 (-1.56) 
 
(-1.62)  (-1.37) 
INIDEBT*d t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.76) (0.75) (0.63) (0.66) (1.15) (1.02) 
AVEDEBT*d t-1 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002* -0.002** 
 
(-0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.16) (-1.77) (-2.04) 
AVEBALANCE *d t-1 -0.009*** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.009** 0.006 -0.009 
 
(-2.96) (-2.33) (-2.64) (-2.09) (0.55) (-1.4) 
GDPPC*d t-1 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 -0.018 -0.563** -0.376*** 
 
(-0.57) (-0.84) (-0.75) (-1.00) (-2.24) (-2.91) 
OPEN*d t-1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
(3.22) (3.21) (3.03) (3.13) (2.65) (3.43) 
OLD*d t-1 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.006** 
 
(-0.46) (-0.59) (-0.40) (-0.48) (0.99) (2.17) 
POLCON*d t-1 -0.049 -0.05 -0.049 -0.049 -0.082 -0.073* 
 
(-1.24) (-1.25) (-1.17) (-1.16) (-1.62) (-1.85) 
RULE*d t-1 
 
0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.033** 0.049*** 
 
(1.37) (1.34) (1.12) (1.11) (2.25) (2.98) 
F (Wald) 1013.06*** 575.36*** 10270.39*** 8587.08*** 555.59*** 881.77*** 
R
2
 0.761 0.762 - - 0.252 0.333 
Hausman chi
2
 - - - - 5.05 8.29 
No. of Obs. 578 578 554 554 557 557 
No.of Groups 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the net debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary 
increase in government expenditure, YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle, GROWTH is the 
growth rate, IRL is the interest rate, GAP is the gap between growth rate and interest rate, OPEN is trade 
openness, INIDEBT is initial net debt, AVEDEBT is average net debt, AVEBANANCE is the average primary 
balance, GDPPC is log of income per capita, OLD is the old-age dependency ratio, POLCON is a power 
dispersion index, and RULE is a dummy variable for fiscal rules.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors in regression (1)-(2), 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors in regression (3)-(4), and Fixed effects 
2SLS Instrumental variables estimation (FE 2SLS) in regression (5)-(6).  
 (3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, UN World Population Prospects 
(The 2010 revision), Henisz database (2010), and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
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(2) EMU countries 
This chapter already examined the level of fiscal sustainability of EMU 
countries in section 3.3.1.  We can see from the results that the fiscal finances of 
most EMU countries are sustainable except Greece, and these results can also be 
verified by the results when we examine the fiscal sustainability of 12 EMU 
countries collectively.  
Now, we explore the determinants of fiscal sustainability by analysing a sample 
of 12 EMU countries with special reference to the role of introducing the SGP rules.  
Estimation (1) and (2) are based on the application of the Fixed effects model (FE) to 
consider the heterogeneity of each country.  All coefficients of control variables, 
except initial debt-GDP ratio (INIDEBT), have the same sign as the baseline analysis 
of Table 3.5, although the degree of statistical significance is different in most 
variables.  The results also show that average debt-GDP ratio (AVEDEBT), income 
per capita (GDPPC), and fiscal rules (RULE) play a role in the level of fiscal 
sustainability.  These results could be generally confirmed by the results of GMM 
estimation (regression (3) and (4)).  However, the results show a few differences 
compared with the results of all OECD countries of baseline estimation in Table 3.5.  
First, growth rate (GROWTH) and the gap between growth rate and interest rate 
(GAP), which are significant in our basic estimation, do not seem to have any role to 
maintain a sustainable fiscal policy.  This could be because the distribution of 
economic growth in EMU countries is relatively even rather than that of whole 
OECD countries which are utilized in the baseline estimation of Table 3.5 115 .  
Second, fiscal rules (Rule) play a role in maintaining a sustainable fiscal policy. 
What one should note is that fiscal rules, which was not significant in our 
baseline estimation of 26 OECD countries, could play a role in maintaining 
sustainable fiscal policy in 12 EMU countries.  Also, the coefficients of  the fiscal 
rules in Table 3.12 are larger than those of fiscal rules in Table 3.5.   The coefficient 
of interaction term for fiscal rules and the lag value of the debt-GDP ratio is 0.008, 
which indicates that the adoption of fiscal rules could increase the level of fiscal 
sustainability by 0.008 on average.  This amount indicates that governments respond 
                                                 
115. The standard deviation of GDP growth of 12 EMU countries is 4.52 while that of 26 OECD 
countries in 5.18.      
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a one percentage point increase in the debt-GDP ratio by raising the primary budget 
balance additionally 0.008 percentage points when fiscal rules are introduced.   
This could be interpreted that fiscal rules, including the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) rules, play a certain role for EMU countries to maintain fiscal 
sustainability116.  This could be because the fiscal rules of EMU countries have more 
enforceability than those of other OECD countries.  The violaion of the SGP rules is 
acoompanied by the imposition of penalties from EMU such as public 
recommendations and financial sanctions, which is different from the violation of 
other fiscal rules.  These results are consistent with the existing literature (Alesina, 
2010) which argues that fiscal rules could help achieve fiscal sustainability only 
when a credible punishment is followed.  However, these results do not deny the 
need for modification of the SGP rules in a way that could enable fiscal finances to 
become more sustainable, since the size of the effect is not strong in our estimation.  
This could be rationalized by some literature which shows the SGP rules cannot 
guarantee fiscal sustainability.  Greiner and Semmler (2001) analyse the effect of the 
Maastricht Criteria on the fiscal sustainability of German fiscal policy, and they 
show that the criteria of EMU do not guarantee the fiscal sustainability automatically, 
even though the latter is the prerequisite of successful EMU.  Buiter and Grafe (2004) 
argue that the SGP rules are not well designed to guarantee fiscal sustainability since 
the SGP rules are myopic and backward-looking.  Wyplosz (2012) argues that the 
SGP rules are not sufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability since they are not 
supported by effective institutional arrangements.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116. The period during when fiscal rules are adopted and the period during when the SGP rules are 
adopted are the same in our dataset.  This implies that the results will be same when we replace the 
dummy for fiscal rules into the dummy for the SGP rules. 
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Table 3.12  The main determinants of fiscal sustainability (EMU countries)  
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) GMM (4) GMM (5) FE 2SLS (6) FE  2SLS 
d t-1 
 
-0.434*** -0.470*** -0.412*** -0.431*** 0.285 0.890 
(-3.34) (-5.54) (-2.84) (-4.18) (0.49) (1.19) 
GVAR 
 
-1.266*** -1.268*** -1.253*** -1.255*** -2.177 -0.595 
(-24.09) (-25.49) (-25.72) (-27.35) (-1.12) (-0.40) 
YVAR 
 
-0.337** -0.313** -0.337*** -0.330*** 2.636 -2.001 
(-2.67) (-2.75) (-2.92) (-3.20) (0.39) (-0.58) 
s t-1 0.557*** 0.551*** 0.550*** 0.540*** -9.903 6.483 
 (8.66) (9.56 ) (8.90) (9.28) (-0.47) (0.45) 
GROWTH*d t-1 0.001  0.001  
0.007  
 
(1.08)  (1.38)  
(0.50)  
IRL*d t-1 -0.001  -0.001  
0.004  
 
(-0.80)  (-0.76)  
(0.38)  
GAP*d t-1  0.001  
0.001  -0.001 
 
 (1.25)  
(1.41)  (-0.27) 
INIDEBT*d t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.38) (-0.34) (-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.26) (-0.44) 
AVEDEBT*d t-1 0.001** 0.001***   0.001** 0.001*** 0.006 -0.003 
 
(2.71) (3.40) (2.05) (2.78) (0.58) (-0.32) 
AVEBALANCE *d t-1 0.007 0.006   0.006    0.006 0.168 -0.115 
 
(1.49) (1.52) (1.54) (1.41) (0.47) (-0.46) 
GDPPC*d t-1 0.040** 0.043*** 0.039**   0.041*** 0.989 -0.664 
 
(2.76) (4.38) (2.44) (3.53) (0.47) (-0.46) 
OPEN*d t-1 -0.000   -0.000* -0.000   -0.000 -0.005 0.003 
 
(-1.37) (-1.80) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.46) (0.47) 
OLD*d t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*   -0.001** -0.015 0.014 
 
(-1.21) (-1.05) (-1.94) (-1.98) (-0.47) (0.46) 
POLCON*d t-1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001   0.001 0.008 -0.02 
 
(-0.22) (-0.08) (-0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (-0.35) 
RULE*d t-1 0.008**   0.008**    0.007** 0.006** 0.007 0.020 
 
(2.25) (2.51) (2.40) (2.31) (0.53) (0.73) 
F (Wald) - - 97348.82*** 71018.73*** 125.35*** 188.63*** 
R
2
 0.518 0.510 - - 0.179 0.009 
Hausman chi
2
 - - - - 0.25 0.31 
No. of Obs. 282 282 269 269 271 271 
No.of Groups 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary increase in 
government expenditure, YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle, GROWTH is the growth rate, 
IRL is the interest rate, GAP is the gap between growth rate and interest rate, OPEN is trade openness, INIDEBT 
is initial debt, AVEDEBT is average debt, AVEBANANCE is the average primary balance, GDPPC is log of 
income per capita, OLD is the old-age dependency ratio, POLCON is a power dispersion index, and RULE is a 
dummy variable for fiscal rules.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model (FE) with robust standard errors in regression (1)-(2), 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors in regression (3)-(4), and Fixed effects 
2SLS Instrumental variables estimation (FE 2SLS) in regression (5)-(6).  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, UN World Population Prospects 
(The 2010 revision), Henisz database (2010), and IMF fiscal rules database (2009).  
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4. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Our main results can be summarized as follow.  First, we find that most OECD 
countries seem to operate their fiscal policy in a sustainable way while some 
countries such as Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, and Slovakia have suffered from 
unsustainable fiscal finances, which is consistent with the existing literature and 
current fiscal situation.  Second, it could be seen that a number of factors play an 
important role in determining fiscal sustainability.  The growth rate has a positive 
effect on fiscal sustainability while aging populations have a negative effect.  The 
countries with high income per capita tend to be more likely to have sustainable 
fiscal finances.  Finally, the SGP rules appear to have helped governments maintain 
fiscal sustainability in EMU countries, although other fiscal rules may not play any 
role in maintaing fiscal sustainability in OECD countries due to the lack of 
enforceability when they are violated.   
To conclude, our findings indicate that governments could operate their fiscal 
finances in a sustainable way even under continuous budget deficit and debt 
accumulation, if the economy keeps growing and the government have a good 
quality of fiscal institutions.  Our findings also show that advanced countries are 
more likely to maintain sustainable fiscal finances.  Our findings, therefore, imply 
that the best solution might be a stable and sustained economic growth.   In addition, 
policymakers should make an effort to find solutions to alleviate future spending 
pressure such as ageing population related spending.  
Fiscal sustainability is essential for the success of economic development 
strategy (Buiter, 2004).  It could be functioned as the last resort which the 
government could rely on when the economy is in crisis.  The government, therefore, 
should operate their fiscal policy in a sustainable way to respond to the business 
cycle and to invest public capital for supporting sustained economic growth.  This is 
because it is not easy to recover fiscal sustainability once the budget deficit and 
government debt start to increase, since fiscal policy has inertial properties as 
confirmed in our analysis.  The process of budget consolidation, which aims to 
improve fiscal sustainability, should be as transparent as possible and stick to a clear 
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message (Henriksson, 2007).  Well organized fiscal rules could be one solution to 
persuade tax payers.  Afonso and Schuknecht (2008) show that fiscal rules could 
help eliminate the deficit biases in the fiscal policy making process.  Bi and Leeper 
(2010) argue that fiscal reform, such as an expenditure ceiling and budget surplus 
target, could decrease the possibility of default by reducing the risk premium of debt.  
What one should note is that fiscal rules should be set to be easy for the government 
to follow and should be embedded in instituitonal arrangements to confirm the 
enforceability.  OECD (2002) argues that fiscal rules should be credible, flexible, 
and transparent to be implemented appropriately in practice.  Wyplosz (2012) argues 
that fiscal rules are not sufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability if supporting 
institutions are not followed.  The fiscal responsibility act or independent fiscal 
policy committees similar to independent central bank could be one possible solution 
to confirm the enforceability of fiscal rules.  It can decide the expenditure or 
borrowing limit independently, and therefore it could enable governments to avoid 
political distortion (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011; Fatás, 2010; Bi and Leeper, 
2010; Coeure and Pisani-Ferry, 2005; Wyplosz, 2005; Eichengreen, Hausmann, and 
von Hagen, 1996).  
The contribution of this chapter is that it could provide the basis of research 
about the determinants of fiscal sustainability which has been ignored in the existing 
literature.  Our analysis provides empirical evidence that economic growth and the 
level of development could help strengthen fiscal sustainability, and it could also 
provide the structure of fiscal rules to improve fiscal sustainability.  Our results 
imply that fiscal rules with enforceability, such as the SGP rules, could strengthen 
the sustainability of fiscal finances.  Also, our analysis employs the concept of net 
debt which also has not been dealt with in the existing literature even though we 
failed to provide reliable evidence.   
However, our analysis has several limitations.  First, our analysis tests the fiscal 
sustainability of the past period historically, but one cannot assure whether the 
positive response of the government will be continue in the future.  Fiscal 
sustainability is not a problem of the past only but a problem of infinite horizon 
including the past, the present, and the future altogether.  It can be described as the 
question of whether the current fiscal stance will be maintained in the future on the 
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basis of the current economic structure and the forecasting of the future economic 
structure.  Aging populations related expenditure might be a good example.  Fiscal 
policy might be unsustainable although the government maintains a sustainable 
fiscal stance at present because the expenditure of pension and health care will 
increase automatically in the future.  Second, the measurement of debt is another 
difficult issue.  The scope of government debt is considerably different in most 
countries even though many countries compile government debt statistics according 
to the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) manual which is composed by IMF.  
Therefore, the manipulation of publicly published statistics should be performed in 
empirical works very carefully to coincide with the scope of debt across each 
country117.  In addition, one should consider implicit debt such as public pension 
liability which has been generally neglected in the existing literature118 .  Some 
literature argues that one needs not to consider implicit debt because the government 
can pay off without financial burden through continuous reform (Coeure and Pisani-
Ferry, 2005; Franco, Marino, and Zotteri, 2004).  However, it will finally result in 
real liabilities of the government if the reform does not satisfy necessary condition.  
OECD (2002) also recommends that future contingent liabilities about age-relating 
spending should be considered when one assesses fiscal sustainability.  Future 
studies are needed in these fields.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117. Buiter (2004) and Buiter and Grafe (2004) even argue that one should consider non-monetary net 
financial debt of the consolidated general government and central bank since the fiscal authority is the 
last resort that stands behind the central bank.  Dias, Richmond, and Wright (2011) suggest a new 
measure of government debt which is invariant to contractual form since face values of government 
debt could be a misleading indicator due to different contractual form.   
118. Valderrama (2005) estimates the fiscal sustainability of Korea and Thailand in the presence of 
contingent liabilities.  The author adds a private credit expansion variable into Bohn’s (1998) reaction 
function to proxy for contingent liabilities.  The results show that fiscal sustainability is not related to 
the presence of credit expansion in Korea, while it seems to become worse in Thailand.    
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Appendix 3 
 
Table3A.1  Estimation period 
 
  
  
Regression when using gross debt Regression when using net debt 
No.of Obs. Period No.of Obs. Period 
Australia 20 1988-2008 20 1988-2008 
Austria 38 1970-2008 28 1980-2008 
Belgium 38 1970-2008 38 1970-2008 
Canada 38 1970-2008 38 1970-2008 
Denmark 26 1980-2006 26 1980-2006 
Finland 33 1975-2008 33 1975-2008 
France 30 1978-2008 30 1978-2008 
Germany 15 1991-2006 15 1991-2006 
Greece 9 1995-2004 9 1995-2004 
Iceland 10 1998-2008 10 1998-2008 
Ireland 9 1998-2007 9 1998-2007 
Italy 37 1970-2007 37 1970-2007 
Japan 37 1970-2007 37 1970-2007 
Korea 32 1975-2007 32 1975-2007 
Luxembourg 11 1995-2006 - - 
Netherlands 38 1970-2008 38 1970-2008 
New Zealand 14 1993-2007 14 1993-2007 
Norway 37 1970-2007 28 1979-2007 
Poland 12 1995-2007 12 1995-2007 
Portugal 13 1995-2008 13 1995-2008 
Slovakia 13 1995-2008 13 1995-2008 
Spain 20 1987-2007 20 1987-2007 
Sweden 38 1970-2008 38 1970-2008 
Switzerland 17 1990-2008 - - 
UK 34 1970-2004 34 1970-2004 
USA 38 1970-2008 38 1970-2008 
No. of countries  26 
 
24 
 
Mean of Obs. 25.27 
 
25.42 
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Table 3A.2  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across countries             
(Robust estimation) 
 
  Debt ratio t-1 GVAR YVAR Balance t-1 Obs. R
2
 
t 
 
t 
 
t  t 
  EMU countries (12) 
Austria 0.01 1.65 -1.10*** -4.99 -0.80** -2.29 0.63*** 6.53 38 0.71 
Belgium 0.04*** 4.95 -1.39*** -7.28 0.09 0.25 0.75*** 14.58 38 0.95 
France 0.01 1.48 -1.42*** -3.66 -0.45 -1.12 0.43*** 3.10 30 0.66 
Finland 0.03 1.34 -1.50** -2.22 -0.26 -0.41 0.74*** 6.28 33 0.74 
Germany 0.04* 1.86 -1.33*** -8.81 -1.59** -2.42 0.12 1.01 15 0.90 
Greece -0.07 -0.93 -0.52 -1.77 0.94 0.38 0.44 1.56 9 0.94 
Ireland 0.09 
 
-2.07 
 
-0.00 
 
0.76  6 1.00 
Italy 0.06*** 3.45 -0.86** -2.31 -0.33 -0.68 0.62*** 6.02 37 0.91 
Luxembourg 1.14*** 4.47 -0.88** -2.53 -1.18** -2.88 0.23 1.62 11 0.93 
Netherlands 0.00 0.29 -1.27*** -5.72 -0.26 -0.53 0.57*** 4.96 38 0.66 
Portugal 0.04 0.79 -1.26* -2.35 -0.46 -0.87 0.40** 2.49 12 0.60 
Spain 0.01 0.45 -0.46 -1.12 0.40 0.92 0.92*** 8.65 19 0.85 
Mean 0.12 
 
-1.17 
 
-0.33 
 
0.55  23.8 
 S.D. 0.32   0.44   0.67   0.24   12.9   
Other Advanced European countries (7) 
Denmark 0.03 0.75 -1.18** -2.25 -1.41 -1.70 0.60*** 5.07 26 0.81 
Iceland 0.23 0.78 -2.53 -1.73 -1.24 -1.08 0.01 0.03 9 0.93 
Norway 0.18*** 3.70 -1.25*** -4.18 -0.09 -0.12 0.75*** 9.23 37 0.85 
Slovakia -0.10 -0.99 -1.35*** -4.67 0.80 0.59 0.20 0.82 13 0.75 
Sweden 0.04** 2.32 -0.69*** -3.58 -0.85* -1.92 0.83*** 11.01 38 0.86 
Switzerland 0.09*** 5.82 -0.73** -2.83 -1.66*** -3.23 0.27** 2.30 17 0.91 
UK 0.02 0.56 -1.07*** -2.84 0.10 0.19 0.55*** 4.81 34 0.69 
Mean 0.07 
 
-1.26 
 
-0.62 
 
0.46  24.9 
 S.D. 0.11 
 
0.61 
 
0.91 
 
0.30  12.0 
 Other Advanced non-European countries (6) 
Australia 0.03 0.94 -0.90 -0.98 0.14 0.13 0.82*** 4.95 20 0.77 
Canada 0.05*** 5.59 -1.29*** -4.85 -0.58 -1.54 0.72*** 14.17 38 0.94 
Japan 0.00 0.34 -1.65*** -5.35 -1.02 -1.48 0.84*** 9.71 37 0.83 
Korea -0.00 -0.15 -1.12*** -6.57 -0.85*** -3.11 0.47*** 4.49 32 0.73 
New Zealand -0.03 -1.26 -1.29** -3.04 -1.84** -2.28 0.31 1.37 14 0.75 
USA 0.05** 3.02 -1.42*** -2.98 -1.49*** -3.81 0.65*** 7.59 38 0.81 
Mean 0.02 
 
-1.28 
 
-0.94 
 
0.64  29.8 
 S.D. 0.03   0.26   0.70   0.21   10.4   
Emerging Market countries (1) 
Poland -0.00 -0.01 0.33 0.45 -2.41 -1.21 0.02 0.02 12 0.60 
All countries (26) 
Mean 0.08 
 
-1.16 
 
-0.63 
 
0.51  25.0 
 S.D. 0.23 
 
0.53 
 
0.83 
 
0.26  12.0 
 MAX 1.14 
 
0.33 
 
0.94 
 
0.84  38 
 MIN -0.10  -2.53  -2.41  0.01   6  
Note: (1) Dependent variable is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st)   
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation. 
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
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Table 3A.3  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across countries             
(Original Bohn’s model) 
 
  Debt ratio t-1 GVAR YVAR  Obs. R
2
 
t 
 
t 
 
t   
  EMU countries (12) 
Austria 0.01 1.00 -1.04*** -4.18 -0.96** -2.62   38 0.36 
Belgium 0.10*** 11.20 -1.33** -2.09 -0.21 -0.24   38 0.63 
France 0.02** 2.36 -1.70*** -4.82 -0.87** -2.17   30 0.56 
Finland -0.04 -1.45 -0.95 -0.78 -1.96 -1.55   33 0.39 
Germany 0.05** 2.84 -1.30*** -14.06 -1.80*** -3.77   15 0.89 
Greece -0.11 -1.25 -0.53 -1.47 2.68 1.33   9 0.92 
Ireland 0.11*** 13.90 -1.74*** -9.55 -1.39*** -4.57   9 0.97 
Italy 0.16*** 9.49 -0.61 -1.29 0.18 0.28   37 0.83 
Luxembourg 0.82* 2.07 -1.12** -2.44 -1.19** -2.68   11 0.83 
Netherlands 0.01 0.48 -1.18*** -6.65 -1.15* -1.85   38 0.44 
Portugal -0.06 -0.96 -1.96*** -3.94 -0.23 -0.36   13 0.69 
Spain 0.04 1.04 -0.66 -1.18 -1.30 -1.04   20 0.14 
Mean 0.09 
 
-1.18 
 
-0.68 
 
  24.25 
 S.D. 0.24   0.46   1.24      12.47   
Other Advanced European countries (7) 
Denmark -0.02 -0.47 -1.88** -2.20 -3.02*** -3.60   26 0.60 
Iceland 0.01 0.28 -1.26*** -24.02 -1.61*** -3.58   10 0.98 
Norway 0.31*** 3.20 -2.07*** -3.25 -2.16* -1.71   37 0.45 
Slovakia -0.14* -1.85 -1.33*** -6.28 1.40* 2.22   13 0.77 
Sweden -0.04 -1.29 -0.92 -1.54 -2.56** -2.71   38 0.38 
Switzerland 0.11*** 8.03 -0.90** -2.86 -2.91*** -4.78   17 0.81 
UK 0.02 0.42 -1.88*** -5.20 0.22 0.32   34 0.45 
Mean 0.04 
 
-1.46 
 
-1.52 
 
  25.00 
 S.D. 0.14 
 
0.48 
 
1.69 
 
  11.75 
 Other Advanced non-European countries (6) 
Australia -0.04 -1.38 -1.02 -0.75 -3.02* -1.82    20 0.47 
Canada 0.12*** 5.52 -1.43** -2.31 -0.95 -1.09   38 0.58 
Japan -0.03*** -3.39 -1.28** -2.43 -2.05 -1.46   37 0.31 
Korea -0.03 -0.98 -0.96*** -4.47 -1.09*** -3.43   32 0.51 
New Zealand -0.04* -2.09 -1.31*** -3.37 -2.54*** -5.02   14 0.73 
USA 0.04** 2.05 -2.44*** -3.44 -1.45*** -3.21   38 0.49 
Mean 0.00 
 
-1.41 
 
-1.85 
 
  29.83 
 S.D. 0.06   0.54   0.83      10.36   
Emerging Market countries (1) 
Poland 0.00 0.03 0.33* 1.89 -2.44*** -4.17   12 0.69 
All countries (26) 
Mean 0.05 
 
-1.25 
 
-1.25 
 
  25.27 
 S.D. 0.18 
 
0.57 
 
1.35 
 
  11.64 
 MAX 0.82 
 
0.33 
 
2.68 
 
  38 
 MIN -0.14  -2.44  -3.02     9  
Note: (1) Dependent variable is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st)   
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation. 
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
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Table 3A.4  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries across country groups 
(GMM) 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
All countries EMU  Other European Other non-European 
 
(DIF) (SYS) (DIF) (SYS) (DIF) (SYS) (DIF) (SYS) 
d t-1 
0.027** 0.004 0.030*** 0.006** 0.039*** 0.010 0.008 -0.000 
(2.50) (1.27) (5.27) (2.05) (2.53) (0.54) (1.17) (-0.08) 
GVAR 
-1.248*** -1.053*** -1.171*** -1.178*** -1.215*** -0.912*** -1.383*** -1.388*** 
(-17.47) (-11.02) (-10.28) (-8.15) (-10.27) (-10.53) (-14.92) (-14.88) 
YVAR 
-0.510*** -0.426*** -0.379*** -0.222* -0.564*** -0.530** -0.762*** -0.751*** 
(-4.61) (-3.61) (-3.64) (-1.77) (-2.93) (-2.41) (-3.33) (-3.19) 
s t-1 0.730*** 0.814*** 0.713*** 0.794*** 0.713*** 0.801*** 0.792*** 0.851*** 
 (22.30) (23.45) (18.40) (16.78) (11.71) (13.26) (18.29) (25.36) 
F (Wald) 1925.57*** 1012.53*** 1317.03*** 722.66*** 1829.91*** 506.88*** 2058.26*** 3413.18*** 
Hansen 
2
18.58 20.35 10.24 7.70 3.55 1.82 0.40 0.07 
No. of Obs. 631 657 279 291 168 175 173 179 
No.of Groups 26 26 12 12 7 7 6 6 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary increase in 
government expenditure, and YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle.
 
(2) Regression methods are Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors.  DIF is the 
difference GMM and SYS is the system GMM.                                                                                                                                            
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.Source: 
OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
 
Table 3A.5  The fiscal sustainability of OECD countries - FE 2SLS Estimation        
(utilizing net debt) 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
All countries EMU  Other European Other non-European 
d t-1 
 
0.019*** 0.040*** -0.011 0.017*** 
(5.45) (8.26) (-1.05) (3.71) 
GVAR 
 
-1.249*** -1.224*** -1.286*** -1.382*** 
(-21.19) (-14.42) (-11.61) (-10.30) 
YVAR 
 
-0.438*** -0.426*** -0.440 -0.832*** 
(-3.58) (-2.79) (-1.48) (-4.12) 
s t-1 0.747*** 0.671*** 0.677*** 0.797*** 
 (37.74) (23.01) (13.72) (24.15) 
Wald 2329.71*** 1321.21*** 557.11*** 805.51*** 
R
2
 0.753 0.635 0.758 0.843 
Hausman chi
2
 13.47*** 33.75*** - 3.00 
No. of Obs. 586 259 143 173 
No.of Groups 24 11 6 6 
Note: (1) st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is debt-GDP ratio, GVAR is the temporary increase in 
government expenditure, and YVAR is the temporary variation in the business cycle.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects 2SLS Instrumental variables estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.   
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
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1. Introduction   
 
One of the most important objectives of fiscal policy in modern economies is to 
conduct a cyclical stabilization over a business cycle in the short term and to 
maintain fiscal sustainability in the long term (Wyploz, 2005).  The SGP rules, 
which are the compulsory criterion that EU member countries have to abide by, also 
target macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability as the main objectives 
(Buiter, 2004; Buiter and Grafe, 2004).  The argument about reform of the SGP rules 
in the mid-2000s also mainly focused on enhancing both goals.   
However, it is not easy to obtain both macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
sustainability simultaneously.  Fiscal policy tends to be procyclical rather than 
countercyclical in a large number of countries because of credit constraints, political 
constraints, and weak fiscal instruments as argued in chapter 2.  The sustainability of 
fiscal finances are also difficult to achieve due to the increasing spending pressures 
from political competition, an aging society, and economic crisis as stated in chapter 
3.  Moreover, to obtain both countercyclical fiscal policy and sustainable fiscal 
finances at the same time could be conflicting in practice119.  Countercyclical fiscal 
policy is one of the most important economic policy tools which can be utilized by 
governments when the economy is in recessions, but the risk of deteriorating fiscal 
sustainability arising from countercyclical fiscal stimulus packages has been 
recognized by policymakers and economists.   
This thesis dealt with the issue of the macroeconomic stabilization function of 
fiscal policy in chapter 2 and the issue of the fiscal sustainability in chapter 3.  This 
chapter deals with how these two main objectives of fiscal policy affect economic 
growth.  These arguments will verify the rationale of a countercyclical and 
sustainable fiscal policy if sustained economic growth is assumed to be ultimate 
objective of economic policy.  This chapter firstly explores the effect of fiscal 
                                                 
119. Huart (2011) argues that fiscal stabilization and fiscal sustainability could be contradictory if 
fiscal policy causes a deficit bias.  Coeure and Pisani-Ferry (2005) also argue that fiscal sustainability 
and macro stabilization could be contradictory by examining the role of the SGP rules on debt 
sustainability and macroeconomic stability in EMU countries even though to achieve both at the same 
time depends on the initial fiscal position and the position in the business cycle.   
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procyclicality on economic growth which is recently starting to be studied in the 
literature.  We specially focus on analysing the effect of the cyclical properties of 
fiscal policies on economic growth across spending categories, which has been 
ignored in the existing literature.  We find that the composition of government 
spending plays a key role in its effects on economic growth.  More specifically, 
procyclical government consumption and current transfers, which is assumed to be 
unproductive, could have a negative effect on economic growth while procyclical 
government investment, which is considered to be productive, does not hinder 
economic growth.  We also focus on analysing the effect of the cyclical properties of 
fiscal policies on economic growth across country groups for the first time.  We find 
that negative effect of procyclical fiscal policy is prominent in emerging market 
countries than in advanced countries.  This chapter also assesses the effect of fiscal 
sustainability on economic growth, which has also been ignored in the existing 
literature.  The relationship between fiscal procyclicality and sustainability is also 
examined to assess the channel through which fiscal sustainability affects economic 
growth.  We find that the sustainability of fiscal finances do not seem to play any 
role in economic growth in tranquil times even though it could lead to sudden 
economic crisis. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the 
empirical evidence on the above topics in the existing literature.  Section 3 contains 
the empirical analysis on the effect of both fiscal procyclicality and sustainability on 
economic growth.  Finally, this chapter ends with some concluding remarks and 
policy implications.   
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2. The existing empirical evidence 
 
2.1. The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth  
One of the most controversial issues about economic policy is whether fiscal 
policy has an effect on the real economy or not.  Keynesian models have a clear view 
that fiscal policy should be operated in a countercyclical pattern to stabilize the 
variation of the economy because they assume that the economy has an inherent 
unstable property, while neoclassical models argue that the government should not 
try to fine tune economy because they assumes that the economy is naturally stable 
(Mankiw, 1997).  Empirical literature has also suggested different results, but it 
generally shows that productive government expenditure could have a positive effect 
on long term growth 120 .  Nijkamp and Poot (2004) report that government 
expenditures on education and infrastructure play a role in economic growth even 
though the effects of conventional fiscal policy on economic growth are weak 
through the meta analyses of 93 published empirical studies.       
The effect of fiscal policy on economic growth is not purely academic as 
argued by Aghion and Marinescu (2007).  The question of whether the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy could have an effect on economic growth is also not purely 
academic.  Recently, a number of papers have attempted to assess the effect of the 
cyclical properties of fiscal policy on economic growth empirically, and they show 
that countercyclical fiscal policy tend to enhance economic growth while procyclical 
fiscal policy tend to hinder economic growth (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Aghion, 
Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2009; Woo, 2009).  These studies employ a two-step 
procedure to explore the effect of fiscal cyclicality on economic growth.  Firstly, 
                                                 
120. A large number of studies (see, for example, Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008; Ismihan and 
Ozkan, 2005; Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller, 2001; Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell, 1999) suggest a 
positive effect of productive spending on economic growth and consider public investment to be 
productive spending.  Some studies show that government investment has a growth enhancing effect 
utilizing economic classification of government spending, and some studies show that productive 
spending, such as spending on infrastructure, education, health, and defence, have growth enhancing 
effects, utilizing functional classifications of government spending (Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller, 
2001; Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell, 1999).  On the other hand, some studies (Ghosh and Gregoriou, 
2008; Gregoriou and Ghosh, 2009) show that current spending is productive while capital spending is 
unproductive utilizing both economic and functional classifications of government spending.      
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they obtain the degree of the cyclicality of fiscal policy by estimating models of the 
form (4.1) which regresses the proxy for fiscal policy (G) on the fluctuation in 
business cycle (Ya), as already stated in chapter 2.  The existing literature employs 
government spending or budget balance as the proxies for fiscal policy and employs 
output gap or GDP growth as the proxies for the fluctuation in business cycle.  Then, 
it explores the effect of fiscal cyclicality on economic growth by estimating models 
of the form (4.2) which regresses economic growth (∆Y) on the estimated measure 
for the fiscal cyclicality (/b) and a set of control variables (Z).  The existing literature 
employs per capita GDP growth to capture the change in economic growth (∆Y). 
           - = .- + /- Gc- + 8-                                                                          (4.1)  
           )G- = d + e/b- + f :- + g-                                                               (4.2) 
Aghion and Marinescu (2007) explore the effect of fiscal cyclicality on 
economic growth utilizing a panel of 19 OECD countries.  They show that higher 
countercyclical fiscal policy, which is estimated as time-varying coefficients, could 
have a positive effect on economic growth especially in the countries with tight 
credit constraints.  At first, they explore the degree of countercyclicality of fiscal 
policy by regressing budget deficit on output gap.  Then, they regress the change in 
income per capita on the estimated time-varying measure for the countercyclicality 
of budget deficit by panel data model to examine the effect of fiscal 
countercyclicality on economic growth.  They include the ratio of private credit to 
GDP as independent variables to control the effect of credit constraints and show 
that credit constraints are negatively associated with the positive effect of 
countercyclicality of budget balance on economic growth.  
Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi (2009) develop Aghion and Marinescu’s 
(2007) argument in a way that utilizes microeconomic data to overcome the 
weakness of cross country measure of output gap and to avoid the causality issue 
which is caused by using macroeconomic data.  They analyse the panel data of 
manufacturing industries across 18 OECD countries for the period 1980-2005 and 
provide the empirical evidence that more countercyclical fiscal policy has a positive 
effect on value added growth and productivity growth in industry, especially in 
industries with financial constraints and less tangible asset.  They argue that 
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countercyclical fiscal policy in recessions could play a role in enhancing value added 
growth and productivity growth by promoting firm’s investment to long term 
projects, and it in turn induces favourable long run effect on economic growth.  At 
first, they obtain the degree of countercyclicality of fiscal policy by regressing the 
change in budget deficit and government spending on the change in the output gap 
employing time series analysis for each country, and then they regress real value 
added growth and productivity growth in industry on the estimated time invariant 
measure for the countercyclicality of budget deficit and government spending 
through a panel data model to examine the effect of fiscal countercyclicality on 
economic growth.   
Woo (2009) argues that the social polarization of preferences over fiscal 
spending could lead to procyclical fiscal policy and finds that procyclical fiscal 
policy could lead to slow economic growth.  The author shows that social 
polarization, measured by income and education inequality, has a negative effect on 
economic growth through procyclical fiscal policy by utilizing a cross section data of 
96 countries for the period 1960-2003.  At first, the author obtains the measure of 
procyclicality of government spending by regressing the change in government 
consumption on the change in GDP employing time series analysis121   for each 
country and then regresses the change in income per capita on the estimated 
coefficient for procyclicality of government consumption utilizing cross country 
analysis to examine the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth.  The 
author includes initial income and initial human capital as the independent variables 
to control the effect of these variables.  
The differences of the methods among the existing literature are as follows.  
First, Aghion and Marinescu (2007) utilize the time-varying measure of fiscal 
cyclicality while Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi (2009) and Woo (2009) utilize the 
time invariant measure of fiscal cyclicality for each country.  Aghion, Hemous, and 
Kharroubi (2009) employ the interaction term for the countercyclicality of budget 
deficit / government spending and financial dependence / asset tangibility to 
overcome the problem of utilizing time invariant measure of fiscal countercyclicality.  
                                                 
121. Woo (2009) utilizes the time series regression of the form equation (2.6) in chapter 2.  The only 
difference is that the author does not include the lag values of the first difference of log real GDP.    
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Second, Aghion and Marinescu (2007) utilize the budget deficit as the proxy for 
fiscal policy while Woo (2009) utilizes government consumption.  Aghion, Hemous, 
and Kharroubi (2009) utilize both the budget deficit and government spending.  It 
seems reasonable to utilize government spending as the proxy for fiscal policy, as is 
done in the most existing literature on the determinant of fiscal procyclicality.  This 
is because the budget balance cannot reflect policymaker’s discretionary action 
appropriately because of the existence of the cyclical components (Mackiewicz, 
2008), as already argued in chapter 2. 
Table 4.1  The variables utilized in the second step in the existing literature 
 
Dependent 
variable Independent variables 
Aghion and 
Marinescu 
(2007) 
The first difference 
of the log of real 
GDP per capita 
Lag of estimated coefficients for countercyclicality of budget balance (+) 
Lag of the ratio of private credit to GDP (-) 
Lag of interaction of above two variables (-) 
Lag of log real GDP per capita (-) 
Human capital (average years of secondary schooling of the population 
over age 25) (+, but insignificant) 
Trade openness (+) 
Government size (-) 
Investment / GDP (+) 
Population growth (-) 
Inflation (-) 
Inflation targeting (-,but insignificant) 
Aghion, 
Hemous, and 
Kharroubi 
(2009) 
The average annual 
growth rate in real 
value added / 
labour productivity 
for each industry   
Interaction of financial dependence and the countercyclicality of budget 
balance/GDP (+) 
Interaction of  asset tangibility and the countercyclicality of budget 
balance/GDP (+) 
Log of initial share in manufacturing value added (-) 
Woo     
(2009) 
The average annual 
growth rate of real 
GDP per capita 
Estimated coefficients for procyclicality of government consumption (-) 
Initial income per capita (log of initial real GDP per capita) (-) 
Initial human capital (log of average years of secondary schooling of the 
population over age 15 in 1960) (+) 
GDP volatility (-) 
Trade openness (+) 
Government size (-, but insignificant) 
Note :  The sign of coefficient is in parentheses. 
 
However, the positive effect of countercyclical fiscal policy could be ineffective 
in practice because of possible time lags and fiscal condition.  Alesina (2010) argues 
that one should be cautious when using countercyclical fiscal measures as policy 
tools.  The author suggests two main factors as the reason.  First, countercyclical 
fiscal policy is likely to be ineffective when the government size is big such as 
European countries.  Second, the possible time lags could reduce the effect of 
countercyclical fiscal policy.  Badinger (2012) also shows that the cyclical properties 
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of fiscal policy do not have a direct effect on economic growth even though they 
have an indirect effect on economic growth by affecting out volatility122.  Varvarigos 
(2009) even argues that countercyclical fiscal policy, by adjusting the tax rate to 
stabilize fluctuations in economic activity (e.g., employment and human capital 
investment), could reduce the long run growth rate since it removes the volatility 
generated from technology shocks which is beneficial for economic growth, 
although it could have a favourable effect on social welfare. 
 
2.2. The effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth 
Henriksson (2007, p.10) argues that fiscal sustainability is a “prerequisite” for 
economic growth suggesting a stable macroeconomic climate, which arises from 
sound and stable public finances, as the reason for success of Scandinavian 
economies.  The existing literature has mainly dealt with the measurement of fiscal 
sustainability and has ignored the effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth, 
in spite of increasing concern about fiscal sustainability which might have played a 
crucial role in triggering current economic crises since 2009.  One can just find some 
related empirical literature concerned with the effect of fiscal consolidation on 
economic growth which implies the relationship between fiscal sustainability and 
economic growth indirectly.  This literature, however, has failed to come to 
consistent results.    
The conventional wisdom about the effect of fiscal consolidation on economic 
growth is that it has a contractionary effect.  Keynesians argue that deficit reduction 
could lead to an economic downturn at least in the short term (Bi, Leeper, and Leith, 
2012).  The large reduction in government expenditure could lead to the loss of 
aggregate demand and could make economic growth slow (Makin, 2005).  Some 
literature suggests the empirical evidence that fiscal consolidation could have a 
negative effect on economic growth.  IMF (2010) shows that fiscal consolidation 
could reduce economic growth in the short term by analysing the fiscal consolidation 
episodes of 15 advanced countries for the period 1980-2009.  It provides the 
                                                 
122. Badinger (2012) shows that the cyclical properties of fiscal policy could amplify output volatility 
regardless of whether they are procyclical or countercyclical patterns.    
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empirical evidence that fiscal consolidation equal to one percentage point of GDP 
decreases the economic growth rate by 0.5 percentage points within two years and 
suggests that this effect could be mitigated under high perceived debt default risk.  It 
also suggests that fiscal consolidation could boost the economy in the long term if 
fiscal consolidation is conducted by cutting government consumption and transfers 
rather than government investment through the simulations of a dynamic general 
equilibrium model.  Perotti (2011) raises a question about the expansionary fiscal 
consolidation hypothesis.  The author suggests the case of four episodes of large 
fiscal consolidations (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) and argues that the 
expansionary effect of fiscal consolidations should be interpreted with caution since 
the driver of growth was internal demand only in Denmark and that the expansionary 
effect is not likely to be applicable to many countries in the present circumstances of 
low interest rates and wage increase. 
However, much literature has suggested the possibility of the positive effect of 
fiscal consolidations on economic growth if they are carried out by a reduction in 
current spending and have been large and decisive (Bi, Leeper, and Leith, 2012; 
Fatás, 2010; Alesina, 2010; Alesina and Ardagna, 2009; Ismihan and Ozkan, 2005; 
Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Alesina and Perotti, 1995).  Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2012) 
argue that the duration of fiscal consolidations, the level of government debt, and 
monetary policy stance play a role in determining whether fiscal consolidations are 
expansionary or not.  They especially suggest that fiscal consolidations could 
enhance economic growth if the government could remove the uncertainty associated 
with the composition and timing of fiscal consolidations.  Fatás (2010, p.6) argues 
that large and quick fiscal consolidations, so called “cold shower approach”, could 
have a positive effect on economic growth since large adjustments in government 
spending could increase private consumption and investment through the wealth 
effect.  The author suggests that fiscal consolidations should be driven by the 
reduction in spending rather than tax increases in order to raise the probability of 
success in fiscal consolidation and to help boost the economy, by providing the 
lessons from previous fiscal consolidations case.  Alesina (2010) argues that fiscal 
consolidations could help reduce debt quickly without causing recessions by 
generating a positive wealth effect and expectation about low interest rates.  The 
author shows that a great number of large fiscal consolidation episodes lead to 
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sustained economic growth if adjustment is conducted by spending cuts rather than 
tax increases.  Alesina and Ardagna (2010) analyse the fiscal consolidation episodes 
in OECD countries for the period 1970-2007 and show that fiscal adjustment by 
spending cuts appeared to avoid economic downturns more effectively rather than 
fiscal adjustment by tax increases.  Ismihan and Ozkan (2005) argue that fiscal 
contractions could have a positive effect on output performances.  They analyse the 
policymaker's decision making with regard to the composition of public spending by 
dividing government spending into the current spending and productivity enhancing 
public investment and show that successful reduction in current spending could 
result in favourable output performance123.  Alesina and Ardagna (1998) also show 
that fiscal adjustment is likely to be successful and expansionary if the size of the 
deficit adjustment is large, especially spending cuts rather than tax increases, by 
inducing expectations about permanent changes in fiscal policy, comparing 
expansionary fiscal adjustment episodes with contractionary fiscal adjustment 
episodes in OECD countries for the period 1960-1994.  Alesina and Perotti (1995) 
show that successful consolidation could lead to an improvement in economic 
growth and employment by comparing the growth rate and unemployment rate of G-
7 countries before and after the fiscal adjustment.   
Overall, the empirical evidence of the effect of fiscal consolidation on economic 
growth does not suggest a consistent picture.  This implies that one cannot be certain 
the fact that fiscal sustainability could have a favourable effect on economic growth 
even though a successful fiscal consolidation leads to the improvement of fiscal 
sustainability.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123. Ismihan and Ozkan (2005) show that current spending at the expense of public investment can be 
linked to low output performance, which could imply that governments could raise the long term 
economic growth rate maintaining fiscal sustainability if they allocate their revenues to investment 
rather than consumption.   
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3. Empirical analysis  
 
3.1. Data description  
The sample consists of 21 OECD countries, and we employ annual data for the 
period 1970–2008.  Nine OECD countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Turkey) are excluded due 
to the data availability124.   
With regard to the data for fiscal variables which are utilized to obtain the level 
of fiscal procyclicality and sustainability, this chapter employs the same data set as 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 which are taken from OECD Economic Outlook database 
No.86: government consumption (CGAAV), interest payments (GGINTPV), current 
transfers (TCTV), current expenditure (YPGV) 125 , government investment 
(IGAAV), total expenditure (YPGTV), the primary balance-GDP ratio (st), and the 
debt-GDP ratio (dt).  Summary statistics of fiscal variables are presented in Table 4.2 
and 4.3.  The fifth and sixth columns of Table 4.2 indicate the share of government 
spending relative to total expenditure and GDP respectively.  The fifth column 
shows that government consumption (CGAAV) occupies nearly a half of total 
expenditure (YPGTV) followed by current transfers (TCTV, 28.5%), government 
investment (IGAAV, 17.3%) and interest payments (GGINTPV, 6.7%).                 
Table 4.2  Summary statistics of government spending variables 
 
No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations Mean (A) A/H A/B 
GDPV (B) 21 801 40.503 - 100% 
CGAAV (C) 21 801 5.646 49.6% 13.9% 
GGINTPV (D) 21 775 0.761 6.7% 1.9% 
TCTV (E) 21 774 3.248 28.5% 8.0% 
YPGV (F=C+D+E) 21 782 9.431 82.8% 23.3% 
IGAAV (G) 21 793 1.970 17.3% 4.9% 
YPGTV (H=F+G) 21 769 11.393 100.0% 28.1% 
Note : (1) Unit of each variable is 1,000 billion unit of local currency.  (2) The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86. 
                                                 
124. Five countries (Czech Republic, Hungry, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey) are excluded following 
chapter 1 and 2.  Two countries (Luxembourg and Slovakia) are also excluded because there is no 
available data for initial human capital.  Two countries (Germany and Switzerland) are additionally 
excluded because the time series of the fiscal procyclicality and sustainability indicator are below ten.    
125. Current expenditure is the sum of government consumption, interest payments, and current 
transfers.    
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With regard to the data for the estimation of the effect of both fiscal 
procyclicality and sustainability on economic growth, this chapter employs the 
growth rate in GDP per capita (GDPPCR) as the dependent variable, which is taken 
from Penn World Tables 6.3.  This chapter employs two main control variables 
which have been commonly employed in the neoclassical literature on the 
determinant of economic growth.  Initial income (INIIC) is included to reflect the 
concept of the conditional convergence effect which has been advocated by the 
neoclassical growth model following Aghion and Marinescu (2007) and Woo (2009).  
This variable is defined as the log of real initial GDP per capita at 1970.  Initial 
human capital (INIHC) is included to control for the positive effect of human capital 
on economic growth following Aghion and Marinescu (2007) and Woo (2009).  This 
variable is defined as years of schooling at the secondary and higher level for males 
aged 25 and over at 1970126 and is taken from Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  The 
summary statistics of these variables are explained in Table 4.3.  This chapter also 
introduces some other control variables, such as output volatility, trade openness, 
and government size, following Woo (2009) to check the effect of endogenous 
growth factors and the robustness of our results.    
Table 4.3  Summary statistics of variables  
 
No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
st 21 755 0.282% 3.345 -14.069 16.135 
dt 21 636 59.073% 30.215 4.980 175.274 
GDPPCR 21 760 2.471% 2.972 -13.022 11.639 
INIIC 21 571 $14,349 3,754 3,030 22,689 
INIHC 21 571 2.490 1.117 0.907 5.066 
Note : The sample period is 1970–2008. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000). 
 
This chapter additionally utilizes a sample of 53 IMF member countries127 for 
the period 1980–2009, which is taken from IMF World Economic Outlook (2011), to 
assess the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth.  The growth rate of real 
GDP per capita (GDPPCR) are averaged over the period 1980-2009.  Initial income 
                                                 
126. Some initial income (INIIC) and initial human capital (INIHC) variables are defined as at 
different year depending on the data availability.      
127. We utilize data from 53 countries out of 187 IMF countries for which we have at least 20 years 
of data which is consistent with the criterion of selecting 21 OECD countries from OECD Economic 
Outlook Database.    
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(INIIC) is defined as the log of real initial GDP per capita at 1980, and initial human 
capital (INIHC) is defined as years of schooling at the secondary and higher level for 
males aged 25 and over at 1980.  The Summary statistics of these variables are 
explained in Table 4.4.    
Table 4.4  Summary statistics of variables (IMF dataset) 
 
No. of 
countries 
No. of 
observations mean 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
GDPV 53 1,488 15.210 71.836 0.0004 560.651 
YPGTV 53 1,359 4.803 23.885 0.0001 198.327 
GDPPCR 53 53 5.025% 2.468 1.365 15.945 
INIIC 53 53 $5,916 6,438 197 35,770 
INIHC 40 40 2.228 1.415 0.081 5.644 
Note : (1) Unit of GDPV and YPGTV are 1,000 billion unit of local currency (2) The sample period is 1980–2009. 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2011) and Barro and Lee dataset (2000). 
 
3.2. Empirical methodology 
To explore the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth, this chapter 
conducts both cross country analysis of the form (4.3) using time invariant 
procyclicality indicators following Woo (2009), and panel analysis of the form (4.4) 
using time-varying procyclicality indicators which are obtained by rolling window 
estimation following Aghion and Marinescu (2007), Alberola and Montero (2007), 
and Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés (2003).  A positive value 
of β implies the positive effect of a procyclical fiscal policy on economic growth.  
The same methods are applied to examine the effect of fiscal sustainability on 
economic growth.  This chapter conducts both cross country analysis of the form 
(4.5) and panel analysis of the form (4.6) using time-varying sustainability indicators 
which are obtained by recursive estimation128.  A positive value of γ implies the 
positive effect of a sustainable fiscal policy on economic growth.  
 
                                                 
128 . This chapter employs recursive estimation to find out time-varying estimator of fiscal 
sustainability since recursive estimation is more suitable than rolling window estimation when one 
estimates the trend of long term fiscal sustainability.  This is because fiscal sustainability is a long 
term characteristics, not short term concept as argued by Wyplosz (2012).       
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          G- = . + / 6- +  :- + H-                                                                     (4.3) 
          G- = . + / 6- +  :- + H-                                                                (4.4) 
          G- = . + 9 h- +  :- + H-                                                                     (4.5) 
          G- = . + 9 h- +  :- + H-                                                                (4.6)  
where Yit is the growth rate of real GDP per capita.  Pit is the procyclicality indicator 
which is obtained by regressing various categories of government spending growth 
on the GDP growth, as can be seen from equation (2.6) in chapter 2.  Sit is the 
sustainability indicator which is obtained by regressing the primary budget balance-
GDP ratio on the debt-GDP ratio, as can be seen from the equation (3.6) in chaptetr 3.  
Zit is a set of control variables.  Two main control variables (initial income and initial 
human capital) are included following the suggestion of Woo (2009) 129, and some 
other control variables, such as output volatility, trade openness, and government 
size, are included to check the robustness of results.    
To explore the effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal procyclicality, this chapter 
utilizes the panel data model that we employed in chapter 2 to assess the level of 
fiscal procyclicality.  We include the interaction term for the indicator of fiscal 
sustainability and GDP growth directly into the regression equation (2.7) in chapter 2, 
which estimates the fiscal procyclicality, following the argument of the existing 
literature (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Alberola and Montero, 2007; Mackiewicz, 2008; 
Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009).        
        ) log - = .- + ∑ /0)01 23456-,70 + 9h- × )23456- +  8-            (4.7)         
in which ∆log Git  is a first difference of the log real government spending, ∆log 
GDPit  is a first difference of log real GDP, and Sit is the fiscal sustainability indicator 
which is obtained by recursive estimation.  A positive β0 implies a procyclical 
behaviour of government spending, and a positive γ indicates that sustainable fiscal 
finances play a role in enhancing fiscal procyclicality. 
                                                 
129. Woo (2009) argues that this analysis on the effect of procyclicality on economic growth should 
focus on a core set of explanatory variables since the existing literature on the economic growth using 
many control variables often experiences the sensitive estimates to other conditional variables.      
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3.3.  Estimation results  
This chapter explores the effect of both fiscal procyclicality and sustainability 
on economic growth utilizing both cross country data and pooled data.  Firstly, we 
conduct estimations including the fiscal procyclicality indicators and fiscal 
sustainability indicators simultaneously as independent variables, as can be seen 
from subsection 3.3.3.  Then, we conduct estimations including the fiscal 
procyclicality indicators and fiscal sustainability indicators separately as independent 
variables in subsection 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  The results show a large degree of similarity 
between both estimations including the fiscal procyclicality and sustainability 
indicators simultaneously and separately.  We at first explain the results of the 
analysis including the fiscal procyclicality and sustainability indicators separately for 
better understanding of our argument.   
 
3.3.1.The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth 
 
(1) Baseline results  
If we include the fiscal procyclicality indicators and fiscal sustainability 
indicators simultaneously as independent variables in the estimation, all coefficients 
of fiscal sustainability indicators are insignificant as can be seen from Table 4.16 in 
subsection 3.3.3.  This section, therefore, conducts analysis excluding the fiscal 
sustainability indicators to explore the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic 
growth utilizing both cross country data and pooled data.  A iteratively reweighted 
least squares (RWLS) procedure is used to reduce the effect of outliers following 
Woo (2009) 130.  Firstly, we conduct cross country analysis using time invariant 
procyclicality indicators following Woo (2009).  Time invariant procyclicality 
indicators are obtained by regressing various categories of government spending 
growth on GDP growth across countries, which can be seen from Table 2.12 of 
Chapter 2.   
                                                 
130. We do not employ GMM method in this chapter.  This is because we cannot control initial 
income and initial human capital variables when we estimate by GMM due to the collinearity.      
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Graph 4.1 shows a scatter plot between the procyclicality of fiscal policy and 
economic growth which is the average growth rate in income per capita for the 
period 1970-2008131 .  The graphs do not show a clear picture across spending 
categories.  Government consumption (first panel) and current expenditure (fourth 
panel) appear to have a negative correlation with the average growth rate in income 
per capita, while current transfers (third panel) seems to have a positive correlation 
with the average growth rate in income per capita.   
Graph 4.1  The procyclicality of fiscal policy and average growth rate  
   
   
Note: GDPPCR is the average growth rate in income per capita, beta1-6 are the procyclicality indicators of 
government consumption (1), interest payments (2), current transfers (3), current expenditure (4), government 
investment (5), and total expenditure (6) respectively.  A positive value of beta implies the procyclical behaviour 
of government spending. 
 
However, these relaionships become clear if one controls initial outcome and 
inital human capital as can be seen from Table 4.5.  The procyclicality of 
government spending has a negative effect on economic growth except for 
government investment in column (5), even though the coefficients are only 
significant in explaining the effect of procyclicality of government consumption and 
total expenditure132.  A unit increase in the procyclicality of government spending133 
                                                 
131. Some countries are averaged over shorter period due to the data availability.      
132. Korea is excluded from the estimation in column (2) – (5) of cross country data analysis since it 
has large residual and leverage.  The case of Korea explains a great deal of portions of estimates in 
regression (1) and (6).  If we exclude the sample of Korea from regression (1) and (6), the values of 
R2 drop to 0.602 in regression (1) and 0.471 in regression (6) even though the results are generally 
consistent with baseline estimation in Table 4.5.        
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could reduce income per capita by 0.429 percentage points in government 
consumption and 0.486 percentage points in total expenditure. 
Table 4.5  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth in OECD countries 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
<cross county data> 
 
 
  
  
P -0.429** -0.030 -0.124 -0.272 0.046 -0.486*** 
 
(-2.66) (-0.54) (-0.72) (-1.13) (0.43) (-5.84) 
INIIC 
 
-2.278*** -0.871** -0.872* -0.976** -0.832* -2.433*** 
(-17.57) (-2.14) (-2.06) (-2.45) (-1.95) (-25.73) 
INIHC 
 
0.138*** 0.045 0.020 0.037 0.043 0.174*** 
(2.97) (0.58) (0.27) (0.53) (0.53) (5.34) 
F  112.94*** 1.96 1.93 2.85* 1.68 226.65*** 
R
2
 0.952 0.269 0.266 0.348 0.240 0.976 
No. of outliers - 1 1 1 1 - 
No. of Obs. 21 20 20 20 20 21 
<pooled data> 
 
     
P -0.292** -0.033 -0.191* -0.470*** 0.029 -0.067 
 (-2.01) (-0.82) (-1.66) (-2.87) (1.01) (-0.65) 
INIIC 
 
-2.483*** -2.568*** -2.365*** -2.471*** -2.608*** -2.578*** 
(-9.23) (-9.14) (-8.19) (-9.34) (-9.19) (-9.08) 
INIHC 
 
0.122 0.161* 0.123 0.147 0.161* 0.143 
(1.30) (1.70) (1.32) (1.61) (1.69) (1.52) 
F  30.83*** 29.33*** 23.59*** 32.17*** 29.29*** 28.74*** 
R
2
 0.140 0.138 0.114 0.149 0.135 0.137 
No. of Obs. 571 554 552 557 568 548 
Note: (1) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, INIIC is initial income, and INIHC is initial human capital. 
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000). 
 
Initial income (ININC) and initial human capital (INIHC) variables show 
expected signs, which is in line with the theory and the existing literature.  Initial 
income (ININC) is significantly negatively associated with per capita GDP growth, 
which supports the general notion of conditional convergence which has been 
advocated by the neoclassical growth model (Barro, 1996).  That is, the per capita 
GDP growth rate will be high when initial GDP per capita is low, if other conditions 
are constant.  Table 4.5 shows that the growth rate in GDP per capita (GDPPCR) is 
estimated to fall by 0.8~2.4 percentage points across spending categories for every 
                                                                                                                                          
133. A one unit of increase in the procyclicality of government spending indicates that the coefficient 
of GDP growth in equation (2.6) of chapter 2 increases by one unit.  In other words, it means that 
government spending growth, which increased by the same amount of GDP growth (e.g., one 
percentage point), increases by two times of the amount of GDP growth (e.g., two percentage points) 
for every one unit increase in GDP growth (e.g., one percentage point).      
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one percent increase in initial income (INIIC).  This coefficient is very similar to that 
of Barro (1996) which explores the determinants of economic growth while that of 
Woo (2009) shows huge difference with both our analysis and Barro (1996) as can 
be seen from Table 4.6 
Initial human capital (INIHC) is significantly positively associated with GDP 
per capita growth in explaining the effect of procyclicality of government 
consumption in column (1) and total expenditure in column (6), which implies that 
the countries with higher initial human capital tend to achieve higher economic 
growth.  Table 4.5 shows that the growth rate in GDP per capita (GDPPCR) is 
estimated to increase by 0.138 percentage points in column (1) and 0.174 percentage 
points in column (6) for every additional year of schooling at the secondary and 
higher level for males aged 25 and over (INIHC). 
If one compares our baseline results with that of Woo (2009), one can find the 
fact that our baseline results suggests a smaller negative effect of fiscal procyclicality 
on economic growth compared to Woo (2009).  The coefficient of the procyclicality 
of government consumption is smaller than that of Woo (2009).  Our cross country 
analysis might not be as informative as Woo (2009) who analyses 79 countries 
worldwide.  This could be because OECD countries generally show homogeneous 
characteristics in economic growth (Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008), and because 
our sample size is smaller than that of Woo (2009).  
Table 4.6  The comparison of the size of coefficients 
 Our analysis Woo (2009) Barro (1996) 
P -0.429** -0.7***  
INIIC -2.278*** -0.1 -2.25*** ~ - 2.54*** 
INIHC 0.138*** 0.4** 0.98***~ 1.18*** 
No. of Observations 21 79 87 
Note: The coefficients of Woo (2009) is corrected reflecting the difference of measurement unit. 
 
First, the distribution of economic growth in OECD countries is relatively even 
rather than that of those countries which Woo (2009) utilizes in his analysis, as can 
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be seen from Table 4.7134.  Second, our cross country analysis utilizes only 21 
samples, so there is a possibilty of suffering from small sample bias.   
Table 4.7  Summary statistics of the growth rate of income per capita  
 
No. of 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Woo (2009) 96 1.7 1.6 -3.0 6.3 
Our analysis 21 2.465 0.923 1.536 5.857 
Note: The number of observations which Woo (2009) utilizes in the analysis of the effect of procyclicality on 
economic growth is 79 out of 96 total observations. 
 
Therefore, this chapter conducts the same analysis using pooled data of time-
varying procyclicality indicators which are obtained by rolling window estimation 
following Aghion and Marinescu (2007) to overcome the problem of using cross 
country data, which can be seen from Graph 2.3 and 2.4 of chapter 2.   
Table 4.5 shows that the signs of coefficients are the same, but statistical 
signifcance levels are different with those of cross country data analysis.  Therefore, 
the coefficients of procyclicality indicators are significant in explaining the effect of 
procyclicality of government consumption, current transfers, and current expenditure.  
A negative effect of procyclical current transfers on economic growth could be 
interpreted that stronger automatic stabilizers could enhance economic growth.  A 
unit increase in procyclicality of government spending could reduce income per 
capita by 0.29 percentage points in government consumption, 0.19 percentage points 
in current transfers, and 0.47 percentage points in current expenditure.   
To conclude, procyclical current expenditure, especially government 
consumption and current transfers, could have a negative effect on economic growth, 
while procyclical interest payments and government investment do not play any role 
in economic growth.  These results are generally consistent with the existing 
literature (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2009; 
Woo, 2009).  One could think of several channels that procyclical fiscal policy 
hinders economic growth.  First, procyclical fiscal policy could amplify output 
volatility, so it in turn leads to lower economic growth (Badinger, 2012).  Second, 
                                                 
134. If we exclude Korea from our sample, the distribution of economic growth becomes more similar 
among sample countries.  The mean of sample in 2.295, standard deviation is 0.511, min is 1.536, and 
max is 3.986.      
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procyclical fiscal policy could be considered to be a sign of poor policy, so it could 
have an unfavourable effect on economic growth.  For example, fiscal policymakers 
often decide expansionary fiscal policy after the economy starts to recover (Burger 
and Jimmy, 2006) due to the lack of forecasting ability.  This policy tends to become 
procyclical and could amplify the volatility of business cycle, so it in turn leads to 
lower economic growth.  Third, procyclical government spending in recessions could 
foster both firms and workers, who are faced by credit constraints, to make growth-
enhancing investments such as R&D and human capital (Aghion and Marinescu, 
2007; Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2009).  Lastly, unproductive government 
spending in booms, such as government consumption and current transfers, could 
cause crowding out of private economic activity as argued by neoclassical literature.  
  
(2) The different effect depending on country groups 
This subsection extends our samples into more comprehensive samples 
including both OECD and non-OECD countries to check robustness of baseline 
analysis.  The sample consists of 53 IMF member countries for the period 1980–
2009, which is taken from IMF World Economic Outlook (2011).  This section 
analyses only cross section data of 53 IMF countries because of data availability135. 
Graph 4.2 shows a scatter plot between the procyclicality of total expenditure and the 
average growth rate in GDP per capita.  The graph generally shows a negative 
correlation between them, which implies that procyclical fiscal policy could hinder 
economic growth.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135. The average number of time-varying fiscal procyclicality indicators of each country is only 15.5.       
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Graph 4.2  The procyclicality of fiscal policy and average growth rate                  
(IMF countries) 
 
Note: GDPPCR is the average growth rate in income per capita.  A positive value of the fiscal procyclicality 
indicator implies the procyclical behaviour of government spending. 
 
This conjecture can be confirmed by the results of Table 4.8.  To obtain the 
robust estimates avoiding the effect of outliers, an iteratively reweighted least 
squares (RWLS) estimation is employed following Woo (2009) 136 .  The results 
show that the procyclicality of government spending has a significantly negative 
effect on economic growth.  A unit increase in procyclicality of government 
spending could reduce income per capita by 0.748 percentage points on average in 
column (1).  The size of coefficient is larger than that of baseline analyses of Table 
4.5 and similar with that of Woo (2009).  This could be because this estimation 
includes both advanced countries and emerging market countries following Woo 
(2009). 
 
 
                                                 
136. Ghana is excluded from the estimation since it has large residual and leverage.       
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Table 4.8  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth (IMF countries)  
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 All countries           Advanced countries Emerging market countries 
               (1)               (2)                    (3)               (4)                      (5)              (6) 
P -0.748** -0.597* -0.038 -0.064 -0.862* -0.729 
 
(-2.42) (-1.94) (-0.07) (-0.12) (-1.76) (-1.24) 
INIIC -0.421** -0.250 -2.443*** -2.897*** -0.546 -0.842 
 (-2.06) (-0.91) (-5.33) (-4.99) (-1.46) (-1.41) 
INIHC  0.007  0.206  0.998 
  (0.03)  (1.21)  (1.20) 
F 3.67** 1.49 15.92*** 11.48*** 2.74* 1.47 
R
2
 0.130 0.113 0.652 0.683 0.159 0.228 
No. of outliers 1 1 - - 1 1 
No. of Obs. 52 39 20 20 32 19 
Note: (1) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, INIIC is initial income, and INIHC is initial human capital. 
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation. 
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2011), Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000). 
 
This section additionally analyses the effect of procyclicality on economic 
growth across country group to reflect the different characteristics of county groups 
depending on the level of development.  The results show that the negative effect of 
procyclical fiscal policy on economic growth is prominent in the emerging market 
countries while it is not noticeable in advanced countries.  The coefficient of fiscal 
procyclicality in the advanced countries is negative, but it is insignificant.  However, 
the corresponding coefficient in emerging market countries is significantly negative, 
and the size of coefficient is much larger than that of advanced countries.  A unit 
increase in the procyclicality of government spending could reduce income per 
capita by 0.038 percentage points on average in advanced countries and 0.862 
percentage points in emerging market countries.  These results imply that the 
emerging market countries should be more cautious to operate fiscal policy since 
their economic growth is likely to be more sensitive to their fiscal stance. 
One could conjecture several reasons why the ecomomic growth of emerging 
market countries is more sensitive to procyclical fiscal policy.  First, emerging 
market countries are more likely suffer from poor policy making due to the lack of 
forecasting ability.  Therefore, fiscal policymakers in emerging market countries are 
more likely to decide their fiscal policy under a veil of ignorance about the state of 
the economy (Manasse, 2005), so procyclical fiscal policy could amplify the 
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volatility of the business cycle more than in advanced countries.  Second, emerging 
market countries tend to have more volatile output 137  since their economic 
infrastructure is more vulnerable to external shock than advanced countries (Cuadra, 
Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010; Carmignani, 2010), and more volatile output in turn 
could lead to lower economic growth (Badinger, 2012). 
 
(3) The effect of cyclically adjusted spending 
One should consider carefully the properties of each spending categories when 
one interprets estimation results as is already argued in chapter 2.  Government 
spending can be divided into a discretionary component which is taken by fiscal 
authorities, and a cyclical component which is affected by business cycle 
fluctuations (Candelon, Muysken, and Vermeulen, 2010; Alberola, Mínguez, 
Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003; Galí and Perotti, 2003).  It has been 
generally assumed that automatic stabilizers mainly have an effect on current 
transfers and taxation, not government consumption and investment (Romero-Ávila 
and Strauch, 2008; Alberola, Mínguez, Hernández de Cos, and Marqueés, 2003).  
Automatic stabilizers make government spending more countercyclical as can be 
seen from the results of Table 2.14 in chapter 2 since unemployment benefit 
payments increase in recessions and decrease in booms138.   
Table 4.9 presents the effect of fiscal procyclicality of cyclically adjusted 
government spending on economic growth.  The procyclicality of government 
spending has a negative effect on economic growth across all spending categories, 
even though the coefficients are only significant in explaining the effect of 
procyclicality of total expenditure in cross county data analysis and in explaining the 
effect of procyclicality of current expenditure in pooled data analysis.  A unit 
increase in the fiscal procyclicality indicator in cross county data analysis could 
reduce income per capita by 0.345 percentage points in total expenditure and by 
                                                 
137.  Output volatility, measured as the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth for the period 
1984-2006, is 3.1 in industrial economies, 5.2 in low income economies, and 5.5 in middle income 
economies (Carmignani, 2010).     
138. The only item of government spending which is treated as cyclically sensitive is unemployment-
related current transfers (Girouard and André, 2005; CBO, 2008).     
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0.408 percentage points in cyclically adjusted total expenditure.  A unit increase in 
the fiscal procyclicality indicator in pooled data analysis could reduce income per 
capita by 0.394 percentage points in current expenditure and by 0.351 percentage 
points in cyclically adjusted current expenditure.  These results show that the effect 
of procyclical government spending on economic growth is not different regardless 
of whether the cyclical component is included or not.  The coefficients of the 
procyclicality indicator have same signs and similar sizes.  This could be because the 
cyclical component does not affect the level of the negative effect of procyclical 
spending on economic growth, but it only mitigates the level of fiscal procyclicality 
per se.  
Table 4.9  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth                           
(cyclically adjusted spending) 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
Current Transfers Current Expenditure Total Expenditure  
 
Original 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
Original 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
Original 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
<cross county data> 
 
 
  
  
P -0.124 -0.064 -0.272 -0.293 -0.345** -0.408*** 
 
(-0.72) (-0.38) (-1.13) (-1.25) (-2.37) (-3.21) 
INIIC 
 
-0.872* -0.842* -0.976** -1.009** -1.237*** -1.285*** 
(-2.06) (-1.93) (-2.45) (-2.53) (-3.17) (-3.73) 
INIHC 
 
0.020 0.027 0.037 0.048 0.068 0.089 
(0.27) (0.35) (0.53) (0.68) (1.01) (1.50) 
F  1.93 1.63 2.85* 2.97* 4.75*** 6.75*** 
R
2
 0.266 0.234 0.348 0.357 0.471 0.559 
No. of Obs. 20 20 20 20 20 20 
<pooled data>      
P -0.184 -0.162 -0.394** -0.351** -0.036 -0.040 
 (-1.63) (-1.38) (-2.45) (-2.12) (-0.36) (-0.36) 
INIIC 
 
-1.544** -2.246*** -1.662** -2.299*** -1.429** -2.253*** 
(-2.33) (-3.33) (-2.53) (-3.45) (-2.12) (-3.32) 
INIHC 
 
0.052 0.045 0.076 0.068 0.039 0.052 
(0.48) (0.41) (0.70) (0.63) (0.35) (0.48) 
F  2.91** 5.48*** 4.17*** 6.42*** 2.10* 5.10*** 
R
2
 0.016 0.032 0.023 0.038 0.012 0.030 
No. of Obs. 529 498 529 498 523 498 
Note: (1) One country (Korea) for which no cyclically adjusted data are available is excluded from the sample. 
(2) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, INIIC is initial income, and INIHC is initial human capital. 
(3) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(4) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000). 
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(4) The time horizon of effect 
This section also explores the persistency of the effect of fiscal procyclicality on 
economic growth.  We modify the regression equation by replacing the lag values of 
fiscal procyclicality indicator as is implemented in Aghion and Marinescu (2007).  
Table 4.10 shows that an increase in procyclicality of current expenditure, especially 
government consumption and current transfers, have a negative effect on economic 
growth during two or four years, which is consistent with Aghion and Marinescu 
(2007) who show that the effect of an increase in fiscal countercyclicality lasts two 
or three years.  A unit increase in the current procyclicality indicator of government 
consumption could reduce income per capita by 0.292 percentage points on average, 
and a unit increase in the past procyclicality indicators of government consumption 
at t-1, t-2, and t-3 could reduce current income per capita by 0.265, 0.289, and 0.250 
percentage points respectively.  However, an increase in procyclicality of 
government investment has a positive effect on economic growth for the next two 
years, even though it has no effect during the current year.  A unit increase in the 
procyclicality indicators of government investment at last year and the year before 
last year could raise current income per capita by 0.061 and 0.079 percentage points 
respectively.  This could be because the accumulated capital by government 
investment could have a positive effect on the future economic growth for years.   
Table 4.10  The time horizon of the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth  
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
(1)   
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
Pit     
 
 
-0.292** -0.033 -0.191* -0.470*** 0.029 -0.067 
(-2.01) (-0.82) (-1.66) (-2.87) (1.01) (-0.65) 
Pit-1   -0. 265* 0.085** -0.228* -0.326* 0.061* -0.019 
 (-1.80) (2.12) (-1.95) (-1.93) (1.82) (-0.17) 
Pit-2   -0.289** 0.141*** -0.183 -0.217 0.079* 0.022 
  (-1.97) (3.55) (-1.56) (-1.27)   (1.93) (0.20) 
Pit-3 -0.250*   0.159*** -0.108   -0.143 0.077 0.043 
 (-1.69) (4.01) (-0.92) (-0.82) (1.58) (0.38) 
Pit-4 -0.168 0.136*** -0.106 -0.099 0.059 0.060 
 (-1.10) (3.38) (-0.88)     (-0.55) (1.15) (0.49) 
Pit-5 -0.152 0.048 -0.229* -0.296 0.0545 0.016 
 (-0.99) (1.18) (-1.81) (-1.60) (0.81) (0.12) 
Note: (1) Pit is the procyclicality indicator. All regressions include INIIC (initial income) and INIHC (initial 
human capital) as control variables.  (2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
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(5) Summary of results 
To conclude, procyclical government spending could have a unfavourable effect 
on economic growth.  These results are generally consistent with the existing 
literature (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2009; 
Woo, 2009).    
Our analysis develops these argument further and deals with the effect of fiscal 
procyclicality across the spending categories while the existing literature only deals 
with the effect of fiscal procyclicality in terms of government consumption (Woo, 
2009), total spending (Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2009) or budget balance 
(Aghion and Marinescu, 2007; Aghion, Hemous, and Kharroubi, 2009).  More 
specifically, our findings show that procyclical current expenditure, especially 
government consumption and current transfers, could have a negative effect on 
economic growth while procyclical interest payments and government investment do 
not play any role in economic growth.  One thing we should note is that procyclical 
government investment does not hinder economic growth.  Furthermore, government 
investment is generally considered to be productive, namely growth enhancing139, so 
an increase in government investment even during booms could help the long term 
economic growth since the accumulation of capital stock by government investment 
could have favourable effect on the future economic performances.   
Also, our analysis deals with the effect of fiscal procyclicality across different 
country groups. The results show that the negative effect of fiscal procyclicality is 
more prominent in emerging market countries than in advanced countries.   
    
 
 
 
                                                 
139 . See, for example, Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008; Ismihan and Ozkan, 2005; Bleaney, 
Gemmell, and Kneller, 2001; Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell, 1999.       
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3.3.2.The effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth 
 
(1) Baseline results  
To explore the effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth, this section 
conducts estimation utilizing both cross country data and pooled data.  First, we 
conduct cross country analysis using time invariant fiscal sustainability indicators.  
Time invariant fiscal sustainability indicators are obtained by regressing the primary 
budget balance-GDP ratio on the lag value of the debt-GDP ratio across countries, 
which can be seen from Table 3.2 of chapter 3.  Second, we conduct the same 
analysis using pooled data of time-varying sustainability indicators which are 
obtained by recursive estimation, which can be seen from Graph 3.3 of chapter 3, to 
overcome the problem of using cross country data.  
Graph 4.3 shows a scatter plot between the sustainability of fiscal policy and 
economic growth which is the average growth rate in income per capita for the 
period 1970-2008.  We can see that the figure does not show a meaningful 
relationship between the level of fiscal sustainability and economic growth.  
Graph 4.3  The sustainability of fiscal policy and average growth rate 
 
Note: GDPPCR is the average growth rate in income per capita.  A positive value of the fiscal sustainability 
indicator implies a sustainable fiscal policy. 
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Table 4.11 confirms this finding and presents the results for the effect of fiscal 
sustainability on economic growth using both the cross country data and the pooled 
data.  Regression (1) utilizes a sample of 16 OECD countries to coincide a sample of 
pooled data in regression (2) and (3).  One can see from the results that it is difficult 
to establish a significant role for fiscal sustainability on economic growth.  The 
coefficient of the fiscal sustainability indicator in cross country data analysis in 
column (1) is small and insignificant 140 .  Income per capita is estimated to be 
increased by about 0.38 percentage points for every one unit increase in fiscal 
sustainability141.  We conduct the same analysis utilizing pooled data to check the 
robustness of the results, considering the fact that the result of cross county data 
analysis in column (1) might suffer from small sample bias.  The results in column 
(2) show a large degree of similarity with the results of cross country data analysis.  
The size of coefficient of the fiscal sustainability indicator is similar to that of cross 
country data analysis, which indicates that fiscal sustainability does not have any 
effect on economic growth.  We additionally conduct the same analysis utilizing 
time varying fiscal sustainability indicators which are obtained by rolling window 
estimation, which can be seen from Graph 3.4 of chapter 3, to check the robustness 
of result of pooled data analysis in column (2).  The results in column (3) show a 
large degree of similarity with those of column (2).  The coefficient of the fiscal 
sustainability indicator is still insignificant, which indicates that we cannot find any 
evidence for an effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth.    
In addition, the relationship between fiscal sustainability and economic growth 
does not show a consistent picture when one explores the effect of fiscal 
sustainability of economic growth country by country.  The coefficients of the fiscal 
sustainability indicator are generally insignificant, and the sign of coefficients are not 
consistent across countries142.  To sum up, the results show that fiscal sustainability 
does not play any role in economic growth.  Our result could be consistent with Irons 
                                                 
140. Korea and Norway are excluded from the estimation since they have large residual and leverage.       
141. A one unit of increase in the fiscal sustainability indicates a one unit of increase in the coefficient 
of the lag value of the debt-GDP ratio in equation (3.6) of chapter 3.  In other words, it means that 
governments respond to a one unit increase in the debt-GDP ratio (e.g., one percentage point) by 
raising the primary budget surplus-GDP ratio, which the government increase by the same amount of 
change in the debt-GDP ratio (e.g., one percentage point), by two times of the amount of change in 
the debt-GDP ratio (e.g., two percentage points).      
142 . The coefficient of fiscal sustainability indicators is significant only three countries.  It is 
significantly positive in Japan while it is significantly negative in Italy and Netherlands.     
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and Bivens (2010) who argue that the stock of government debt does not hinder 
current economic growth.  Our results could also be rationalized by the fact that the 
short-term violation of fiscal sustainability might not hinder long-term economic 
growth.  Successful fiscal stimulus packages in recessions could boost economy 
although they are generally accompanied by an increase in debt, and they in turn 
induce the deterioration of fiscal sustainability as argued in the existing literature 
(Taylor, Proaño, de Carvalho, and Barbosa, 2012 143 ; Padoan, 2009; Freedman, 
Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, and Mursula, 2009; Bi, 2010; Bi and Leeper, 2010).     
Table 4.11  The effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
cross country data pooled data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
S 0.381 0.307 -0.662 
 (0.11) (0.31) (-0.86) 
INIIC 
 
-2.049*** -2.478*** -2.453*** 
(-3.17) (-9.11) (-9.03) 
INIHC 
 
0.100 0.043 0.053 
(1.45) (0.41) (0.52) 
F  3.80** 29.28*** 29.64*** 
R
2
 0.532 0.187 0.189 
No. of outliers 2 - - 
No. of Obs. 14 387 387 
Note: (1) S
 
is the sustainability indicator, INIIC is initial income, and INIHC is initial human capital.
 
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
 
 
(2) The channel of the effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth 
Our empirical evidence in subsection 3.3.1 suggests that countercyclical fiscal 
policy could enhance economic growth.  This result could imply that there is a 
possibility that sustainable fiscal finances could have a favourable effect on 
economic growth, if fiscal sustainability could change the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities in a way that is more countercyclical.        
This subsection examines the existence of this possible channel to verify our 
results that fiscal sustainability does not have an effect on economic growth.  This 
                                                 
143. Taylor, Proaño, de Carvalho, and Barbosa (2012) show that an increase in the government deficit 
could stimulate faster economic growth.       
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subsection explores the relationship between the cyclical properties of fiscal policy 
and fiscal sustainability.  Little has been dealt with the relationship between them 
directly.  Some literature considers fiscal sustainability as one of the determinants of 
fiscal procyclicality and suggests that the concern about fiscal sustainability could 
bring about procyclical fiscal policy by inducing credit constraints (Gavin and 
Perotti, 1997; Alberola and Montero, 2007; Mackiewicz, 2008; Lledó, Yackovlev, 
and Gadenne, 2009; Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010) 144.  Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) suggest credit constraints which arise from the fear of unsustainable budget 
deficits as the main reason for fiscal procyclicality and show that a high initial deficit 
could lead to more procyclical pattern of budget balance than a low initial deficit by 
analysing 13 Latin American countries.  Alberola and Montero (2007) also suggest 
that the financial market’s perception of debt sustainability, which comes from 
financial vulnerability, could make fiscal policy more procyclical by showing the 
positive relationship between current threshold budget balance, which is needed to 
maintain current debt level, and the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
analysing the example of nine Latin American countries.  Mackiewicz (2008) points 
out that high debt could cause credit constraints, and it in turn leads to reducing the 
room for countercyclical policy.  Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne (2009) show that 
high external debt could negatively affect the government’s ability to respond to the 
business cycle because it signals tighter financial conditions of that country.  Cuadra, 
Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) argue that the possibility of government debt default 
could lead to procyclical fiscal policy by inducing a high risk premium.  The results 
of this literature could imply that sustainable fiscal finances could provide 
governments with the ability to respond to recession by increasing spending or 
decreasing tax rates, in other words, sustainable fiscal finances are likely to be 
accompanied by countercyclical fiscal policy.  However, these studies mainly focus 
on the effect of debt or budget balance on fiscal cyclicality.  In this subsection, we 
attempt to explore the effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal procyclicality directly.   
                                                 
144. The issue on the effect of the cyclical properties of fiscal policy on fiscal sustainability have been 
ignored in the existing literature.  This could be because any theoretical foundations cannot be found 
about this relationship.  Procyclical fiscal policy could reduce the deficit and debt in recession while it 
could increase the deficit and debt in booms.  The effect of cyclical properties of fiscal policy on the 
fiscal sustainability, therefore, could be concluded to be neutral.  Empirical analysis also shows that 
the effect of fiscal procyclicality on fiscal sustainability is not certain as can be seen from Appendix 4.       
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First, this subsection explores the effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal 
procyclicality reflecting the argument of existing literature by estimating equation 
(4.7).  Table 4.12 shows that fiscal sustainability does not have any role in the level 
of fiscal procyclicality145 .  The coefficient of the interaction term for the fiscal 
sustainability indicator and GDP growth is negative in explaining the growth in 
government consumption, current transfers, current expenditure, and investment 
while it is positive in explaining the growth in interest payments and total 
expenditure.  However, all coefficients are insignificant at the conventional levels.   
Table 4.12  The effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal procyclicality 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
St * GDPt 
 
 
-0.158 0.299 -0.216 -0.028 -0.904 0.025 
(-0.48) (0.18) (-0.37) (-0.07) (-1.17) (0.05) 
GDPt  0.001 -0.522 -0.344** -0.176 0.494*** -0.323** 
 
(0.01) (-1.55) (-2.62) (-1.48) (4.25) (-2.59) 
GDPt-1 0.201*** 0.122 -0.404*** -0.008 0.698*** 0.314*** 
 (4.64) (0.32) (-4.35) (-0.12) (3.77) (3.21) 
GDPt-2 0.294*** -1.508** 0.254** 0.143** 0.449** 0.027 
 (5.07) (-2.28) (2.48) (2.36) (2.41) (0.38) 
F  9.72*** 11.18*** 9.05*** 1.97 30.11*** 5.41*** 
R
2
 0.254 0.019 0.009 0.016 0.109 0.049 
No. of Obs. 406 406 406 406 406 406 
No. of Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: (1) S
 
is the sustainability indicator, and GDP is first difference of the log real gross domestic product.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effects model with robust standard errors. 
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
To avoid the possible endogeneity issue that government spending has an effect 
on economic growth, this section conducts two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
utilizing instrumental variable.  The GDP growth of the USA (for other OECD 
countries) and the average GDP growth of OECD countries (for USA) are utilized as 
the instrument of GDP growth following the existing literature (Candelon, Muysken 
and Vermeulen, 2010; Galí and Perotti, 2003) as stated in chapter 2.  The results 
confirm our baseline estimation of Table 4.12.  Appendix 4. Table A4.2 shows that 
there is a large degree of similarity between baseline estimation and IV estimations, 
                                                 
145.  The results of coefficients of other independent variables generally confirm the result of Table 
2.13 of chapter 2.     
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which confirms that our baseline estimation properly address the endogeneity issue 
although it employs OLS estimation.   
Second, this subsection explores the effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal 
procyclicality in a more explicit way.  We regress the fiscal procyclicality indicator 
on the fiscal sustainability indicator and the lag value of the fiscal procyclicality 
indicator.  We include the lag value of the dependent variable to reflect the inertial 
properties of fiscal policy following the result of chapter 2 that the trend of cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy is stable over time.  Table 4.13 shows that fiscal 
sustainability is negatively associated with fiscal procyclicality, but all coefficients 
of the fiscal sustainability indicator are insignificant.  To sum up, fiscal sustainability 
does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the cyclicality of fiscal 
policies. 
Table 4.13  The effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal procyclicality (Revisited)  
Dependent Variable : fiscal procyclicality indicator 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
St  
 
-0.454 -0.709 -0.480 -0.310 -0.838 -0.354 
(-1.69) (-0.53) (-1.30) (-1.33) (-1.47) (-1.60) 
Pt-1  
 
0.728*** 0.854*** 0.727*** 0.815*** 0.751*** 0.864*** 
 
 
(23.71) (38.37) (12.66) (19.64) (22.10) (17.55) 
F  396.91*** 1248.09*** 84.77*** 257.06*** 261.09*** 161.01*** 
R
2
 0.698 0.754 0.703 0.751 0.621 0.742 
No. of Obs. 386 386 384 386 386 386 
No. of Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: (1) S
 
is the fiscal sustainablity indicator and P is the fiscal procyclicality indicator. 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effect (FE) estimation with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
 Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86 and Penn World Tables 6.3. 
  
To conclude, fiscal sustainability does not appear to have a direct effect on 
economic growth.  Unsustainable fiscal finances do not hinder economic growth in 
tranquil times, even though the deterioration of fiscal finances could lead to sudden 
economic crisis by endangering the default of government debt as is argued by 
Rankin and Roffia (2003) 146.  This finding could be rationalized by the fact that one 
                                                 
146.  Rankin and Roffia (2003) argue that finite maximum sustainable level of debt does exist before 
capital stock reaches its limit even though there is possibility of sudden ceases by employing an 
overlapping generation model.  That is, further small increases in debt could result in unstable capital 
decummulation.  They, therefore, suggest that the government whose debt has been gradually 
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cannot confirm the possible channel that an unsustainable fiscal policy could have a 
harmful effect on ecominimic growth by inducing procyclical government spending, 
as can be seen from the empirical evidence of this subsection.  These results are not 
consistent with the argument set out in the existing literature on the determinant of 
fiscal procyclicality (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Alberola and Montero, 2007; 
Mackiewicz, 2008; Lledó, Yackovlev, and Gadenne, 2009).  However, the argument 
of existing literature could not be supported by our empirical evidence of chapter 2 
and 3.  Table 2.18 of chapter 2 shows that the government debt ratio has a negative 
effect on fiscal procyclicality, and Table 3.5 of chapter 3 shows that initial debt and 
average debt are positively related to the level of fiscal sustainability even though the 
level of significance is low.  This could be because high debt could reduce the 
incentive of an increase in spending by arousing the concern about fiscal 
sustainability in practice as argued by Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel, and André 
(2007), so it could reduce the level of procyclicality and strengthen fiscal 
sustainability.  Also, our results could be rationalized by growth enhancing effect of 
government spending across spending categories (see, for example, Romero-Ávila 
and Strauch, 2008; Ismihan and Ozkan, 2005; Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller, 2001; 
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell, 1999).  An increase in productive spending, such as 
government investment, could help enhancing economic growth while an increase in 
unproductive spending could hinder economic growth.  Therefore, the effect of 
government spending on economic growth is unclear in terms of total spending even 
though both spending could reduce of the level of fiscal sustainability at least in the 
short-term.  To sum up, it may be difficult empirically to establish a significant role 
for fiscal sustainability on economic growth.  
 
3.3.3. Additional robustness checks 
To check the robustness of the baseline analysis, this subsection conducts a few 
additional analyses.  First, we add some control variables which affect economic 
growth following Woo (2009) who adds three variables into the regression equation 
respectively to check whether the baseline result is sensitive to inclusion of these 
                                                                                                                                          
increased should monitor its debt level carefully to avoid sudden deterioration of debt sustainability.  
Michel, von Thadden, and Vidal (2010) also argue that there exists a sustainable target level of 
steady-state debt by employing overlapping generation model.  
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three variables.  Output volatility (GDPVOL) is included to control for the negative 
effect of output volatility on economic growth, which is measured by the standard 
deviation of the GDP growth for the period 1970-2008.  Trade openness (OPEN) is 
included to control the positive relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth, which is defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP which is taken 
from Penn World Tables 6.3.  Government size (GOVSIZE) is included to control 
for the negative effect of government size on economic growth, which is measured 
by the ratio of government expenditure relative to GDP.  One can see from Table 
4.14 that the results show a large degree of similarity with the baseline estimation, 
both in cross country data analysis and pooled data analysis, even though these three 
variables are insignificant in most cross country data analysis.  The differences are 
below: the coefficients of the procyclicality indicator of current expenditure becomes 
significant in cross country analyses, and the coefficient of the procyclicality 
indicator of government consumption in cross coutnry data analysis and current 
transfers in pooled data analysis become insignificant when government size is 
controlled.  These results confirm that our baseline estimation is not affected by 
additional control variables, which is consistent with the result of Woo (2009). 
This section also conducts the same regression including three control variables 
into the regression equation altogether.  Appendix 4. Table 4A. 3 also generally 
confirms our baseline estimation, but the significance level is different.  Therefore, 
the coefficients of the procyclicality indicator of current expenditure in cross country 
data analysis and that of interest payments in pooled data analysis become significant, 
and the coefficient of the procyclicality indicator of government consumption and 
current transfers becomes insignificant in pooled data analyses.  The reason why the 
results show a few differences with the baseline results is that a cross-country 
analysis of the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth is unlikely to be 
robust to inclusion of additional control variables when samples are small (Aghion, 
Hemous and Kharroubi, 2009). 
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Table 4.14  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth                                                           
(Additional control variables) 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
<cross county data>      
P -0.502*** -0.048 -0.245 -0.532**   -0.111 -0.516*** 
 
(-2.97) (-0.57) (-1.10) (-2.41) (-0.75) (-5.24) 
GDPVOL -0.231** 0.231 0.324* -0.119 0.421** 0.050 
 (-2.02) (1.69) (2.00) (-1.09) (2.37) (0.65) 
F  84.04*** 18.41*** 24.69*** 63.36*** 23.46*** 142.54*** 
R
2
 0.955 0.822 0.861 0.941 0.854 0.973 
No. of Obs. 21 21 21 21 21 21 
P  -0.422** -0.015 -0.128 -0.531** 0.061 -0.537*** 
 (-2.62) (-0.22) (-0.69) (-2.43) (0.50) (-7.47) 
OPEN 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.38) (0.25) (0.23) (0.39) (0.27) (-0.91) 
F  85.69*** 30.21*** 1.32 61.21*** 1.22 253.10*** 
R
2
 0.955 0.883 0.261 0.939 0.246 0.984 
No. of outliers - - 1 - 1 - 
No. of Obs. 21 21 20 21 20 21 
P  -0.377 -0.071 -0.123 -0.476** -0.031 -0.526*** 
 (-1.68) (-0.95) (-0.53) (-2.32) (-0.21) (-6.27) 
GOVSIZE -0.013 -0.019 -0.013 -0.011 -0.016 -0.017*** 
 (-1.28) (-1.49) (-1.01) (-1.36) (-1.15) (-3.23) 
F  40.39*** 24.57*** 22.31*** 67.39*** 21.28*** 168.28*** 
R
2
 0.91 0.86 0.848 0.944 0.842 0.977 
No. of Obs. 21 21 21 21 21 21 
<pooled data>      
P -0.291** -0.037 -0.203* -0.508*** 0.029 -0.082 
 (-1.99) (-0.92) (-1.76) (-3.08) (1.02) (-0.76) 
GDPVOL -0.017 0.175 0.183 0.251 -0.053 0.146 
 (-0.09) (0.82) (0.88) (1.20) (-0.27) (0.66) 
F  23.06*** 22.07*** 17.82*** 24.36*** 21.95*** 21.59*** 
R
2
 0.140 0.139 0.115 0.15 0.135 0.137 
No. of Obs. 571 554 552 557 568 548 
P  -0.254* -0.038 -0.206* -0.459*** 0.028 -0.056 
 (-1.74) (-0.95) (-1.79) (-2.80) (0.99) (-0.54) 
OPEN 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006* 0.007** 0.005* 
 (2.03) (2.02) (2.05) (1.88) (2.11) (1.72) 
F  24.11*** 23.30*** 18.42*** 25.01*** 23.23*** 22.34*** 
R
2
 0.146 0.145 0.119 0.153 0.142 0.141 
No. of Obs. 571 554 552 557 568 548 
P  -0.285** -0.055 -0.120 -0.441*** 0.028 -0.070 
 (-1.99 (-1.38) (-1.04) (-2.72) (1.00) (-0.68) 
GOVSIZE -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.050*** 
 (-4.26) (-4.32) (-3.84) (-4.00) (-4.32) (-4.06) 
F  28.37*** 27.49*** 22.13*** 28.67*** 27.36*** 26.33*** 
R
2
 0.168 0.167 0.139 0.172 0.164 0.162 
No. of Obs. 565 554 552 557 562 548 
Note: (1) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, GDPVOL is output volatility, OPEN is trade openness, and GOVSIZE 
is government size.  All regressions include INIIC (initial income) and INIHC (initial human capital) as 
additional control variables. 
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
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We conduct the same analysis with regard to the effect of fiscal sustainability 
on economic growth as well.  We add three control variables (GDP volatility, trade 
openness, and government size) into the regression equation to check whether the 
baseline results are sensitive to inclusion of these variables.  One can see from Table 
4.15 that three variables are generally insignificant, and therefore the results 
generally confirm our baseline analysis.  All coefficients of the sustainability 
indicator in both cross county data and pooled data are insignificant, even though the 
former could suffer from small sample bias.  To sum up, our results of baseline 
estimation that fiscal sustainability does not play any role in economic growth is not 
affected by additional control variables.  
Table 4.15  The effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth                                          
(Additional control variables) 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
 
cross country data pooled data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
S   0.323 0.303 0.220 -2.429 0.531 0.263 0.541 0.441 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (-1.70) (0.52) (0.26) (0.55)    (0.43) 
INIIC -1.817** -2.186** -1.822** -1.685*** -1.978*** -2.408*** -1.834*** -1.643*** 
  (-2.77) (-3.16)   (-3.05) (-14.05) (-3.98) (-9.06) (-5.45) (-3.09) 
INIHC 0.108 0.104 0.092 0.102*** 0.044 0.045 0.012 0.015 
 (1.56) (1.41) (1.44) (4.75) (0.42) (0.43) (0.12) (0.15) 
GDPVOL 0.192   0.295** 0.476   0.068 
 (0.94)   (3.23) (1.20)   (0.15) 
OPEN  0.001  0.004**  0.001  0.007* 
  (0.23)  (3.23)  (0.27)  (1.81) 
GOVSIZE   -0.011 -0.019***   -0.044*** -0.055*** 
   (-1.44) (-4.24)   (-3.38) (-3.75) 
F  2.81* 2.87* 3.60* 271.47*** 22.38*** 21.78*** 25.85*** 17.99*** 
R
2
 0.555 0.561 0.615 0.995 0.190 0.186 0.213 0.221 
No. of outliers 2 2 2 1 - - - - 
No. of Obs. 14 14 14 15 387 387 387 387 
Note: (1) S
 
is the procyclicality indicator, GDPVOL is output volatility, OPEN is trade openness, and GOVSIZE 
is government size.  All regressions include INIIC (initial income) and INIHC (initial human capital) as 
additional control variables. 
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
 
Second, this subsection conducts the same analysis including the fiscal 
procyclicality indicators and fiscal sustainability indicators simultaneously147.  These 
                                                 
147 .  We do not include the interaction for the fiscal procyclicality indicator and the fiscal 
sustainability indicator since the two variables do not seem to have a certain relationship as can be 
seen from section 3.3.2 and Appendix 4.  Regression results also show that the coefficients of 
interaction terms are all insignificant.     
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estimates generally confirm the results of our baseline estimation in spite of different 
levels of statistical significance.  With regard to the effect of fiscal procyclicality on 
economic growth, the coefficients of the procyclicality indicator show a large 
similarity with baseline results except that of government consumption in cross 
country data analysis and that of current transfers in pooled data analysis become 
insignificant when the level of fiscal sustainability is controlled.  With regard to the 
effect of fiscal sustainability on economic growth, all coefficients are still 
insignificant even though many show the opposite signs.  To sum up, our results of 
baseline estimation of Table 4.5 and 4.11 are not affected when the level of fiscal 
procyclicality and sustainability is controlled.  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on 
economic growth is not affected when the level of fiscal sustianbility is constant, and 
the same thing applies to the effect of fiscal sustianbility on economic growth.   
Table 4.16  The effect of fiscal procyclicality and sustainability                              
on economic growth (Control each other) 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
<cross county data> 
 
 
  
  
P -0.279 -0.019 -0.157 -0.317 -0.027 -0.393*** 
 
(-1.25) (-0.36) (-1.07) (-1.67) (-0.20) (-4.68) 
S -0.033 0.528 -0.510 -0.069 -0.279 -0.914 
 (-0.01) (0.13) (-0.15) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.65) 
INIIC 
 
-2.294*** -2.118** -2.116*** -2.333*** -2.158** -2.694*** 
(-16.96) (-3.00) (-3.43) (-4.33) (-3.00) (-9.88) 
INIHC 
 
0.113** 0.107 0.104 0.131* 0.099 0.164*** 
(2.52) (1.34) (1.56) (2.22) (1.32) (5.25) 
F  89.12*** 2.61 3.65* 5.48** 2.70* 29.25*** 
R
2
 0.973 0.537 0.618 0.709 0.545 0.929 
 1 2 2 2 2 2 
No. of Obs. 15 14 14 14 14 14 
<pooled data> 
 
     
P -0.289* -0.065 -0.205 -0.508*** 0.072 -0.049 
 (-1.78) (-1.55) (-1.53) (-2.90) (1.42) (-0.41) 
S -0.018 0.036 -0.162 -0.370 0.528 0.225 
 (-0.02) (0.04) (-0.16) (-0.38) (0.53) (0.22) 
INIIC 
 
-2.502*** -2.435*** -2.319*** -2.518*** -2.486*** -2.501*** 
(-9.25) (-8.98) (-8.42) (-9.41) (-9.12) (-9.07) 
INIHC 
 
0.055 0.06 0.047 0.094 0.034 0.054 
(0.53) (0.58) (0.45) (0.91) (0.33) (0.50) 
F  23.12*** 22.47*** 19.25*** 24.67*** 22.37*** 22.08*** 
R
2
 0.195 0.190 0.168 0.205 0.190 0.188 
No. of Obs. 387 387 386 387 387 387 
Note: (1) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, S
 
is the sustainability indicator, INIIC is initial income, and INIHC is 
initial human capital.
 
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
162 
 
Third, this subsection conducts two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
utilizing instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity problem of the reverse 
casual effect of economic growth on fiscal procyclicality and sustainability.  The 
average GDP per capita and the level of fiscal procyclicality are measured during the 
same period, so this could be functioned as the source of endogeneity (Woo, 2009).  
Freedman, Kumhof, Laxton, and Mursula (2009) argue that not only the level of 
fiscal sustainability might have an effect of economic growth, but also economic 
growth might play a role in the level of fiscal sustainability.   
This section mainly focuses on estimating pooled data since fiscal procyclicality 
of each country cannot be instrumented appropriately148 .  To solve the possible 
endogeneity relationship, the lag and the lead value are utilized as the instrument of 
current fiscal procyclicality and sustainability indicators following Aghion and 
Marinescu (2007) 149 .  Table 4.17 shows that one should consider the potential 
endogeneity problem in explaining the effect of procyclicality of government 
consumption and current expenditure since the Hausman test for exogeneity of an 
explanatory variable is rejected at the conventional levels.  The results also show that 
the coefficient of the procyclicality indicator of government consumption and current 
expenditure, which were significant in the baseline analysis, becomes insignificant.  
To sum up, procyclical current expenditure including government consumption and 
current transfers could have a negative effect on economic growth, but this negative 
effect of procyclical current expenditure on economic growth will be lessened if one 
considers the reverse causuality that economic growth affects the level of 
procyclicality of government consumption. 
With regard to the effect of sustainability, the result show a few differences 
with baseline estimation of Table 4.11.  The coefficient of fiscal sustainability 
indicator becomes larger and significant.  However, we need not to consider the 
                                                 
148 . Woo (2009) employs two variables (natural resource endowments and settler mortality in 
European colonies in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries) to instrument the level of procyclicality 
in his cross country analysis.  However, these variables are only available to developing or 
underdeveloped countries.  The dataset of natural resource endowments (Auty, 2001) includes only 
three OECD countries (Korea, Mexico, and Turkey), and that of settler mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2001) includes only four OECD countries (Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and the 
USA).     
149. The results of the overidentifying test (OID) are insignificant in all specifications except in 
explaining the effect of procyclical interest payments in column (2), which indicates that the 
instrumental variables (the lag and the lead value) are valid.     
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potential endogeneity problem since the Hausman test for exogeneity of an 
explanatory variable is accepted at the conventional levels.  To conclude, fiscal 
sustainability does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on economic 
growth if we consider the result of baseline estimation of Table 4.11 and robust 
estimation of Table 4.17. 
Table 4.17  The effect of fiscal procyclicality and sustainability on economic growth 
(2SLS) 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita  
 
(1) 
Consump-
tion 
(2) 
Interest 
Payments 
(3) 
Current 
Transfers 
(4)  
Current 
Expenditure 
(5)  
Investment 
 
(6)  
Total 
Expenditure 
(7) 
Sustain-
ability 
P   
 
 
-0.205   0.036 -0.218 -0.327 0.078** 0.053    
(-1.07) (0.71) (-1.48) (-1.52) (2.18) (0.41)  
S       2.872**   
       (2.19) 
INIIC 
 
-2.176*** -2.147*** -2.157*** -2.224*** -2.185*** -2.138*** -2.158*** 
 
(-7.11) (-6.64) (-6.33) (-7.14) (-6.80) (-6.43) (-6.59) 
INIHC 
 
0.092 0.092 0.094   0.114 0.131 0.097 0.012   
 
(0.86) (0.84) (0.87) (1.07) (1.22) (0.89) (0.10) 
F  17.92*** 15.48*** 14.31*** 18.19*** 17.21*** 15.20*** 16.39*** 
R
2
 0.090 0.079 0.076 0.095 0.082 0.080 0.120 
No. of Obs. 551 530 528 535 547 526 374 
Hausman chi
2
 21.63*** 6.50* 1.61 48.56*** 6.04 1.39 0.23 
OID  0.95 18.43*** 0.50 2.18 2.19 0.44 0.49 
Note: (1) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, S
 
is the sustainability indicator, INIIC is initial income, and INIHC is 
initial human capital.
 
(2) Regression methods are 2SLS instrumental variables estimation with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
 
 
4. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Our analyses could confirm the facts that a countercyclical fiscal policy could 
have a positive effect on economic growth while sustainable fiscal finances do not 
seem to play any role in economic growth.   
With regard to the effect of the cyclical properties of fiscal policy on economic 
growth, our empirical evidence shows that the procyclical behaviour of unproductive 
government spending, such as government consumption and current transfers, could 
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hinder economic growth.  These results could imply that stronger automatic 
stabilizers in the budget system could help enhance economic growth since current 
transfers include the cyclical component of budget.  On the other hand, procyclical 
government investment does not hinder economic growth, and it could even have a 
positive effect on future economic growth.  This could be because government 
investment is generally considered to be productive (see, for example, Romero-Ávila 
and Strauch, 2008; Ismihan and Ozkan, 2005; Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller, 2001; 
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell, 1999), so an increase in government investment 
even during booms could help long term economic growth since the accumulation of 
capital stock by government investment could have a favourable effect on the future 
economic performances.  We can also confirm the negative effect of procyclical 
fiscal policy on economic growth through more comprehensive samples including 
both advanced countries and emerging market countries.  Our findings suggest that 
the negative effect of procyclical fiscal policy on economic growth is prominent in 
the emerging market countries while it is not noticeable in advanced countries.   
With regard to the effect of the fiscal sustainability on economic growth, our 
findings suggest that it may be difficult empirically to establish a significant effect 
for sustainable fiscal policy on economic growth.  This result implies that fiscal 
sustainability does not seem to play any role in economic growth in tranquil times, 
even though the deterioration of fiscal finances could lead to a sudden economic 
crisis by endangering default of government debt. 
The contribution of our study is that it not only confirms the results of the 
existing literature that suggests the empirical evidence of the negative effect of 
procyclical government spending on economic growth, but also provides several new 
implications by analysing these effects across spending categories and country 
groups for the first time.  First, our analysis provides policy implications that fiscal 
authorities should control the increasing pressure on unproductive spending, such as 
government consumption and current transfers, in booms to avoid an unfavourable 
effect of procyclical fiscal policy on economic growth.  Second, our empirical result 
of the negative relationship between procyclical current transfers and economic 
growth implies that fiscal authorities should make an effort to reform the budget 
systems in a way that has stronger automatic stabilizers to enhance economic growth.  
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Third, our analysis recommends that emerging market countries should be more 
cautious to operate fiscal policy since their economic growth is more sensitive to the 
level of fiscal procyclicality than in advanced countries.  Another important 
contribution of our study is that it shows that unsustainable fiscal finances do not 
hinder economic growth in tranquil times even though it could lead to a sudden 
economic crisis. 
Policymakers, therefore, should aim both a countercyclical and sustainable 
fiscal policy to achieve sustained economic growth avoiding economic crisis.  Well-
designed countercyclical fiscal stimulus measures could achieve both fiscal 
sustainability and macroeconomic stability.  Countercyclical fiscal stimulus 
measures should be accompanied by appropriate exit strategies to avoid the 
deterioration of fiscal sustainability (Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller, 2010).  
Countercyclical fiscal measures in recessions should also be spending increases 
rather that tax cuts to maintain fiscal sustainability. Spending increases have a 
temporary effect even though some spendings could be difficult to terminate due to 
political reasons, while tax cuts have a permanet effect on fiscal sustainability 
(Padoan, 2009).  Well-designed fiscal rules could also help to achieve both two main 
objectives of fiscal policy.  Schick (2003) argues that fiscal rules should be designed 
in a way that is helpful to countercyclical and sustainable fiscal policy.  The author, 
therefore, suggests realistic, enforced, and a multi-year covered rule as the condition 
for efficient fiscal rules.  Our empirical findings in chapter 2 and 3 also suggest that 
fiscal rules should be designed in a way that is multi-year covered and is enforced to 
enhance fiscal countercyclicality and sustainability.  
Our analyses have also several limitations.  First, the measurement of time-
varying indicators of fiscal procyclicality and sustainability is a difficult issue.  
Fiscal procyclicality mainly focuses on the short term change of policy stance 
responding to the business cycle.  However, the dataset should have some degree of 
freedom to obtain the level of procyclicality by the regression method, so it cannot 
reflect the real degree of fiscal procyclicality at a certain time.  On the other hand, 
fiscal sustainability focuses on the long term persistency of fiscal policy, so the level 
of fiscal sustainability at a certain time is difficult to obtain by regression methods 
which are adopted in our analysis.  Some literature have attempted to find 
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appropriate sustainability indicators at certain time (see, for example, Buiter, 1985; 
Blanchard, 1990; Uctum and Wickens, 2000; Croce and Juan-Ramón, 2003; Polito 
and Wickens, 2005), but it still has a weakness that the consensus about the target 
level of the debt is difficult150.  Second, this chapter examines the effect of fiscal 
sustainability on economic growth in OECD countries.  However, the results could 
be different depending on country groups like the effect of fiscal procyclicality on 
economic growth as examined in this chapter.  We can include a further analysis of 
these issues in our agenda of future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150.  The literature does not suggest a helpful answer about the level of optimal debt (Wren-Lewis, 
2011).     
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Appendix 4 
 
The effect of fiscal procyclicality on fiscal sustainability 
 
To explore the effect of fiscal procyclicality on fiscal sustainability, we 
employ a similar method that we utilized in section 3.3.2 where we assessed the 
effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal procyclicality.  We include the interaction 
term for the indicator of fiscal procyclicality and the debt-GDP ratio into the 
regression equation (3.7) in chapter 3 which estimates the level of fiscal 
sustainability.        
     D- =  .i + /?-,7 + 9EF- + GEF- + C-D-,7 +  6-  × ?-,7+H-  (4A.1) 
in which sit is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dit is the debt-GDP ratio, 
GVARit is the temporary government expenditure, YVARit is the proportional short 
fall of output, and Pit is the fiscal procyclicality indicator obtained by rolling window 
estimation.  A positive β implies sustainable fiscal finances, and a positive δ 
indicates that a procyclical fiscal policy plays a role in enhancing fiscal sustainability. 
Table 4A.1 shows that the effect of fiscal procyclicality on fiscal sustainability 
is not certain.  The estimated coefficients do not provide a clear picture.  The 
interaction term for procyclicality of current expenditure (government consumption / 
interest payments / current transfers) and the debt-GDP ratio are negatively 
associated with the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, while that of government 
investment are positively associated with the primary budget balance-GDP ratio.  
These results could be interpreted that procyclical current expenditure could play a 
role in deteriorating fiscal sustainability, but these effects are offset by the positive 
effect of procyclical government investment on fiscal sustainability.  As a result, 
procyclical total expenditure could help maintain fiscal sustainability.  One of the 
possible explanations of these empirical results could be the different effect of fiscal 
procyclicality on economic growth depending on the types of government spending, 
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as discussed in section 3.3.1.  Procyclical current expenditure including government 
consumption and current transfers, which is assumed to be unproductive, could cause 
a crowding out effect, and it in turn leads to negative effect on the fiscal 
sustainability.  On the other hand, procyclical government investment, which is 
assumed to be productive, could help enhancing economic growth, and it in turn 
could raise the fiscal sustainability by increasing tax revenue.  Therefore, procyclical 
total expenditure could help maintain fiscal sustainability if the negative effect of 
procyclical current expenditure is overwhelmed by the positive effect of procyclical 
government investment on fiscal sustainability.  However, all coefficients are 
insignificant, so one cannot confirm the effect of fiscal procyclicality on fiscal 
sustainability.   
Table 4A.1  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on fiscal sustainability 
Dependent Variable : the primary budget balance to GDP ratio (st) 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
P t *  d t-1 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 
(-0.48) (-0.82) (-0.39) (-0.46) (1.19) (1.72) 
d t-1 
 
0.023* 0.023* 0.023* 0.023* 0.023* 0.030*** 
 (1.77) (1.85) (1.84) (1.79) (1.87) (3.12) 
GVAR t 
 
-127.040*** -126.229*** -126.912*** -126.484*** -126.670*** -127.008*** 
 (-12.33) (-11.89) (-12.70) (-12.58) (-12.63) (-14.37) 
YVAR t 
 
-48.863*** -45.516** -48.397*** -49.180*** -48.961** -49.412*** 
 
(-3.02) (-2.57) (-3.07) (-3.06) (-3.03) (-3.32) 
s t-1 0.744*** 0.740*** 0.746*** 0.742*** 0.746*** 0.744*** 
 (23.26) (24.95) (22.54) (24.95) (21.27) (23.07) 
F  1036.38*** 1138.82*** 1002.55*** 1423.56*** 626.47*** 718.67*** 
R
2
 0.758 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.753 0.741 
No. of Obs. 490 487 485 490 487 481 
No. of Groups 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Note: (1) Pt is the procyclicality indicator, st is the primary budget balance-GDP ratio, dt is the debt-GDP ratio, 
GVARt is the temporary increase in government expenditure, and YVARt is the temporary variation in the 
business cycle.
 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effect estimation with robust standard errors.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
 
It is intuitively clear that cyclical properties of fiscal policy do not play a certain 
role in determining fiscal sustainability.  A countercyclical fiscal policy to recover 
economic recession is generally accompanied by an increase in debt, and it in turn 
induces the deterioration of fiscal sustainability as argued in the existing literature 
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(Padoan, 2009; Freedman, Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, and Mursula, 2009; Bi, 2010; Bi 
and Leeper, 2010) 151.  However, a considerable amount of budget deficit will be 
offset by the function of automatic stabilizers (Freedman, Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, 
and Mursula, 2009), and this effect will be strengthened if the economy starts to 
recover due to the effect of successful countercyclical fiscal measures.  On the other 
hand, countercyclical fiscal policy could decrease debt in booms by reducing 
spending.  Hence, the effect of the countercyclical fiscal policy on fiscal 
sustainability could be concluded to be neutral.  The same rationale could be applied 
to procyclical fiscal policy.  Procyclical fiscal policy could reduce deficits and debt 
in recessions while it could increase deficits and debt in booms.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151. Padoan (2009) argues that current fiscal packages could cause a more serious debt sustainability 
problem because the current economic crisis could induce lower growth and higher interest rates by 
analysing the effect of discretionary fiscal stimulus packages on the short term demand and the long 
term growth since 2008.  Freedman, Kumhof, Laxton, Muir, and Mursula (2009) also argue that a 
countercyclical fiscal stimulus could have short term effect on economic growth, but they could lead 
to long-run crowding out effects due to inducing higher debt if fiscal stimulus leads to permanent 
increase in debt by calibrating the short run fiscal multiplier and long run crowding out effect of G20 
fiscal stimulus packages which was implemented over 2009 and 2010.  Bi (2010) and Bi and Leeper 
(2010) argue that countercyclical transfers could enlarge the dispersion of distribution of fiscal limit 
(maximum sustainable debt) by worsening the budget deficit, which implies that the probability of 
default is likely to increase, by analysing the fiscal data of OECD countries.     
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Table 4A.2  The effect of fiscal sustainability on fiscal procyclicality (FE 2SLS) 
Dependent Variable : Difference in log of real government spending 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
St * GDPt 
 
 
-0.191 0.179 -0.260 -0.074 -0.935 -0.022 
(-0.68) (0.14) (-0.70) (-0.25) (-0.98) (-0.06) 
GDPt  -0.541*** -2.448*** -1.054*** -0.924*** -0.013 -1.085*** 
 
(-2.82) (-2.83) (-4.16)   (-4.53) (-0.02) (-4.01) 
GDPt-1 0.429*** 0.933* -0.105 0.307*** 0.911** 0.634*** 
 
(4.05) (1.95) (-0.75) (2.72) (2.56) (4.24) 
GDPt-2 0.234*** -1.724*** 0.174* 0.059 0.392 -0.059 
 (3.27) (-5.35) (1.79) (0.78) (1.63) (-0.58) 
Wald 673.91*** 44.25*** 465.80*** 563.72*** 44.65***    300.62*** 
R
2
 0.063 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.098 0.007 
Hausman chi
2
 28.50*** 39.35*** 214.64*** 81.66*** 0.71 32.99*** 
No. of Obs. 406 406 406 406 406 406 
No. of Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: (1) St is the sustainability indicator, and GDP is first difference of the log real gross domestic product. 
(2) Regression methods are Fixed effect 2SLS Instrumental variables estimation. 
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86.  
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Table 4A.3  The effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth                                
(Three additional control variables) 
Dependent Variable : the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) Interest 
Payments 
(3) Current 
Transfers 
(4) Current 
Expenditure 
(5) 
Investment 
(6) Total 
Expenditure 
<cross county data>      
P -0.484** -0.078 -0.239 -0.539*** 0.105 -0.545*** 
 
(-2.83) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-3.55) (0.57) (-4.09) 
INIIC -2.274*** -1.737*** -1.823*** -2.022*** -1.815*** -1.880*** 
 (-12.65) (-7.30) (-7.5) (-14.72) (-5.13) (-11.08) 
INIHC 0.093* 0.167** 0.146** 0.166*** 0.127 0.170*** 
 (1.81) (2.30) (2.20) (4.28) (1.18) (3.46) 
GDPVOL -0.271** 0.088 0.283* -0.111 -0.092 0.106 
 (-2.58) (0.63) (1.98) (-1.36) (-0.42) (0.98) 
OPEN 0.003 0.006* 0.006* 0.004* 0.011* 0.003 
 (0.98) (1.85) (1.79) (1.93) (2.11) (1.25) 
GOVSIZE -0.020* -0.030** -0.017 -0.028*** -0.039* -0.028** 
 (-1.94) (-2.22) (-1.20) (-3.57) (-1.95) (-2.88) 
F  53.02*** 25.57*** 26.88*** 83.82*** 12.26*** 52.79*** 
R
2
 0.958 0.916 0.920 0.973 0.840 0.958 
No. of Obs. 21 21 21 21 21 21 
<pooled data>      
P -0.215 -0.074* -0.100 -0.415** 0.028 -0.032 
 (-1.50) (-1.85) (-0.87) (-2.53) (0.99) (-0.30) 
INIIC -1.743*** -1.693*** -1.614*** -1.660*** -1.876*** -1.827*** 
 (-5.08) (-4.74) (-4.48) (-4.86) (-5.30) (-5.15) 
INIHC 0.057 0.115 0.072 0.097 0.087 0.081 
 (0.59) (1.17) (0.74) (1.00) (0.89) (0.81) 
GDPVOL -0.254 -0.133 -0.145 -0.073 -0.288 -0.202 
 (-1.22) (-0.60) (-0.66) (-0.33) (-1.37) (-0.87) 
OPEN 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (3.61) (3.88) (3.68) (3.52) (3.75) (3.40) 
GOVSIZE -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.069*** -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.071*** 
 (-5.5) (-5.48) (-4.94) (-4.91) (-5.63) (-5.12) 
F  21.72*** 21.45*** 17.42*** 21.31*** 21.66*** 19.94*** 
R
2
 0.189 0.19 0.161 0.189 0.19 0.181 
No. of Obs. 565 554 552 557 562 548 
Note: (1) P
 
is the procyclicality indicator, GDPVOL is output volatility, OPEN is trade openness, and GOVSIZE 
is government size.   
(2) Regression methods are reweighted least squares (RWLS) estimation.  
(3) t-statistics are in parentheses.   *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database No.86, Penn World Tables 6.3, and Barro and Lee dataset (2000).  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The main purposes of this thesis are to examine the determinants of fiscal 
procyclicality and sustainability with special reference to the role of fiscal rules and 
to explore the effect of both fiscal procyclicality and sustainability on economic 
growth.  The main conclusion of this thesis could be summarized as follows.   
First, we find that a large number of OECD countries seem to operate their 
fiscal policy in a procyclical way from the viewpoint of some spending categories, as 
can be seen from chapter 2.  More specially, government consumption and 
investment appear to be procyclical while current transfers appear to be 
countercyclical in a large number of OECD countries.  This could be explained by 
the characteristics of spending categories.  Government consumption and investment 
are the main spending categories which policymakers can control discretionarily 
while current transfers are not easy to be adjusted by governments since they are 
functioned as automatic stabilizers.  Also, we confirm that some factors which are 
commonly introduced in the existing literature play a certain role in determining the 
level of fiscal procyclicality.  The level of development and the government debt 
ratio have a negative effect on fiscal procyclicality. 
Second, we show that most OECD countries seem to operate their fiscal policy 
in a sustainable way while some countries appear to suffer from unsustainable fiscal 
finances such as Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, and Slovakia, as can be seen from 
chapter 3.  We find that a number of factors play an important role in determining 
fiscal sustainability.  The growth rate has a positive effect on fiscal sustainability 
while aging populations have a negative effect.  Our empirical findings also suggest 
that advanced countries are more likely to maintain sustainable fiscal finances and 
that fiscal rules with enforceability, such as the SGP rules, could improve the 
sustainability of fiscal finances.   
Third, we show that a countercyclical fiscal policy could help enhancing 
economic growth while fiscal sustainability does not play any role in economic 
growth, as can be shown in chapter 4.  Our empirical findings also suggest that the 
composition of government spending plays a key role in its effects on economic 
growth.  More specifically, procyclical current expenditure, especially government 
consumption and current transfers, which are assumed to be unproductive, plays a 
role in reducing economic growth while procyclical government investment, which 
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is considered to be productive, does not hinder economic growth, and it could even 
have a positive effect on the future economic growth since the accumulation of 
capital stock by government investment could have favourable effects on the future 
economic performances.  This negative effect of procyclical government spending 
on economic growth appears to be more prominent in emerging market countries 
than in advanced countries.  We also find that fiscal sustainability does not seem to 
play any role in economic growth in tranquil times, even though the deterioration of 
fiscal finances could lead to sudden economic crisis by endangering the default of 
government debt.   
Finally, the introduction of fiscal rules not only help achieve both 
countercyclical and sustainable fiscal policy as can be seen from chapter 2 and 3, but 
also boost economic growth indirectly as can be seen from chapter 4.  Fiscal rules 
were originally introduced to improve fiscal sustainability, but they also could help 
governments operate fiscal policy in a more countercyclical way.  With regard to the 
effect of fiscal rules on fiscal sustainability, fiscal rules are effective only when they 
are accompanied by enforceability because most fiscal rules are designed in a way 
that has an effect on fiscal sustainability directly such as a budget balance rule or 
debt ceiling.  We provide the empirical evidence in chapter 3 that the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) rules appear to have helped for policymakers maintain a 
sustainable fiscal policy in EMU countries, although other fiscal rules do not seem to 
have any role in maintaining fiscal sustainability in OECD countries due to lack of 
enforceability when they are violated.  With regard to the effect of fiscal rules on 
fiscal cyclicality, multi-year fiscal rules tend to stimulate a countercyclical fiscal 
policy more efficiently than annual fiscal rules because they allow the long-term 
perspective on fiscal policy making.  The introduction of multi-year fiscal rules 
could reduce the level of procyclicality or make fiscal policy more countercyclical, 
while the effect of anual fiscal rules is not as clear as multi-year fiscal rules as can be 
see from chapter 2.  These results could imply that fiscal rules could help boost 
economic growth indirectly by stimulating countercyclical fiscal policy if one 
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considers the results of chapter 4 that countercyclical fiscal policy could enhance 
economic growth152.  
This thesis deals with several new issues on fiscal procyclicality and 
sustainability for the first time.  We explore the role of the time coverage of fiscal 
rules in determining fiscal procyclicality and assess the effect of fiscal procyclicality 
on economic growth across spending categories and county groups.  We also attempt 
to answer the determinants of fiscal sustainability and the effect of fiscal 
sustainability on economic growth.  The main contributions of this thesis are that our 
analyses not only confirm the results of recent literature on fiscal cyclicality that the 
fiscal policy of advanced countries have also been procyclical at times and 
procyclical fiscal policy could hinder economic growth, but also suggest several 
novel and interesting implications.  First, we find a new important determinant of 
fiscal procyclicality by showing that fiscal rules could play a different role in 
determining fiscal procyclicality depending on their time coverage.  We show that 
multi-year fiscal rules could contribute more towards mitigating the level of fiscal 
procyclicality than annual fiscal rules.  This result implies that the existing studies 
about the role of the SGP rules on fiscal cyclicality could be misleading since they 
do not differentiate the effect of the SGP rules, which are annual rules, and their own 
national fuscal rules which take generally the form of multi-year rules.  Second, we 
provide the main determinant of fiscal sustainability, which has been ignored in the 
existing literature, and the structure of fiscal rules to improve fiscal sustainability 
that fiscal rules should be designed in a way that has enforceability.  Third, our 
analyses provide the empirical findings that the effect of procyclical fiscal policy on 
economic growth is different depending on spending categories and country groups.  
These findings suggest that fiscal authorities should control the increasing pressure 
on government consumption and current transfers in booms, and that fiscal 
authorities in emerging market countries should be more cautious to operate their 
fiscal policies in a countercylcial way to avoid an unfavourable effect of procyclical 
fiscal policy.  Finally, our finidings also suggest that unsustainable fiscal finances do 
not hinder economic growth in tranquil times, even though they could lead to sudden 
economic crisis by endangering the default of government debt.   
                                                 
152. Badinger (2012) suggests another path through which fiscal rules affect economic growth.  The 
author argues that fiscal rules which are designed to limit discretionary fiscal policy could enhance 
economic growth by reducing output volatility.     
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It could be concluded from these findings that governments should operate 
fiscal policy in a countercyclical and sustainable way to ensure sustained economic 
growth without endangering sudden economic crisis.  The policymakers, therefore, 
should operate fiscal policy both from the short-term and long-term perspective to 
achieve both a countercyclical and sustainable fiscal policy.  A successful fiscal 
policy could provide governments with a more strengthened ability on 
macroeconomic stabilization and more efficient debt management, and it in turn 
results in sustained economic growth.    
One of the most effective solutions could be well-designed fiscal rules which 
could help achieve both a countercyclical and sustainable fiscal policy (Schick, 
2003).  Our empirical findings suggest that fiscal rules should be designed in a way 
that is multi-year covered and is enforced to enhance fiscal countercyclicality and 
sustainability153.  Another solution about fiscal policy is that countercyclical fiscal 
stimulus measures should be accompanied by appropriate exit strategies to avoid the 
deterioration of fiscal sustainability (Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller, 2010).  
Various kinds of budget system innovations could also be used as possible solutions 
to improve fiscal countercyclicality and sustainability.  Independent fiscal policy 
committees similar to independent central banks (for example, Swedish Fiscal Policy 
Council) or fiscal watchdog (for example, the UK Office for Budget Responsibility) 
could prevent unsustainable fiscal finances and mitigate the level of fiscal 
procyclicality by checks and balances (Wyplosz, 2012; Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 
2011; Fatás, 2010; Bi and Leeper, 2010; Debrun and Kumar, 2008; Coeure and 
Pisani-Ferry, 2005; Wyplosz, 2005; Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen, 1996).  
Rainy day funds (Fernández-Arias and Montiel, 2011; Hou, 2006) and mid-term 
budget reviews could be helpful to operate fiscal policy in a more countercyclical 
way helping maintain fiscal sustainability.  Raising the ratio of automatic stabilizers 
(Carmignani, 2010; Eskesen, 2009), enhancing the government’s ability to forecast 
economic variables (Carmignani, 2010; He, 2003), and reducing implementation 
time lags might also be solutions for successful fiscal policy.   
                                                 
153. Much literature on the role of the SGP rules argues that the augmented fiscal rules could help 
both maintain fiscal sustainability and improve countercyclicality of fiscal policy (Menguy, 2008; 
Buiter, 2004; Buiter and Grafe, 2004).     
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However, our analyses have several limitations.  First, the analysis period in 
this thesis is 1970-2008, thus it cannot reflect the effect of recent crisis on fiscal 
procyclicality and sustainability.  Second, this thesis mainly makes use of the data of 
OECD countries, even though we analyse a more comprehensive dataset from 53 
IMF countries when we explore the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic 
growth.  Fiscal data seems to have low reliability, especially in emerging market 
countries.  This could be not only because the measurement of some fiscal variables 
such as government debt is difficult, but also because the budget systems of each 
country are different according to the development of fiscal democracy of each 
country.   
Therefore, there are several interesting issues to develop our analyses further.  
First, there is a need to assess the effect of the recent economic crisis even though 
fiscal sustainabiliy is a relatively long-term issue154 .  It would be interesting to 
examine how the recent crisis affects the fiscal procyclicality and sustainability and 
whether our results are robust in this regard155 .  The experience of the current 
economic crisis shows that countercyclical fiscal packages lead to the deterioration 
of fiscal sustainability in some countries, and they in turn result in further economic 
crisis.  Therefore, one can conjecture from this experience that the positive effect of 
countercyclical fiscal policy on economic growth will last during only short period 
of time, as argued in chapter 4.  One can also conjecture that unsustainable fiscal 
finances could have a negative effect on the long-term economic growth by 
triggering other crises such as the default of government debt, which is not 
sufficiently dealt with in our analysis.  Second, this thesis shows that multi-year 
fiscal rules could be more effective to mitigate the level of fiscal procyclicality by 
analysing the data of OECD countries.  Thus, there is a need to confirm this result by 
extending the sample to emerging market countries.  Fiscal rules are a kind of fiscal 
institutions (Fatás, 2010), so they could be closely related to the quality of 
institutions that are commonly employed as the determinant of economic growth in 
                                                 
154. For example, the ratio of the breaches of the SGP rules was 25.4% (45 out of 177 possible cases) 
for the period 1999-2007, but it rocketed up to 76.5% (62 out of 81 possible cases) for the period 
2008-2010 (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011).  Misra and Khundrakpam (2010) also show that the 
fiscal sustainability of India deteriorated rapidly during 2008-2009 by analysing the correlation of 
government spending and revenue.     
155. For example, European Commission (2011) shows that the SGP rules do not play any role on 
ensuring sound fiscal finances during the recent crisis, which is not consistent with the result of 
chapter 3 that the SGP rules could help maintain sustainable fiscal finances in EMU countries.      
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the literature.  Therefore, it would be interesting to explore whether the negative 
effect of multi-year fiscal rules on fiscal procyclicality also applies to emerging 
market countries where the quality of institutions may not be particularly high.  
Third, this thesis confirms that the effect of fiscal procyclicality on economic growth 
is prominent in emerging market countries than in advanced countries.  It would also 
be interesting to explore whether the effect of fiscal sustainability on economic 
growth also varies across country groups by extending sample into emerging market 
countries.  
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